

DECONSTRUCTIVISM AND DECONSTRUCTION: A CRITICAL RE-  
EVALUATION OF DERRIDA THROUGH HEIDEGGER WITH REGARD TO  
ARCHITECTURE

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## ABSTRACT

### DECONSTRUCTIVISM AND DECONSTRUCTION: A CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION OF DERRIDA THROUGH HEIDEGGER WITH REGARD TO ARCHITECTURE

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Deconstructivism in architecture flourished in the 80s after influence of Derrida's deconstruction in architecture. Displacement, fragmentation, and disorder are among those attributions of deconstructivism that resulted in exaggerated visual appearance to enhance the spatial experience to address the problem of indifference. Criticized as meaningless, un-functional, and anti-historical, deconstructivism is linked to nihilism and relativism. Reviewing major deconstructivist architects (including Libeskind, Gehry, Hadid, Koolhaas, Himmelb(l)au, Eisenman, and Tschumi) suggest a possible missed link between deconstruction and deconstructivism.

While main evaluation of deconstructivism is based on some deconstruction's keywords (like *differance*, trace, supplement, absence), this study aims to transcend this literally connected relationship in searching for deeper ontological and epistemological analysis of deconstruction together with conceptual sources of these thoughts to be argued for understanding the relationship between architecture, deconstruction and deconstructivism – as a necessity for progressive architectural criticism. Therefore, this thesis steps further of Derrida's keywords into the main opposition against metaphysics of presence that has governed architecture since Plato which can be observed within part-whole relationship or influence of subjectivism and objectivism in architecture.

Opposed to metaphysical thinking, Heidegger's philosophy about Being and authentic Dasein is examined and interpreted through which a *triplet strategy* emerges based on recognition of Being as the abyss and foundationless foundation that can be confirmed within Caputo's radical hermeneutics and Derrida's strategy of deconstruction. Hence, the *triplet strategy* becomes the possible missed link between deconstructivism and deconstruction through which problematics of deconstructivism can be addressed and could bring an envision to architectural interpretation and criticism.

**KEYWORDS:** Deconstructivism, Deconstruction, Metaphysics of Presence, Being, Authentic Dasein.

## ÖZ

### **YAPISÖKÜMCÜLÜK VE YAPIBOZUM: DERRIDA'NIN HEIDEGGER ÜZERİNDEN YAPIBOZUMCULUK YORUMU ARACIĞI İLE MİMARLIKTAKİ TUTUMLARIN ELEŞTİREL YENİDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ**

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Mimarlıkta yapışökümcülük, Derrida'nın mimarideki yapıbozumculuğunun etkisinden sonra 80'lerde gelişti. Yer deęiştirme, parçalanma ve düzensizlik, kayıtsızlık sorununu çözmek için mekansal deneyimi geliştirmek amacıyla abartılı görsel görünümle sonuçlanan yapışökümcülüğün nitelikleri arasındadır. Anlamsız, işlevsiz ve tarih karşıtı olmakla eleştirilen yapışökümcülük, nihilizm ve rölativizme bağlantılıdır. Önemli yapışökümcü mimarların (Libeskind, Gehry, Hadid, Koolhaas, Himmelb(1)au, Eisenman ve Tschumi dahil) incelenmesi, yapıbozum ile yapışökümcülük arasında muhtemel bir gözden kaçırılmış bağlantı olduğundan bahsetmek mümkündür.

Mimarlıktaki yapışökümcülüğün temel deęerlendirilmesi, yapıbozuculuğun bazı anahtar kelimelerine (*difference, iz, eklenti, yokluk* gibi) dayalı olurken, bu çalışma yapıbozumun daha derin ontolojik ve epistemolojik analizini ve bu düşüncelerin kavramsal kökenlerini araştırarak, yapıbozum ve yapışökümcülüğün aralarındaki ilişkiyi anlamak için, bu yüzeysel bağlantılı ilişkiyi aşmayı hedeflerken, amaçlanan bu derin analizin mimarlık eleştirisi için de kaçınmaz bir gereklilik olduğunu savunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, Derrida'nın anahtar sözcüklerini daha ileriye taşıyarak, Platon'dan bu yana mimariye yön veren, parça-bütün ilişkisi içinde veya mimaride öznelcilik ve nesneciliğin etkisinde görülebilen, ana karşıtlık olan mevcudiyet metafiziğe karşı adım atmaktadır.

Bu tezde, metafiziksel düşünceye karşı Heidegger'ın *Varlık ve otantik Dasein* felsefesi incelenirken ve yorumlanırken, Caputo'nun radikal hermeneutiğe ve Derrida'nın yapıbozu stratejisi içinde doğrulanabilen, Varlığın uçurum ve *temelsiz temel* olarak tanınmasına dayanan *üçlü strateji* öne sürülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, *üçlü strateji*, yapısökümcülük ile yapıbozum arasındaki gözden kaçırılmış olabilen bağlantı haline geliyor; bu bağlantı aracılığıyla mimarideki yapısökümcülüğün sorunsalları ele alınabilir ve mimari yorum ve eleştiriye alternatif bir bakış açısı getirebilmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Yapısökümcülük, Yapıbozum, Mevcudiyet Metafiziği, Otantik Dasein.



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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	v
ÖZ .....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	x
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xiii
CHAPTERS	
1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1 Problem Definition .....	5
1.2 Purpose of Study and Research Questions .....	6
1.3 Significance of the Study .....	7
1.4 Methodology of the Thesis .....	9
1.5 Structure and Boundaries of the Dissertation .....	10
2 DECONSTRUCTIVE ARCHITECTURE: INTERVENTION OF DECONSTRUCTION INTO ARCHITECTURE .....	15
2.1 Deconstructive architects .....	20
2.1.1 Daniel Libeskind: Spatial experience of symbolic meanings .....	20
2.1.2 Frank Gehry: Spontaneous playfulness of forms .....	23
2.1.3 Zaha Hadid: Reforming the environment through architecture .....	26
2.1.4 Rem Koolhaas: Theory of Bigness .....	29
2.1.5 Coop Himmelb(l)au: The moment of destruction .....	32
2.1.6 Peter Eisenman: Presence of absence .....	36
2.1.7 Bernard Tschumi: Irreducible individuality of experience .....	43
2.2 Deconstruction: An opposition to philosophical and metaphysical truth-claiming .....	49
2.2.1 Deconstruction against unified meaning of text .....	49
2.2.2 Deconstruction in architectural literature: Concentration on Derrida's terminology .....	51
2.2.3 Deconstruction in tackling with metaphysical concepts .....	54
2.2.4 Major concepts of deconstruction .....	55
2.3 Deconstructivism in Architecture and its Transition from Deconstruction .....	57

2.3.1 Major concepts of deconstructivism .....	59
2.4 Relation of Eisenman and Tschumi with Deconstruction .....	62
2.5 Problems and Gaps of Deconstructivism within Architectural Literature.....	69
<b>3 METAPHYSICS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ARCHITECTURE .....</b>	<b>75</b>
3.1 Metaphysics of Presence .....	75
3.2 Metaphysical Thinking within Architecture .....	79
3.2.1 Part-Whole Relationship in Architecture .....	80
3.2.2 The Relation of Objectivism and Subjectivism with Architecture .....	87
3.2.2.1 Objectivism and Subjectivism .....	87
3.2.2.2 Objectivism and Subjectivism in Architecture .....	91
<b>4 INTERPRETING DERRIDA THROUGH HEIDEGGER .....</b>	<b>99</b>
4.1 Heidegger Against Metaphysical Detachment, and Toward Unity.....	100
4.1.1 Question of Being .....	100
4.1.2 Dasein .....	104
4.1.3 Dasein as Disclosedness .....	106
4.1.4 Against Subject-Object Detachment or Metaphysical Realism and Idealism .	109
4.1.5 Existence of Beings as Unity of Dasein with Being: Being-in-the-World .....	110
4.1.6 Existence of Dasein as Unity of Dasein with Being in Early Heidegger: Authentic Dasein .....	111
4.1.7 Existence of Dasein as Unity of Dasein with Being in Later Heidegger: Living Without Why .....	116
4.1.8 Belongingness of Dasein to Being, and its Unity with Being as the Real Existence .....	119
4.1.9 Heidegger's Philosophy in a Nutshell .....	120
4.2 Interpreting Heidegger: The Triplet Strategy .....	122
4.3 Heidegger's Philosophy in Relation to Derrida's Deconstruction through Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics .....	126
4.4 The Triplet Strategy within Derrida's Deconstruction .....	132
<b>5 RE-EVALUATION OF DECONSTRUCTIVISM IN ARCHITECTURE THROUGH THE TRIPLET STRATEGY .....</b>	<b>143</b>
5.1 The Possible Embodiment of the Triplet Strategy within Architecture .....	143
5.2 The Triplet Strategy in Addressing the Problems .....	148
5.2.1 The Triplet Strategy as a Deeper Interpretation of Deconstruction .....	148
5.2.2 The Triplet Strategy as a Possible Missed Link of Deconstructivism and as Anchorage for Differentiation of the Deconstructivist Architects .....	148

5.2.3 The Triplet Strategy in Relation to Meaninglessness .....	159
5.2.4 The Triplet Strategy in Relation to Subjectivism and Relativism .....	160
5.2.5 The Triplet Strategy in Relation to Indifference and Disengagement .....	161
6 CONCLUSION .....	163
REFERENCES .....	179
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	185
CURRICULUM VITAE .....	199

## LIST OF FIGURES

### FIGURES

Figure 1. Deconstructivism, from deconstruction to its criticism (Source: drawn by author) .....	4
Figure 2. Structure and abstract of chapters (Source: drawn by author).....	13
Figure 3. Characteristic features of deconstructivist architects in interpreting deconstruction (Source: drawn by author).....	18
Figure 4. Jewish Museum Berlin, Germany, 1999, Daniel Libeskind (Source: <a href="https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/daniel-libeskind-architecture">https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/daniel-libeskind-architecture</a> ) .....	21
Figure 5. Jewish Museum San Francisco, USA, 2008, Daniel Libeskind. (Source: <a href="https://live.staticflickr.com/3129/2851126338_ba5f0f669a_b.jpg">https://live.staticflickr.com/3129/2851126338_ba5f0f669a_b.jpg</a> ) .....	22
Figure 6. Vila Olimpica Barcelona, Spain, 1992, Frank Gehry. (Source: <a href="https://www.barcelonaturisme.com/wv3/en/page/1232/peix-fish-frank-gehry.html">https://www.barcelonaturisme.com/wv3/en/page/1232/peix-fish-frank-gehry.html</a> ) .....	23
Figure 7. Guggenheim Museum, Bilbao, 1997, Frank Gehry. (Source: <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/frank-gehry-portfolio-buildings-gallery-4065251">https://www.thoughtco.com/frank-gehry-portfolio-buildings-gallery-4065251</a> ) .....	24
Figure 8. Disney Concert Hall, Los Angeles, 2003, Frank Gehry. (Source: <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/frank-gehry-portfolio-buildings-gallery-4065251">https://www.thoughtco.com/frank-gehry-portfolio-buildings-gallery-4065251</a> ) .....	25
Figure 9. Vitra Fire Station, Germany, 1993, Zaha Hadid. (Source: <a href="https://cl.staticflickr.com/3/2041/2222675997_03032f0e59_b.jpg">https://cl.staticflickr.com/3/2041/2222675997_03032f0e59_b.jpg</a> ) .....	26
Figure 10. Heydar Aliiev Center, Baku, 2012, Zaha Hadid. (Source: <a href="https://www.bayut.com/mybayut/modern-architecture-spotlight-zaha-hadid-architect/">https://www.bayut.com/mybayut/modern-architecture-spotlight-zaha-hadid-architect/</a> ) .....	27
Figure 11. Beko building, Belgrade, 2012, Zaha Hadid. (Source: <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/zaha-hadid-architecture-2013-7?op=1#in-late2012-hadid-unveiled-plans-for-the-zany-beko-building-in-downtown-belgrade-its-slated-to-be-a-city-center-with-residential-retail-and-commercial-space-11">https://www.businessinsider.com/zaha-hadid-architecture-2013-7?op=1#in-late2012-hadid-unveiled-plans-for-the-zany-beko-building-in-downtown-belgrade-its-slated-to-be-a-city-center-with-residential-retail-and-commercial-space-11</a> ) .....	28
Figure 12. Exodos or Voluntary Prisoners of Architecture, London, 1972, Rem Koolhaas. (Source: <a href="https://humanscribbles.blogspot.com/2014/04/voluntaryprisoners-of-architecture.html">https://humanscribbles.blogspot.com/2014/04/voluntaryprisoners-of-architecture.html</a> ) .....	29

Figure 13. CCTV Headquarters, Beijing, China, 2012, Rem Koolhaas. (Source: <a href="https://timberplan.es/las-mejores-obras-del-arquitecto-rem-koolhaas/">https://timberplan.es/las-mejores-obras-del-arquitecto-rem-koolhaas/</a> ) .....	30
Figure 14. Seattle Public Library, Seattle, 2004, Rem Koolhaas. (Source: <a href="https://ohiostate.pressbooks.pub/exploringarchitectureandlandscape/chapter/seattle-public-library/">https://ohiostate.pressbooks.pub/exploringarchitectureandlandscape/chapter/seattle-public-library/</a> ) .....	31
Figure 15. Groninger Museum, Groningen, Netherlands, 1993-1994, Coop Himmelb(l)au. (Source: <a href="https://www.marchantasianart.com/museum/groninger-museum/">https://www.marchantasianart.com/museum/groninger-museum/</a> ) .....	33
Figure 16. Musee des Confluences, Lyon, France, 2014, Coop Himmelb(l)au. (Source: <a href="https://www.archdaily.com/606061/coop-himmelb-l-au-s-musee-des-confluences-through-the-lens-of-edmund-sumner/54f8976fe58ece08b4000287-cop-lyo-0026-jpg">https://www.archdaily.com/606061/coop-himmelb-l-au-s-musee-des-confluences-through-the-lens-of-edmund-sumner/54f8976fe58ece08b4000287-cop-lyo-0026-jpg</a> ) .....	34
Figure 17. Pavilion 21 MINI Opera Space, Munich, Germany, 2008-2010, Coop Himmelb(l)au. (Source: <a href="http://www.marcusbuck.com/opera21_en.php#">http://www.marcusbuck.com/opera21_en.php#</a> ) .....	35
Figure 18. House III, Lakeville, Connecticut, 1969-1971, Peter Eisenman (Source: <a href="https://eisenmanarchitects.com/House-III-1971">https://eisenmanarchitects.com/House-III-1971</a> ) .....	36
Figure 19. House VI, Cornwall, Connecticut, 1972-1975, Peter Eisenman (Source: <a href="https://eisenmanarchitects.com/House-VI-1975">https://eisenmanarchitects.com/House-VI-1975</a> ) .....	37
Figure 20. Wexner Center, Columbus, Ohio, 1983-1989, Peter Eisenman. (source: <a href="https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Wexner-Center-for-the-Visual-Arts-and-Fine-Arts-Library-1989">https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Wexner-Center-for-the-Visual-Arts-and-Fine-Arts-Library-1989</a> ) .....	38
Figure 21. Nunotani Office Building, Tokyo, Japan, 1990-1992, Peter Eisenman. (source: <a href="https://freight.cargo.site/w/700/q/75/i/f70167ab48cd7c031a0ef1ce5ca1a4c17d961bd61de73a74561b8cc5a430b3db/23_NUNOTANI_IMAGE2.jpg">https://freight.cargo.site/w/700/q/75/i/f70167ab48cd7c031a0ef1ce5ca1a4c17d961bd61de73a74561b8cc5a430b3db/23_NUNOTANI_IMAGE2.jpg</a> ) .....	39
Figure 22. Berlin Memorial, Berlin, Germany, 2003-2005, Peter Eisenman (source: <a href="https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Berlin-Memorial-to-the-Murdered-Jews-of-Europe-2005">https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Berlin-Memorial-to-the-Murdered-Jews-of-Europe-2005</a> ) .....	40
Figure 23. City of Culture of Galicia, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 1999-2011, Peter Eisenman. (source: <a href="https://eisenmanarchitects.com/City-of-Culture-of-Galicia-2011">https://eisenmanarchitects.com/City-of-Culture-of-Galicia-2011</a> ) .....	41

Figure 24. Parc de la Villette, 1982-1998, Paris, Bernard Tschumi. (Source: <a href="https://www.tschumi.com/projects/3">https://www.tschumi.com/projects/3</a> ) .....	43
Figure 25. Parc de la Villette, 1976-1981, Bernard Tschumi. (Source: <a href="https://tecne.com/biblioteca/manhattan-transcripts/">https://tecne.com/biblioteca/manhattan-transcripts/</a> ) .....	45
Figure 26. Acropolis Museum, Athens, 2001-2009, Bernard Tschumi. (Source: <a href="https://www.tschumi.com/projects/2">https://www.tschumi.com/projects/2</a> ) .....	46
Figure 27. Alesia Museum and Archaeological park, Alesia, 2003-2012, Bernard Tschumi. (Source: <a href="https://www.tschumi.com/projects/8">https://www.tschumi.com/projects/8</a> ) .....	47
Figure 28. Bilogoy-Pharmacy-Chemistry Center, Paris-Saclay, 2015-2022, Bernard Tschumi. (Source: <a href="https://www.tschumi.com/projects/71">https://www.tschumi.com/projects/71</a> ) .....	48
Figure 29. Transition from metaphysical concepts to the concepts of deconstructivism (Source: drawn by author) .....	52
Figure 30. Derrida’s interpretation of architecture, Eisenman, and Tschumi (Source: drawn by author) .....	64
Figure 31. Influence of metaphysics on architecture (Source: drawn by author) .....	81
Figure 32. Vitruvian Man, an illustration about importance of human proportion and geometry in Vitruvius’s writings. (Source: <a href="https://checkpointech.com/quality-vitruvius-and-leonardo-da-vinci/">https://checkpointech.com/quality-vitruvius-and-leonardo-da-vinci/</a> ) .....	82
Figure 33. Laguier’s primitive hut, 18s Century, an illustration to argue originality of architecture. (Source: <a href="https://www.archdaily.com/1005956/what-primitive-huts-teach-us-about-architecture/64e88249fbc6580ae16751a9-what-primitive-huts-teach-us-about-architecture-image">https://www.archdaily.com/1005956/what-primitive-huts-teach-us-about-architecture/64e88249fbc6580ae16751a9-what-primitive-huts-teach-us-about-architecture-image</a> ) .....	83
Figure 34. Heidegger’s question of Being and Dasein against metaphysics (Source: drawn by author) .....	101
Figure 35. Heidegger’s question of Authentic Dasein (Source: drawn by author) ..	103
Figure 36. The interpretive Triplet Strategy derived out of Heidegger’s philosophy (Source: drawn by author) .....	124
Figure 37. Caputo’s Radical Hermeneutics as intermediary space between Heidegger and Derrida (Source: drawn by author) .....	129
Figure 38. Confirmation of the Triplet Strategy within Derrida’s strategy of deconstruction (Source: drawn by author) .....	139

Figure 39. Possible embodiment of the Triplet Strategy within architecture (Source: drawn by author) ..... 146

Figure 40. Bundeswehr Military History Museum, Dresden, Germany, 2011, Daniel Libeskind (Sources: <https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/daniel-libeskind-architecture>, <https://holzerkobler.com/project/military-history-museum>) ..... 149

Figure 41. Hotel Marques de Riscal, Elciego, Spain, 2006, Frank Gehry (Source: [https://www.bernardsmith.name/hotels\\_and\\_restaurants\\_spain/hotel\\_marques\\_de\\_riscal/](https://www.bernardsmith.name/hotels_and_restaurants_spain/hotel_marques_de_riscal/)) ..... 150

Figure 42. One North Masterplan, Singapore, 2001, Zaha Hadid. (Source: Lebbeus Woods, “Drawn into Space: Zaha Hadid,” *Architectural Design* 78, no. 4 (2008)) . .....151

Figure 43. National Museum of XXI Century Arts, Rome, 1998-2008, Zaha Hadid. (Source: Lebbeus Woods, “Drawn into Space: Zaha Hadid,” *Architectural Design* 78, no. 4 (2008)) ..... 151

Figure 44. Dee and Charles Wyly Theatre, Dallas, Texas, 2004-2009, Rem Koolhaas, OMA, REX. (Sources: <https://www.azahner.com/works/wyly-theater>, <https://arquitecturaviva.com/works/teatro-dee-y-charles-wyly-4>) ..... 152

Figure 45. Dalian International Conference Center, Dalian, China, 2012, Coop Himmelb(l)au, (Source: [https://www.archdaily.com/405787/dalian-international-conference-center-coop-himmelb-lau?ad\\_medium=office\\_landing&ad\\_name=article](https://www.archdaily.com/405787/dalian-international-conference-center-coop-himmelb-lau?ad_medium=office_landing&ad_name=article)) ..... 153

Figure 46. Taichung City Cultural Center, Taichung, Taiwan, 2013, Eisenman Architects, (Source: <https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Taichung-City-Cultural-Center-2013>) ..... 155

Figure 47. Opera House, Dubai, 2005, Bernard Tschumi Architects, (Source: <https://www.tschumi.com/projects/37>) ..... 156



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Derrida developed the philosophical strategy of deconstruction in the 70s opposed to traditional metaphysics of presence with its philosophical stand on fixed meaning, authority, and intention of author as the signified. Aida Hoteit says: “Deconstruction attempts to dismantle Western metaphysics, which is based on fixed and unsurpassable convictions.”<sup>1</sup> Through the texts of Christopher Norris<sup>2</sup> and Jonathan D. Culler<sup>3</sup>, it is to be realized that one main argument of deconstruction was against the traditional axiomatic by emphasizing on multidimensionality of text and subjectivity of writings to be interpreted by readers, different from author’s intention that makes any totality of meanings impossible. In other words, deconstruction with its openness to heterogeneity and multidimensionality resists any philosophical truth-claiming. For Derrida, as every text has potential meanings for individuals, any signification of truth/meaning-claiming of the author would be eventually de-signified.

In the 80s, deconstruction developed alongside of postmodernism as a reaction against modernism’s constraints of pure forms and totality.<sup>4</sup> Also, according to Andrew Benjamin<sup>5</sup>, in the decade, deconstruction followed by raised discussions about autonomy of architecture that needs to be devoid of symbolic meanings, and more concentrated on visual appearance. The raised discussion prescribed spatial experience for architecture that led to contextualism and continuity of architecture in its history that eventually ended with heightened exterior appearance with the sacrifice of

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<sup>1</sup> . Aida Hoteit. “DECONSTRUCTIVISM: Translation From Philosophy to Architecture.” *Canadian Social Science* 11. No. 7, (2015): 118.

<sup>2</sup> . Christopher Norris. 2002. *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.

<sup>3</sup> . Jonathan D. Culler. 1983. *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*. New York: Cornell University Press.

<sup>4</sup> . Ibid, 122.

<sup>5</sup> . Andrew Benjamin. 2007. “Passing Through Deconstruction: Architecture and the project of autonomy.” In *Critical Architecture*, edited by Jane Rendell, and Jonathan Hill, and Murray Fraser, and Mark Dorrian, 40-48. New York: Routledge.

function and programme. Deconstruction encountered with architecture for its philosophic prescriptions; it came to reject visual presence, contextuality, and continuity in architecture affected by traditional metaphysics.

It was first through the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in 1988, organized by Philip Johnson and Mark Wigley, works of Peter Eisenman, Daniel Libeskind, Frank Gehry, Zaha Hadid, Reem Kolhas, Coop Himmelbue, Bernard Tschumi and others classified as deconstructive architecture.<sup>6</sup> Majority of the works of these architects can be observed in exaggerated manipulation of appearance and structure over the function of the buildings. For instance, Gehry's sculptural expression and collaged massive assemblage, Koolhaas's typological combination and strange form patterns, Hadid's de-centralized and waved forms, Libeskind's jugged style with sharpened forms are among those who cherished deformation of appearance and structure over function. These architects will be discussed later.

However, there is no clear criteria for categorizing specific building as deconstructivism<sup>7</sup>, de-centralization, displacement, instability, lack of visual logic, fragmentation, disorder, broken bond between form and function, meaninglessness, discontinuity form history, paradox, incomprehensible and incomparable assemblage of forms, and (presence of) absence can be considered as key elements of deconstructivism; all in favor of exaggerated visual appearance and structure to produce spatial experience different and opposed to philosophical prescription of contextualization, continuity, and visual presence. Noor Cholis gives an overview about deconstructive buildings:

Deconstruction form or building is characterized by ideas of fragmentation and interest in manipulating ideas of a structure's surface or skin. It utilizes non-rectilinear shapes which serve to distort and dislocate some of the elements of architecture, such as structure and envelope. The finished visual appearance of buildings is characterized an encouraging unpredictability and a controlled disorder.

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<sup>6</sup> . Hoteit. "DECONSTRUCTIVISM," 122.

<sup>7</sup> . Ibid, 122.

A deconstructive architect is not one who pulls to pieces of buildings, but one who locates the essential dilemma within buildings. The challenge in deconstructivism is to move architecture away from what its seen as the 'rules' of modernism such as "form follows function," "purity of form," and "truth to materials". For deconstructivists, the formal/classical/conventional geometry was the aspect to be denied, just like ornament was for post-modernists. Instead, the complication of geometry applied to the functional, structural, and special aspects of deconstruction buildings.<sup>8</sup>

However, most of deconstructive architect followed the general interest upon dislocation of fundamental elements of architecture in structure and appearance with less care about function, there were two major architects who were close to Derrida: Bernard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman. Tschumi was in favor of constitution of new and revolutionary meanings through interaction of people and their ideas against fixed institutionalization of architecture. The main point in his works (like Parc Le Villette and The Manhattan Transcripts) revolves around irreducible individuality of experience that forms novel meanings and experience through the subjective interpretation of the individuals and visitors rather than dealing with architecture as a signifier of some already (assumedly) known signified meanings or experience. Eisenman in pursuing the idea of architecture as site of affect, favored programme over aesthetics. Against other deconstructive architects, he displayed a dislocating architecture through a play between tradition and novelty. He used some elements of the tradition in re-presenting the absent part of the tradition; in other words, he transformed the tradition using the same elements of it in different, alienated, and dislocated ways. He presented a novel content upon tradition, which, based on his own subjective judgment, was absent in the tradition.

Today, deconstructive architecture almost abandoned by harsh criticizing – probably, in the favor of reconstruction.<sup>9</sup> Deconstructive architecture is being understood as unfunctional, unreasonable, anti-historical, unsystematic, unstable, quirky, nihilistic, and at the verge of collapse that even couldn't hold on its own terms like dislocation.

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<sup>8</sup> . Noor, Cholis, "Reconstructing Deconstruction in Architecture," *Journal of architecture and Building Environment* 40, no.2 (December 2013): 70.

<sup>9</sup> . Margaret Soltan. 2008. "Deconstruction and architecture." In *Reconstructing Architecture*, edited by Thomas A. Dutton and Lian Hurst Mann, 256. London: University of Minnesota Press.




Figure 1. Deconstructivism, from deconstruction to its criticism  
(Source: drawn by author)

Generally, visual appearance of the most deconstructive architecture indicates non-rectangular forms, “interested in dislocating the fundamental elements of architecture, like structure and appearance”<sup>10</sup>.

### **1.1 Problem Definition**

The main criticism on the problems of deconstructivism circles around its nihilistic-ness. Meaningless forms, unfunctional buildings, or anti-historical architecture eventually would lead to either indifference or chaos. The major works of Tschumi and Eisenman, far from being meaningless, add more to the problem. Although their works are more affiliated with the thought of Derrida, their ideas, in our interpretation, revolve around excessive subjectivity of individuals or excessive subjectivity of the architect. For instance, in the case of Tschumi, an immoderate power is given to individuals in interpreting and constructing multiplicity of other meanings and experience beyond designer’s intention that would open up to Relativism’s chaos or indifference. In the case of Eisenman, there is an excessive subjectivity of the architect in reevaluation and reorganization of the past to provide and present other absent meanings and experiences than the historical ones that would fall back to the traps of Subjectivism. Hence, besides overall association with nihilistic-ness, works of Tschumi intensifies indifference or chaos of Relativism to the problem, and works of Eisenman fetches back subjective meanings of metaphysics. Therefore, major problematics of deconstructivism, we can say, faces two sides: nihilism and relativism – both with inherent indifferent and chaotic outcome. (There also exists the danger of falling back to the fixed meanings of metaphysics.)

Beside all those enumerated complements against deconstructivism that is about its nihilistic-ness, Brockelman acknowledges that featured architects were suddenly thrown to this movement, the movement itself were searching for its own meaning

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<sup>10</sup> . Cristina Criste. 2011. “The Deconstruction of Architecture.” *The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies* 3, no. 5: 33-37.

ever since.<sup>11</sup> He continues that Eisenman does not “anything like justice to the philosophical insight of deconstruction”<sup>12</sup>. Additionally, Benjamin admits that deconstruction in architecture “is not the application of Derrida’s work to architecture”<sup>13</sup>. It seems that most deconstructive projects of architecture since the 80s, are disjointed from the philosophical deconstruction of Derrida. It can be observed from the fact that Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi, as closest architects to Derrida, separated their ways from him because they failed to bring true deconstruction in architecture.<sup>14</sup> According to Dayan, Eisenman’s main struggle was to turn deconstruction from a mode of analysis to the mode of synthesis.<sup>15</sup> Hence, it seems that still there is a room for more appreciation of philosophical deconstruction in architectural practice.

There are less written about how Derrida’s deconstruction is disconnected from deconstructivism, including the works of Tschumi and Eisenman. The problem of this thesis lies here in the gap and lack of research between criticism of deconstructivism and the thought of Derrida in a profound manner. Most of deconstructive architects concentrated on some keywords of Derrida’s deconstruction (like *differance*, paradox, absence, trace, displacement, fragmentation, superimposition, free-floating signifiers, iterability among others) without going further and deeper in overall understanding of deconstruction.

## **1.2 Purpose of study and research questions**

As there are speculations about the disconnection of deconstructivism with deconstruction that might be the probable cause of criticism upon deconstructivism, the problem seems to be the lack of study between deconstructivism and Derrida’s

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<sup>11</sup> . Thomas Brockelman. 1996. “Getting Back Into No Place: On Casey, Deconstruction and the Architecture of Modernity.” Review of *Getting Back into Place*, by Ed Casey. 445. Department of Philosophy, Lemoyne College, Syracuse, NY 13214-1399, U.S.A

<sup>12</sup> . Ibid, 446.

<sup>13</sup> . Andrew Benjamin. 2007. “Passing Through Deconstruction: Architecture and the project of autonomy.” In *Critical Architecture*, edited by Jane Rendell, and Jonathan Hill, and Murray Fraser, and Mark Dorrian, 40-48. New York: Routledge. 44-45.

<sup>14</sup> . Peter Dayan, “Derrida Writing Architectural or Musical Form,” *Paragraph* 26, no.3 (2003): 77-85.

<sup>15</sup> . Ibid, 79.

thought. Furthermore, as the second lack, the major works of deconstructive architects mostly derive from keywords of Derrida's theory about language without a deeper overall analysis. Therefore, in order to fulfill these gaps, the aim of the study is to have deeper interpretation of Derrida's deconstruction beneath the surface of his arguments about language through Heidegger and their main discussions and opposition towards metaphysics to observe if there is a possible missed link between deconstructivism and Derrida's deconstruction.

Hence, there can be generated at least three main questions: First, does main problematics of deconstructivism (related to nihilism and relativism that entails indifference and chaos) spring from Derrida's deconstruction? Secondly, to answer this question, we should see if Derrida's deconstruction is deeply nihilistic or relativistic? Thirdly, if it is not, and if deconstructivism lacks deconstruction in a deeper sense, the question is: In what ways or how deconstructivism lacks Derrida's deconstruction?

### **1.3 Significance of the study**

Deconstruction (alongside of Postmodernism) is one of the key elements in transition of architecture from constraints of Modernism that resulted in the attitude of contemporary architecture against any totalitarian and pure forms. However, deconstructivism consisted problems that decreased its exercise after the 80s, yet it has not completely vanished but lives in current movement of architecture. For instance, Gehry's designed buildings in 2020 (Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, D.C., and Luma Arles in France), Coop Himmelb(l)au's recent buildings (built in 2021, and SCA Arena Sports and Concert Complex in Russia built in 2023), Zaha Hadid Architects' ongoing construction projects like Leeza SOHO in China (2019), or North Souk Department store in Beirut (2021), Libeskind's recent projects like Dancing Tower in China (2022) or his many prospective projects like Supyo in South Korea, Koolhaas's late project of Taipei Performing Arts Center in Taiwan (2022), Eisenman Architects' Montreal Holocaust Museum in 2022, Bernard Tschumi Architects' recent projects like Biology-Pharmacy-Chemistry Center in France (2015-

2022), or the firm's prospective buildings like Center for Science and Entrepreneurship in Rolle (2019-2025) are among those ongoing deconstructive architecture. Also, there are many architects and students of architecture whose projects and ideas are influenced, directly or implicitly, from these deconstructive architects.

Moreover, in architectural literature, there has been escalating discussion about deconstruction. Peter Dayan (2003), Andrew Benjamin (2007), Margaret Soltan (2008), Cristina Criste (2011), Noor Cholis (2013), Aida Hoteit (2015), Francesco Vitale (2018), are among those who are concerned about deconstruction within architecture. The outcome of this thesis may bring new evaluation of deconstruction for prospective architectural practices.

One of the main reasons that the concern of this thesis is about deconstructivism and deconstruction is because of the important critical stance of deconstruction in theory. From one hand, deconstruction in its core departs from metaphysics and metaphysical totality and dogmatism. From other hand, deconstruction and deconstructivism have been linked to nihilism and (in my interpretation, is also associated) to relativism. If deconstruction vindicate itself against meaninglessness and relativism, it would grant deconstruction (and also to the practice of deconstruction in architecture) a grand stand that would be against dogmatism of metaphysics, meaninglessness of nihilism and indifference and chaos of relativism.

Furthermore, the concern of this thesis, somehow, enters into a bigger problematic sphere within architecture: the problem of disengagement with the world. John Hancock<sup>16</sup> relates architecture to the problem of disengagement. For him, interpretation is the way of our being, and he condemns subject-object dichotomy in architecture specifically seeing architecture as detached object that leaves only aesthetic treatment as the solution for us as detached subject. For Hancock, the work of architecture, as it is already a made work of us, is also at work for us reflecting and also constructing us back. He prescribes Gadamer's and Heidegger's hermeneutics for

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<sup>16</sup> . Hancock, John. "The Interpretive Turn: Radical Hermeneutics and the Work of Architecture." *83<sup>RD</sup> ACSA ANNUAL MEETIN. HISTORY/THEORY/CRITICISM*. (1995): 183-188.



architecture, emphasizing upon contextuality, interaction, and temporality. Contextuality refers to our embeddedness to the world, history and tradition; interaction means the dialogue with the past tradition and “openness to the “otherness” of the past work”<sup>17</sup>; and temporality touches on impermanence of totality of past tradition in interaction with our own projection toward future. Additionally, in my point of view, it seems that the problem of disengagement derives from either monotony of totalitarian fixed meanings that excludes any further or radical interaction of human sense-making, or from lack of meaning to include occupants and visitors in generating sense-making, or from overwhelming existence of relative meanings that puts humans on the verge of indifference. All come with the same result of disengagement. One could find that the outcome of this thesis meets the essential inquiries of Hancock’s concern about disengagement in architecture. (This idea will be explained in the following chapters.)

#### **1.4 Methodology of the thesis**

First, there will be a review of deconstructivism and the major deconstructive architects to identify its direction that eventually led to its criticism. Also, there will be an attempt to spot the lacks or gaps of both deconstructivist architects and those discussion in architectural literature in relating deconstructivism (and its criticism) to the thought of Derrida for a possible missed link between deconstructivism and deconstruction.

In between, metaphysics of presence and its influence on architecture will be searched, as opposition toward metaphysics is the main argument of Derrida’s deconstruction.

Then, in order to find out that possible link, there will be a critical reevaluation of Derrida’s thought by a deeper interpretation of deconstruction through Heidegger’s philosophy. Final step would be a comparison of the outcome of our reevaluation to deconstructivism as the possible solution in addressing the criticism on deconstruction and deconstructivism.

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<sup>17</sup> . Ibid, 186.

## 1.5 Structure and boundaries of the dissertation

Chapter 2 will start with general introduction and evaluation of deconstructivism. From one hand, path of deconstructivism from the demand of the 80s (architecture to be site of *affect*) and philosophical prescription (contextualism, continuity, aesthetics) to intervention of deconstruction in architecture will be discussed. From the other, ideas of major deconstructivist architects (including Libeskind, Gehry, Hadid, Koolhaas, Himmelb(l)au, Eisenman, and Tschumi) will be talk through. However, the aim is not to cover all deconstructive architecture and architects, but to introduce deconstructivism through selective works of some prominent architects. In this case, Bernard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman will be focused as they are known for close relationship with Derrida.

Then, there will be introduction to Derrida's deconstruction against unified meaning of text and in opposite to metaphysics of presence, and also transition of deconstruction into architecture that happened through conversion of metaphysical concepts (like centrality of presence, logocentrism, phonocentrism, centrality of language, binary opposition) into deconstruction's keywords (like *Differance*, dissemination, supplement, iterability, trace) that also entailed interpretation of those keywords as key concepts of deconstructivism on which most deconstructivist architects concentrated upon, including deconstructing traditional architectural discourse, non-centrality of construction, presentness, free-floating signifier, parados, trace, superimposition of layers, *differance*, iterability, destroying binary opposition. In this case, main idea of Derrida about architecture, and about relation of architecture with metaphysics will be discussed. Also, relation of Eisenman and Tschumi (as two main figures of deconstructivism that were close to Derrida) with the thought of Derrida will be referred. The goal is not a comprehensive study of all concepts of metaphysics, deconstruction or deconstructivism, but to introduce Derrida's theory to spot the main discussions and keywords that are argued in architectural literature.

At the end of chapter 2, problems are to be redefined and articulated. For instance, the link of deconstructivism to meaninglessness, subjectivism, relativism, disengagement that could be result of miss-link between deconstructivism and deeper reflection on deconstruction.

In chapter 3, there will be deeper research about metaphysics of presence (which is based on presupposition of Being as mere presence in which human subject is detached from the world) as a necessity to step beyond keywords/concepts of metaphysics, Derrida's deconstruction, and deconstructivism's keywords. Then the effect of metaphysics on architectural history will be scanned through part-whole relationship and subjectivism and objectivism in architecture. However, the aim is not to cover all discussion about part-whole relationship or effects of subjectivism and objectivism on architecture but to the point the effect be sensed.

Chapter 4 will be an intense reflection on Heidegger's philosophy as he questions metaphysical understanding of Being. Question of Being beyond mere presence entails question of qualities of Dasein (as human being) and entities to be understood as real existence. In this regard, concepts like practicality, thrownness, projection, care, authenticity, individuality, disclosed-ness, belongingness, event of truth, living without why, and unity will be discussed which results in understanding of Being as the abyss, and as the foundationless foundation. Out of Heidegger's philosophy against metaphysical understanding of Being, there will be an attempt to develop a strategy to address the question of Being and real existence that can be confirmed with Caputo's radical hermeneutics (which is based on intermediary space between Heidegger and Derrida) and Derrida's strategy of deconstruction. The developed strategy (which is called *the triplet strategy*) will include elements of *the stand of truth-claimer* (related to thrownness), *promise of death* (associated with challenging thrownness), and *promise of novel rebirth* (related to projection).

Chapter 5 will be evaluation of the triplet strategy within architecture. First, possible embodiment of the strategy within architecture will be argued. Then, consistencies and inconsistencies of deconstructivism and deconstructivist architects with the triplet

strategy will be explained. At the end, potentiality of the triplet strategy to be the possible missed link between deconstructivism and deconstruction (in its deeper sense against metaphysics) that could address the problematics of deconstructivism (including meaninglessness, subjectivism, relativism, disengagement) will be discussed.




Figure 2. Structure and Abstract of Chapters  
 (Source: drawn by author)



## CHAPTER 2

### DECONSTRUCTIVE ARCHITECTURE: INTERVENTION OF DECONSTRUCTION INTO ARCHITECTURE

Arrival of deconstruction in architecture, in the 80s, can be considered as a development of post modernism in the decade; however, it is different than post-modernism.<sup>18</sup> Deconstruction, alongside of post modernism, at first, was a reaction of and refuge from modernism's constraints. furthermore, in the 80s, from one hand, there was a demand that architecture should be the ground of judgement, and to be a tool for social change.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, "architecture has often sought justification or legitimation in that which is external to it"<sup>20</sup>. Requesting to be the ground of judgement and social change, those were somethings outside of architecture before, had entered the architecture.<sup>21</sup> This situation, eventually followed by the discussion of autonomy of architecture; the autonomy that was grasped in relation to social and political. Additionally, the discussion of these autonomy and legitimized architecture broke "the hold of symbols on the hand and the ubiquity of certain modernist conceptions of form on the other"<sup>22</sup>. In accordance with this deprivation of symbolic meanings of architecture in favor of autonomous architecture, Eisenman, as one of the featured deconstructive architects, claimed that symbolization "are today meaningless and merely nostalgic."<sup>23</sup>

The autonomy of architecture as the local point of the 80s, was not merely to understand architecture as autonomous object, but it understood as architecture's potential for development and criticality. The issue was the autonomy of discourse of

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<sup>18</sup> . Cholis, 2013, 69.

<sup>19</sup> . Benjamin, 2007, 40.

<sup>20</sup> . Ibid, 40.

<sup>21</sup> . Ibid, 40.

<sup>22</sup> . Ibid, 40.

<sup>23</sup> . Soltan, 2008, 243.

architecture.<sup>24</sup> As far as philosophy is concerned with textual and institutional presence, discussion of autonomy of discourse of architecture opened way for philosophy to intervene.<sup>25</sup> The authority, with its abandoning any intervention of intentional interests while depriving symbolic values of architecture, left aesthetic of architecture to be focused.<sup>26</sup> Architecture needed to be present in its aesthetic; both as beauty or attraction.<sup>27</sup>

Conjunction of the request from architecture to produce social change, or in other words, to be the site of *affect* from one hand, and the importance of aesthetic as a visual presence (beauty and attraction) from the other hand, followed by the idea that architecture should create *spatial experience*.<sup>28</sup> Philosophical discussions leading the architecture to be the creation of spatial experience, resulted in contextualism of architecture that architecture needs to be understood in urban fabric. This contextualism of the 80s is understandable through Jaquelin Robertson perspective when he sees architects as secondary to urban designers.<sup>29</sup> Soltan says: “Robertson [...] sees architecture as the communication of a personal vision of the built environment. “Architects are urban designers first,” he insists, and later asserts, “you can’t build good streets by doing individual buildings that are good.””<sup>30</sup>

Critics argued that architecture (as site of *affect* and aesthetic) in production of spatial experience is problematic; what if the experience is non-occurrent. Then it would result in *indifferent* architecture.<sup>31</sup> Benjamin says:

An aesthetic response could be one of indifference. The reason for such a response – indifference – being understood as aesthetic has to do with the inherent relation between aesthetics and experience. If the aesthetic is the site of experience, then it is always possible for there to be an experience that does not occur. In other words,

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<sup>24</sup> . Benjamin, 2007. 40-41.

<sup>25</sup> . Ibid, 41.

<sup>26</sup> . Ibid, 42.

<sup>27</sup> . Ibid, 42.

<sup>28</sup> . Ibid, 42-43.

<sup>29</sup> . Soltan, 2008, 234-235.

<sup>30</sup> . Ibid, 235.

<sup>31</sup> . Benjamin, 2007, 42-43.



what this allows for is a site of potential experience in which the object's presence, both in terms of appearance as well as function possibilities, is so mute and thus unable to engender a connection, be it in terms of affect or more banally in terms of use, that it becomes possible to argue that the aesthetic is marked by its non-occurrence; the experience that does not arise with a corresponding absence of affect.<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, philosophical emphasize on autonomy of the discourse of the architecture heightened the notion of *discontinuity* in assertion to the idea that architecture should be understood in its own history and activity, with no intervention from outside.<sup>33</sup> However, this continuity doesn't mean the repetition of same elements of architecture but it probably means the engagement of the continuity with its own possibility.<sup>34</sup> Benjamin says:

Continuity cannot be avoided. Architecture, as discursive practice has to its own history. The history of philosophy could be understood as the continual reposting of questions that rarely vary such that history is the continuity of the always the same. However, once a concern with the critical enters, then any practice, while continuing, does so with recognition that continuity is itself an engagement with its own possibility. In other words, there cannot be simple continuity, nor can continuity be understood as the repetition of the same ideal elements. Continuity emerges therefore as a form of discontinuity.<sup>35</sup>

Eventually, philosophical autonomy with its goal to produce affective architecture by emphasizing on aesthetic and continuity encountered with opposition of deconstruction. Benjamin about the intervention of deconstruction in philosophy says: "Deconstruction is inextricably connected to the project of autonomy. [...] deconstruction opened up as a question philosophy's self-construction and thus allowed philosophy's image to be a site of investigation and radical reappraisal."<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> . Ibid, 42-43.

<sup>33</sup> . Ibid, 42.

<sup>34</sup> . Ibid, 42.

<sup>35</sup> . Ibid, 42.

<sup>36</sup> . Ibid, 41.

Demand of the 80s: Architecture to be site of affect (against indifference)




Figure 3. Characteristic features of deconstructivist architects in interpreting deconstruction.

As one of the focal points in which deconstruction came to oppose, was the rejection of contextualism. Deconstruction refused philosophical stress on aesthetic or visual presence to be understood as its collaboration with urban body. Critics like Peter Eisenman, Rem Koolhaas, and Frank Gehry took one step forward against contextualism and constraint all together.<sup>37</sup> Soltan explain the rejection of contextualism in the eyes of Eisenman: “Eisenman announces that, in a world itself so surreal as to be in fact without context, architecture has no business seeking to establish or strengthen context; it ought rather to draw attention to the condition of drift and alienation at the heart of modern placelessness.”<sup>38</sup> However, deconstructive architects were beyond the a-contextualism. Soltan continues: “If a-contextualism removes building’s relatedness to other buildings, deconstructive architecture removes the building from relatedness with itself.”<sup>39</sup> The heightened notion of *paly* and instability in deconstruction and deconstructive buildings rejects any kind of foundation or context.

Philosophical autonomy that suggested aesthetic as visual presence to produce spatial experience in architecture confronted by emptiness or lack in itself: the problem of non-occurrent experience and indifferent architecture. One way to compensate this emptiness, for deconstructive architects, was to heighten the aesthetic content or exterior appearance and less concerning about function and programme; in other words, sacrificing function and programme over exaggerated external appearance accomplishing with complete disjunction to urban fabric. Benjamin says:

Once this description is given to an aesthetic response marked by a type of emptiness, then one way of responding is to heighten the aesthetic content. Heightened content will always be positioned on the level of appearance. [...] it will have two interrelated components. In architecture, as opposed to art, this means, in the first place, excluding the link between affect and function, while in the second, privileging appearance over programme. [...] while there is an obvious difficulty in that even though both function and programme will be retained [...] the fact of their presence will not automatically be attributed architectural significance. Nor will they

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<sup>37</sup> . Soltan, 2008, 235.

<sup>38</sup> . Ibid, 235.

<sup>39</sup> . Ibid, 236.

emerge as sites of research or experimentation. What matters will be appearance. One way of accounting for this position will be in terms of having provided form with a uniquely aesthetic characterization.<sup>40</sup>

This heightening the exterior appearance can be seen in projects of majority of supposed deconstructivist architects like Frank Gehry, Zaha Hadid, Daniel Libeskind, Coop Himmelbue, and Rem Koolhaas; the architects whose works, alongside of the works of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi, categorized as deconstructive architecture for the first time in the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in 1988 organized by Philip Johnson and Mark Wigley.

## **2.1 Deconstructive architects**

In this section, the aim is to introduce the major called deconstructive architects of the exhibition in 1988. However, the main concentration will be on Eisenman and Tschumi as the two closest architects to Derrida, the other named architects will be formally introduced, including: D. Libeskind, F. Gehry, Z. Hadid, R. Koolhaas, and Coop Himmelb(l)au.

### **2.1.1 Daniel Libeskind: Spatial experience of symbolic meanings**

In Libeskind's works, one can find an exaggerated jogged forms, zigzag lines, restricted yet dynamic path of movements, and direct opposition to the context and tradition; all in favor of proposing a specific spatial experience and symbolic meanings. For instance, in the Jewish Museum Berlin, he applied extensive use of voids through the building, in the "Holocaust Tower that contains no object except a depressing dark space", and also in the "Garden of Exile" (which is the only way out to have visitors bodily experience) to consign the symbolic message of a Jewish absence after Holocaust.<sup>41</sup> Contemporary Jewish Museum San Francisco is another

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<sup>40</sup> . Benjamin, 2007, 43.

<sup>41</sup> . Hao Jiang and Sijia Jiang, "The Architecture of Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museums," *Applied mechanics and Materials Vols 174-177* (2012) 1814-1815.



Figure 4. Jewish Museum Berlin, Germany, 1999, Daniel Libeskind.  
(Source: <https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/daniel-libeskind-architecture>)

example of Libeskind's concern about exaggerated appearance of the building to seize the gaze of visitors for the purpose of spatial experience. However, the building's jogged form is analogous to Jewish Museum Berlin, but it has different symbolic message. Hao Jiang and Sijia Jiang say:

The striking juxtaposition of the museum and its surrounding site and the blue metal-clad façade reminds one of Jewish Museum Berlin. Yet the bright atmosphere, luminous interior and fluid space are the great contrast to the dark and uneasy space in Berlin [...] which emphasizes the safe heaven that many Jews found on the new continent. [...] [The museum] is all about celebration, about living history, about making connections.<sup>42</sup>

Additionally, Danish Jewish Museum is another case of Libeskind which is designed like a boat to have visitors' spatial experience of "a Dane might have had, entering a boat in 1943 to make the dangerous trip across the waters to Sweden"<sup>43</sup>. As can be seen, there is an overstate of formal appearance in Libeskind's works in order to evoke specific spatial experience. Jiang et al speak about the museums:

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<sup>42</sup> . Ibid, 1815-1816.

<sup>43</sup> . Ibid, 1818.

They struggle to put on a show for visitors, in which visitors are provided an unforgettable bodily experience. [...] Spaces address people bodily and affectively, controls visitor behavior, and help them to see what the museum wants them to see. [...] The changed concept in architecture practice of the museum as an expressive experience, involving movement, rather than the static enjoyment of single works of art [...] [...] The site is of paramount importance in deciding the museum's public message, which Libeskind has respectively managed to convey through architecture. [...] In commemorating the holocaust, palpable absence may be the most important "exhibit".<sup>44</sup>

In the cited projects, there is a controlled path of movement and symbolic forms and elements for body experience of individuals to impose the intentional symbolic meanings desired by Libeskind. Unfamiliar, twisted, and harsh forms of the Libeskind which is in direct contrast to historical forms and also to the projects' situated context resulted in overstated appearance of the buildings that is common to the same trait of deconstructive architecture.



Figure 5. Jewish Museum San Francisco, USA, 2008, Daniel Libeskind.  
(Source: [https://live.staticflickr.com/3129/2851126338\\_ba5f0f669a\\_b.jpg](https://live.staticflickr.com/3129/2851126338_ba5f0f669a_b.jpg))

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<sup>44</sup> . Ibid, 1818-1819.





Figure 6. Vila Olímpica Barcelona, Spain, 1992, Frank Gehry.  
(Source: <https://www.barcelonaturisme.com/wv3/en/page/1232/peix-fish-frank-gehry.html>)

### 2.1.2 Frank Gehry: Spontaneous playfulness of forms

Frank Gehry's works can be observed from several aspects, however, his sculptural architecture with its formal playfulness is another example of the way deconstructivism paved for exaggerated appearance. Gevork Hartoonian<sup>45</sup> points out some characteristics of Gehry's architecture. One of the main features of Gehry's works is his obsession with biometric of fish, visible in his projects like Central Business Districts project (1981), Fishdance Restaurant (1987), Winton Guest House (1987), Vila Olimpia (1992). Gehry's usage of vertical void in the middle, "montage of fragmented forms", masses and volumes, and "plastic quality of folding surface" resembles the bouncing (and even dancing) body of a fish.<sup>46</sup> It seems that his interest in bouncing body of fish, [or dancing dancer, or growing flower that can be seen in his works] displays his fascination to actualize the full potentiality of a form or entity in the name of freedom. The free and spontaneous playfulness of the exterior forms chases an "open-ended formal inquiry"<sup>47</sup> for the autonomy of forms, as another major

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<sup>45</sup> . Gevork Hartoonian, "Frank Gehry: roofing, wrapping, and wrapping the roof," *The Journal of Architecture*, 7:1, (2002), 1-31.

<sup>46</sup> . Ibid, 5.

<sup>47</sup> . Ibid, 10.



Figure 7. Guggenheim Museum, Bilbao, 1997, Frank Gehry.  
(Source: <https://www.thoughtco.com/frank-gehry-portfolio-buildings-gallery-4065251>)

aspect in Gehry's architecture. Dancing body and spontaneous playfulness of exterior forms leads to another feature of his architecture which is animation. For that reason, Gehry used computer programs extensively to which Hartoonian claims Gehry's architecture is an example of the effect of "telecommunication technologies on architecture"<sup>48</sup>. The animated dancing body of Gehry's works, from one hand, is independent from interior space. To be against modernism's features like affiliation of interior and exterior, there are some dualities in Gehry's works like differences of inside/outside, old/new, unfinished material/articulated material, construction/appearance. One of the main distinctions in Gehry's works is his specific usage of construction that hides behind yet allows for the unprecedented exterior appearance of the buildings. This feature is to be considered as the element of wrapping and (expressive) clothing. The dancing formal appearance that wraps around the central body, construction elements, and interior space. From the other hand, the "dream-like" or "phantom-like" images of Gehry's works steps into the aesthetics of "commodity fetishism".<sup>49</sup> Hartoonian says: "My discussion here is ... his [Gehry's] resilience to think of an architecture that in some ways would sustain a critical position

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<sup>48</sup> . Ibid, 1.

<sup>49</sup> . Ibid, 1-3-12.





Figure 8. Disney Concert Hall, Los Angeles, 2003, Frank Gehry.  
(Source: <https://www.thoughtco.com/frank-gehry-portfolio-buildings-gallery-4065251>)

palpable to the drive of commodification and its aesthetic connotation for architecture.”<sup>50</sup>

All in all, the expressive and exaggerated phantom-like exterior images of Gehry’s works with its free and autonomous dancing forms independent from the interior space, which complies with commodity fetishism of the capitalist market economy, can be recognized as “theatricalisation of architecture” or “architecture of spectacle” in which the building is not mere a sheltering set for human activities, but it (at least formally) becomes an activity itself. Hartoonian says:

the theatricalisation of architecture ... [is] shifting tradition into the phantasmagoria of a commodity world. ... Here architecture is not a stage set, around and within which an event could take place, but the event itself. ... The theatrical character of Gehry’s design, its allusions to the posture of the dancer and the expressive falseness of its dressing, is suggestive of an architecture of spectacle. ... In Kahn’s words, Gehry’s building wants to be the architecture of event that has no referral and yet by bringing together the spectacle (the stage) and the spectator, the building itself becomes part of the culture of spectacle. ... the dressed-up [or the theatricalisation],

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<sup>50</sup> . Ibid, 13.

instead, suggests a vision of wrapping that is implied in the formal and aesthetic freedom embedded in the frame-structure at work since the inception of the Dom-ino frame.<sup>51</sup>

Contrary to Libeskind, there is no intentional (symbolic) meanings in the projects of Gehry. It seems that autonomy of forms and spontaneous playfulness of exterior appearance are the source of casual meaning-creation for Gehry. However, the exaggerated appearance of unprecedented forms, in direct negation of traditional ones, puts Gehry's projects in the category of deconstructive architecture.

### 2.1.3 Zaha Hadid: Reforming the environment through architecture

Zaha Hadid was deeply concerned about integration of architecture, as a unifying force, with the wider world through which architecture becomes “the dynamic center of an ever more dynamic world”.<sup>52</sup> Her drawings are rearrangement, reinterpretation, and re-governing the reality and of “the relationships between sky and earth, horizon and ground, the artificial and the natural”.<sup>53</sup>



Figure 9. Vitra Fire Station, Germany, 1993, Zaha Hadid.  
(Source: [https://cl.staticflickr.com/3/2041/2222675997\\_03032f0e59\\_b.jpg](https://cl.staticflickr.com/3/2041/2222675997_03032f0e59_b.jpg))

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<sup>51</sup> . Ibid, 3-4-22.

<sup>52</sup> . Lebbeus Woods, “Drawn into Space: Zaha Hadid,” *Architectural Design* 78, no. 4 (2008): 30.

<sup>53</sup> . Ibid, 31.

Hadid's works can be divided into two periods: before and after the 90s. According to Woods, Hadid's 80s' works are paradoxical: From one hand, they have the effort of postmodernism to "strike out in a new direction by appropriating the tectonic languages of an earlier epoch – notably Russian avant-garde" by which there is a powerful assertion of something unclear; from the other, they have Modernist roots, considering architecture to be means of reformation of the world.<sup>54</sup> In short, novel rearrangement of the environment through architecture seems to be the main concept in Hadid's works of the decade. Woods describes the early works of Hadid as "amazing", "fresh", "original", with an "instant sensation" in which "fragmentation" is central.<sup>55</sup> He says: "Animated bits and pieces and landscapes fly through air. The world is changing. It breaks up, scatters and reassembles in unexpectedly new, yet uncannily familiar forms."<sup>56</sup>

In reviving the neglected ideal of Modernism (for novel reconfiguration of the world through architecture), Woods argues that early Hadid followed Malevich's Suprematist movement, as one of main branches of Modernism, for whom, fragmentation is not merely chaotic but philosophic "even an impetus for higher re-



Figure 10. Heydar Aliyev Center, Baku, 2012, Zaha Hadid.  
(Source: <https://www.bayut.com/mybayut/modern-architecture-spotlight-zaha-hadid-architect/>)

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<sup>54</sup> . Ibid, 31.

<sup>55</sup> . Ibid, 31.

<sup>56</sup> . Ibid, 31.



Figure 11. Beko building, Belgrade, 2012, Zaha Hadid.

(Source: <https://www.businessinsider.com/zaha-hadid-architecture-2013-7?op=1#in-late-2012-hadid-unveiled-plans-for-the-zany-beko-building-in-downtown-belgrade-its-slated-to-be-a-city-center-with-residential-retail-and-commercial-space-11>)

reformation”.<sup>57</sup> Malevich, in opposition to unified force, cherished fragmentation and breaking up as necessary element for higher reformation and social change, and accordingly Hadid favored fragmentation for her desire of reformation of the world.

Later Hadid, in contrast to early Hadid’s favorite fragmentation and “utopian visions of an ideal Hadidian world”, took different method for her desire of transformation of the environment.<sup>58</sup> She changed her interest to fluid dynamic forms with extensive usage of complex curvilinear formations. The major aspect in this new configuration is gathering and directing aspect of the unifying forms, in direct opposition to early Hadid’s fragmentation. Woods describes later Hadid’s works:

The forms gather energies around them and retain them. The contained energy contorts simple forms into complex ones. They are tightly wound, or bundled, and seem ready to explode – though they do not. ... The urban landscape, re-formed by her architecture, was always a basic theme of her work. ... In the new designs, energy flows congeal into vaster urban sections, no longer mere buildings. It is one thing to imagine Hadid’s buildings as anchors

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<sup>57</sup> . Ibid, 32.

<sup>58</sup> . Ibid, 33.



in a broadly diverse landscape, but it is quite another thing to imagine entire districts that must conform to her designs.<sup>59</sup>

As Woods indicates, there is a unifying “big gesture” in later Hadid’s works that requires other building to conform to its totality; it is more autocratic in relation to early Hadid’s fragmentation which was more democratic.<sup>60</sup> All in all, maybe it is possible to claim that Hadid’s desire of reformation through architecture by her buildings’ unprecedented unifying big gesture is in compliance with general attitude of deconstructive architects who desired architecture to be the site of affect that followed autonomy of discourse of architecture (which grants architecture to be an authentic apparatus for power and culture) that finally resulted in exaggerated exterior appearances.

#### 2.1.4 Rem Koolhaas: Theory of Bigness

Rem Koolhaas is kind of deconstructive architect whose thoughts exceed from building to more urban plannings. Koolhaas, distressed by Capitalist culture of production and consumption and its influence on social constitutions, and also disturbed by Modernism (including fragmentation) that spoils classical city, produced an idea of “Bigness of autonomy from the city” that seemingly created to address his at least two major concerns: loss of reality, and loss of social unity.<sup>61</sup>




Figure 12. Exodus or Voluntary Prisoners of Architecture, London, 1972, Rem Koolhaas.  
(Source: <https://humanscribbles.blogspot.com/2014/04/voluntary-prisoners-of-architecture.html>)

<sup>59</sup> . Ibid, 34.

<sup>60</sup> . Ibid, 35.

<sup>61</sup> . Jorge Otero-Pailos, “Bigness in context: some regressive tendencies in Rem Koolhaas’ urban theory,” *City: analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, action* 4, no. 3 (2000): 379, 383.



Figure 13. CCTV Headquarters, Beijing, China, 2012, Rem Koolhaas.  
(Source: <https://timberplan.es/las-mejores-obras-del-arquitecto-rem-koolhaas/>)

Koolhaas was opposed to urban planning and context, and called them as things of past.<sup>62</sup> The reason behind his opposition is that any fixed planning is to block the vibrant reality of urban life and metropolises; that they prevent the real forces that shape present.<sup>63</sup> However, as he was against complete fixity, he was also believed in necessity of closedness (in the classical city). The challenge to solve the paradox of having both closedness or boundary from on hand, and allowing present forces to be free for further recreation and reshaping the cities led him to contemplate on 19<sup>th</sup> century urban planning in which there were insertion of non-urban spaces like parks and voids into urban contexts. European historic centers of the century gave Koolhaas the insight of floating city centers grafting into the larger context of metropolises. Koolhaas's solution for the paradox was to insert large voids into the context of city; making islands of filled blocks of buildings and empty voids float into the larger context of metropolis. In this view, the voids make possible for reconstitution and recreating a new urban planning as the filled blocks of city can be destructed in the new creation. Thus, usage of both solids and voids makes possible the destruction and

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<sup>62</sup> . Ibid, 379.

<sup>63</sup> . Ibid, 379.



Figure 14. Seattle Public Library, Seattle, 2004, Rem Koolhaas.  
(Source: <https://ohiostate.pressbooks.pub/exploringarchitectureandlandscape/chapter/seattle-public-library/>)

reconstruction; it makes possible the recreation which is the vibrant reality of metropolis.

The theory of Bigness is also to address about social unity. The solid islands of filled blocks in urban planning and enormous bulky volumes of buildings in Koolhaas's designs not only excludes the outside, but makes them independent of outside world by creating an enveloped man-made reality inside, in which people would not require what is outside. In the theory, everybody is inside, and inside-outside duality is faded away. Even in interior design of Koolhaas's buildings, one can find that some elements of outer space are mingled with interior elements to the point which the difference between inside and outside becomes vague. Otero-Pailos says:

Bigness replaces the whole with a new totality which is fundamentally independent of its outside. ... There is an emptying out of history and specificity in the notion of Bigness that limits the right to live only to those willing to be equalized into sameness. Bigness is the ideal singularity. It is Stephen Hawkins' model of universe, bounded but without edges. It is a seamless interiority. ... it is chaotic but at the same time establishes a boundary which contains that very chaos. For Koolhaas, each large scaled architectural project 'acquires the pretension and sometimes the



reality of a completely *enveloping* reality, and an absolute autonomy. To the degree that these mega-projects separate us from the world 'out there' they also liberate us from it. They are worlds-in-themselves. Thus, Koolhaas proposes Bigness as an index of possible new freedoms, and credits mega-projects with the power to transform culture or, better yet, to create new forms of culture. ... They determine autonomous worlds that can pose as the real and feign totality. ... Once inside, the outside (as with the shopping mall) becomes not only irrelevant but also inaccessible. ... Koolhaas' new city stands inside a double wall meant to enclose and protect this zone to retain its integrity... once you are in, there is no outside, only the semblance of exteriority in a perfect interiority.<sup>64</sup>

All in all, theory of Bigness inspired by floating islands into the larger context employs usage of voids in both urban planning and buildings for the sake of openness to the possibility of further recreation, and operation of massive volumes that cuts off outside reality in aiming for creating a virtual reality inside in which inside-outside dichotomy is faded away is another imposing totalitarian big gesture from the deconstructive architect that fits the general flow of deconstructivism in negating the history and context.

### **2.1.5 Coop Himmelb(l)au: The moment of destruction**

According to Michael Chapman and Michael Oswald<sup>65</sup>, Coop Himmelb(l)au accords to the thought of Manfredo Tafuri and Peter Burger; the two anti-neo-avant-garde who criticized both avant-garde of the 20s and neo-avant-garde of the 60-70s as reaffirmation of Capitalism, bourgeois social values, and autonomy of art rather than challenging them. In this affiliation with the skeptical thought of Tafuri and Burger, Coop Himmelb(l)au is deeply rooted in Dadaism. As Chapman and Oswald claim, deconstructivism itself is driven from Dadaism.

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<sup>64</sup> . Ibid, 383-388.

<sup>65</sup> . Michael Chapman and Michael Oswald, "Automated architecture: violence and nihilism as strategies of 'making' in the tactics of Coop Himmelb(l)au," *Architectural Research Quarterly* 10, no. 3-4 (2006): 241-248.





Figure 15. Groninger Museum, Groningen, Netherlands, 1993-1994, Coop Himmelb(l)au.  
(Source: <https://www.marchantasianart.com/museum/groninger-museum/>)

Dadaism was an art movement in the early 20s, generated as the reaction from the brutality and pessimism of the First World War. The general attitude of Dada was the nihilistic violent negation against any kind of codes and conventions of claiming normalization, including social values of bourgeois class, cultural standards, and also autonomy of art. In Dadaism, the final product as kind of undesigned object, incidentally comes out of violent attack on social and conventional values of art, making the object as a frozen sketch of highly brutal charged moment of destructing negation.<sup>66</sup> Problematic relation between designer, object, and making process, alongside of violence, indeterminacy, destabilization, randomness, and deliberate nihilistic tendencies can be considered as features of Dadaism.<sup>67</sup>

The main traits of Dadaism can be found in Coop Himmelb(l)au's works. The firm's works are like a captured moment of destruction (psychogram); destroying and distorting the already accumulated conventions of artistic and architectural forms and codes. For instance, domesticity, shelter, and autonomy of forms are to be attacked violently from outside. The attack has un-humanistic tendency that takes various forms like stabbing, piercing, puncturing, ripping, plunging, tearing which gives a sudden death to the what is attacked. In Haus Vektor II, Chapman and Oswald talk about a

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<sup>66</sup> . Ibid, 242-246.

<sup>67</sup> . Ibid, 242.



Figure 16. Musee des Confluences, Lyon, France, 2014, Coop Himmelb(l)au.  
(Source: <https://www.archdaily.com/606061/coop-himmelb-l-au-s-musee-des-confluences-through-the-lens-of-edmund-sumner/54f8976fe58ece08b400287-cop-lyo-0026-jpg>)

dagger dropping from above to tear apart the skin, internal space, programme, and historical values. Generally, in Coop Himmelb(l)au's works, there is speed of drawing, violence, and anger to which the final product comes out with nihilistic gesture in which both inherited values of the body and also the process of making as the framework are to be assaulted. Chapman and Oswald say:

A powerful image of a domestic house, plunged through from above with a shiny metal dagger, is the surviving record of Coop Himmelb(l)au's 1978 project Haus Vektor II [...] the project articulates a radical new relationship between the architect and the architectural object where the cultural values of domesticity and shelter are manifest in the building's shell are violently attacked from outside. [...] not only attack the values of domesticity inscribed in the building's shell, but the architectural object itself and the processes of making which implicate it. [...] For Vidler the work of Coop Himmelb(l)au can be aligned with an anti-humanistic tendency which seeks violently to dismantle the relationship between the body and architecture and is a characteristic of avant-garde practices of the late twentieth century. The implications of stabbing, puncturing and piercing which are manifest in the Vector projects provide a clear correlation with this tendency to destabilize the body as the logocentric origin of architectural form in Himmelb(l)au's often quoted pursuit of: [a]rchitecture that bleeds,



Figure 17. Pavilion 21 MINI Opera Space, Munich, Germany, 2008-2010, Coop Himmelb(l)au.  
(Source: [http://www.marcusbuck.com/opera21\\_en.php#](http://www.marcusbuck.com/opera21_en.php#))

that exhausts, that whirls, and even breaks. Architecture that lights up, stings, rips and tears under stress.<sup>68</sup>

Coop Himmelb(l)au's works can be recognized as the most violent ones among the cited deconstructive architects. Deeply influenced by Dadaism, not only his projects are anti-historical and meaningless, but he directly attacks on any social conventions and autonomy of forms in favor of nihilism. However, the exaggerated appearance is one of the most apparent results of the firm's works, the reason behind it is different from the others. If exaggerated form for Libeskind is to deliver specific meanings, for Gehry is to display the autonomy of forms as the source of creation and probably meaning generation, for Hadid is to dominate the environment for its own totalitarian meanings, for Koolhaas is to create virtual reality in which inside/outside or freedom/boundary is faded away to make room for more possible creation and meanings, for Coop Himmelb(l)au, the big gesture, is to defend nihilism and meaninglessness. Nevertheless, Coop Himmelb(l)au is one of the major deconstructive firms in architecture whose works, alongside of general move of other deconstructive architects, are categorized as anti-historical, unfunctional, and nihilistic.

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<sup>68</sup> . Ibid, 241-243.

### 2.1.6 Peter Eisenman: Presence of absence

Peter Eisenman (alongside of Bernard Tschumi) is one of the two major features of deconstructivism with more affiliation to Derrida and deconstruction, and also different from the other deconstructive architects. As Noor Cholis acknowledges, the main connection between deconstruction theory and architectural theory was through Derrida's influence on Eisenman.<sup>69</sup>

Eisenman's early interest lies within Modernism's ideas of autonomy, self-sufficiency, self-referentiality, form, structure, and its search for essence of architecture. As he was deeply interested in autonomous architecture, for him, architecture is beyond buildings' function or illusory symbolic meanings.<sup>70</sup> For this reason, Eisenman criticized classic architecture after Renaissance as the architecture of representation in which it is governed by human body, geometrical perspective, denial of feelings in favor of reason, and semantic (for instance, functioning alignment of doors, windows, symmetry, and proportion). Furthermore, he denounced Modernism in following classical architecture after Renaissance. For example, Eisenman found fault with Modernism's scale that is governed by human body. For him, autonomous architecture should be relieved from man and human body.<sup>71</sup> Eisenman switched from semantics to syntactic as there, for him, lies the essence of architecture. In this way, Eisenman took Formalistic gesture since he believed in archetypal relationship of forms ("that




Figure 18. House III, Lakeville, Connecticut, 1969-1971, Peter Eisenman  
(Source: <https://eisenmanarchitects.com/House-III-1971>)

<sup>69</sup> . Cholis, 2013, 69.

<sup>70</sup> . Thomas Patin, "From Deep Structure to an Architecture in Suspense: Peter Eisenman, Structuralism, and Deconstruction," *Journal of Architectural Education* 47, no. 2 (1993): 88.

<sup>71</sup> . Ibid, 88-89.






Figure 19. House VI, Cornwall, Connecticut, 1972-1975, Peter Eisenman



(Source: <https://eisenmanarchitects.com/House-VI-1975>)

affects our most basic sensibilities about environment”) beyond any superficial shape of style that can be understood only “in certain juxtapositions in solids and voids”.<sup>72</sup> Eisenman interest in autonomy of architecture against semantics, and in favor of formalism and syntactics can be found in his early works of “House of Cards” in which there is a logical relation of forms and space through redundancy of non-structural and non-functional elements that are inwardly referential and autonomous from everything else.

Eisenman’s interest in internal relationship of forms pushed him towards structuralism as it concerns the ontology of things (or internal structure of things) to find out the innate structure or order of things. For him, there are two levels: surface level that is related to the physical body (of buildings), and deep level or deep structure that concerns the abstract, implicit and underlying relationship or order.<sup>73</sup> For Eisenman, the deep level is based on “complex systems of syntactical oppositions of line, plane, and volume” that resulted in the surface by oppositions of internal elements (like windows, doors, columns) referring to each other.<sup>74</sup> It seems that the deep level, in early Eisenman’s thought, is the code for expansion and transformation of the physical body and surface of buildings. In this view, buildings become the manifestation of a system of internal relationships (of forms and meanings) against traditional external or semantic architectural forms (like human body, function, rational ideology). Consequently, buildings become self-reflective and they exist as their own

<sup>72</sup> . Ibid, 90.

<sup>73</sup> . Ibid, 91.

<sup>74</sup> . Ibid, 91.

representation through which the process of transformation becomes the object itself. It is possible to note that there are at least two points in early Eisenman's interest in internal transformation (out of autonomy): first, it is already linked to its own history and tradition as it transforms internally from its past toward future. Second, it is about new content (of forms and meanings).

Nevertheless, failure of Modernism and Structuralism in their quest for autonomy and self-referentiality accompanied with the collapse of Eisenman's idea of autonomous architecture. There were several defects in his idea of autonomous architecture. For instance, the supposedly independent architecture seemed to be more dependent on initial willful choice of the designer; or Eisenman's own works appeared to be more dependent on his own essays to not to be mistaken with minimalistic sculpture; or autonomous architecture is not independent from other shared aspects of architecture, or other disciplines and discourses. The major criticism on autonomous architecture, according to Patin, is that Eisenman's idea is already at work within western tradition of architecture as they both exclude some other cultures in search for the essence of architecture.<sup>75</sup> In other words, Eisenman's believe of autonomy is just another face of Western tradition.

Later Eisenman abandoned the idea of autonomous architecture, yet there seems to be a resilience to the idea of internal transformation (that once oriented from idea of



Figure 20. Wexner Center, Columbus, Ohio, 1983-1989, Peter Eisenman.  
(source: <https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Wexner-Center-for-the-Visual-Arts-and-Fine-Arts-Library-1989>)

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<sup>75</sup> . Ibid, 92-93.

autonomy) as he cherishes open ended capacity of architecture for new meanings out of history. For this reason, Eisenman shifted from autonomy to the idea of absence within deconstruction, in which there comes the possibility of dislocation and new meanings while remaining in the traditional discourses.<sup>76</sup>

Eisenman's interest in absence (for the possibility of new meanings) from one hand, and the necessity of the presence of architectural object from the other hand, put him in a paradoxical situation through which he became close to Derrida's idea of "double occupancy" or "double writing" that Eisenman referred it as "presence of absence". Patin about the term says: "a structure that reveals, signifies and contaminates the assumed ideal and the seemingly ordinant structure of the positive."<sup>77</sup> Derrida's term of "double writing" is to reverse the traditional hierarchy, and to displace the assumed secondary, fiction, misreading with the assumed primary and original. Eisenman, influenced by this idea, wanted to displace the preferred primary, unity, sameness, and origin with the secondary, diversity, difference, and supplementary in traditional



Figure 21. Nunotani Office Building, Tokyo, Japan, 1990-1992, Peter Eisenman.  
(source: [https://freight.cargo.site/w/700/q/75/i/f70167ab48cd7c031a0ef1ce5cala4c17d961bd61de73a74561b8cc5a430b3db/23\\_NUNOTANI\\_IMAGE2.jpg](https://freight.cargo.site/w/700/q/75/i/f70167ab48cd7c031a0ef1ce5cala4c17d961bd61de73a74561b8cc5a430b3db/23_NUNOTANI_IMAGE2.jpg))

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<sup>76</sup> . Ibid,93.

<sup>77</sup> . Ibid, 93.






Figure 22. Berlin Memorial, Berlin, Germany, 2003-2005, Peter Eisenman  
(source: <https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Berlin-Memorial-to-the-Murdered-Jews-of-Europe-2005>)

architecture. Hence, he focused on the absent face of the traditional architecture. In this way, he shifted from the logic of autonomy to more deconstructive event.<sup>78</sup>

Later Eisenman's idea which revolves around presence of absence, is more apparent in his proposition of "displaced architecture". As Margaret Soltan acknowledges, Eisenman inspired by Derrida's deconstruction to create his own "dislocating" architecture.<sup>79</sup> Patin enumerates Eisenman's displaced architecture with 4 conditions. First, to consider architecture as a text in relation to otherness, absence, and trace. Second, to rethink the binary oppositions (for instance, form follows function, ornament to be added to the structure, etc.). Third, to think or architecture as existing in between (to move away from rigidity of dialectical oppositions). Four, to refer to inward and interiority (rather than outward) which is unseen and hollowed out.<sup>80</sup> These conditions put architecture to uncertainty as the remove the architect's control over the object.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> . Ibid, 94.

<sup>79</sup> . Soltan, 2008, 238.

<sup>80</sup> . Patin,1993, 97.

<sup>81</sup> . Ibid, 64.





Figure 23. City of Culture of Galicia, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 1999-2011, Peter Eisenman.  
(source: <https://eisenmanarchitects.com/City-of-Culture-of-Galicia-2011>)

The main difference of Eisenman with the other deconstructive architects lies here in Eisenman's radical thinking of *dislocated architecture*. From one hand, against other deconstructive architects who took refuge in external appearance of buildings while less concerning about function and programme, Eisenman believed that *affect* of architecture does not lay in the appearance, but lays in "presenting the object such that it is in the formulation of another plan and emergence of new notion that not only the earlier one distanced, but identical qualities inherent in it are also overcome"<sup>82</sup>. While the others linked autonomy with aesthetics, Eisenman's deconstruction is re-planning and re-programming of architecture's possibilities.<sup>83</sup> For Eisenman, *affect* is linked to programme rather than aesthetic. In this way, he connects *affect* with type of reading.<sup>84</sup>

From the other hand, against other deconstructive architects with their exaggerated and completely disjointed from known architecture or form urban fabric, Eisenman wanted both formal invention form one hand, and collaboration with tradition on the other. He preferred to working through between novelty and the tradition. Eisenman uses the term *transformation* in which there are "attempts to break the hold of a certain tradition

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<sup>82</sup> . Benjamin, 2007, 46.

<sup>83</sup> . Ibid, 46.

<sup>84</sup> . Ibid, 46.

of the plan, while at the same time holding to architecture's own continuity".<sup>85</sup> It seems that two specific projects influenced this transformational thinking of Eisenman:

For Eisenman, the Casa Del Fascio (1936) and Casa Giuliani-Frigerio (1942) are both 'critical architectural texts' – because, as he argues, 'the readings of their facades, plans and sections are not stable; they can be read as displacements from an architecture of hierarchy, unity, sequence, progression and continuity. What matters here is how displacement is understood. Criticality enters because there is both a disruption of 'hierarchy' as well as an undoing of a sense of architectural continuity defined in terms of the repetition of the same. Repetition identifies both the continuity of architecture and the internality of architecture as the locus of intervention. Repetition therefore allows for the possibility of the interplay of continuity and discontinuity.'<sup>86</sup>

Inspired by the mentioned projects, Eisenman links the process of recovery and working through tradition to reading, redrawing, and re-representing.<sup>87</sup> Corresponding to this connection of architecture with reading, and also with the term transformation, Eisenman pursued anti-domestic and displacing architecture.<sup>88</sup> Soltan quotes from Eisenman:

Eisenman: dislocating buildings "refuse any single authoritative reading. They do not appeal to the logic of grammar or the reason of truth. Their truth is constantly in flux. [Dislocating architecture] does not symbolize use, shelter or structure. Its aesthetic and history are other. Its dislocation takes place between the conventional and natural. Thus, what is being violated is the maintenance of the system as a whole."<sup>89</sup>

All in all, as it turned out that there is nothing as autonomy, fixed meaning, codes, and context, Eisenman distanced from both functional architecture and autonomous architecture by believing that architecture should constantly distance from itself and from its assumed codes and foundations for the sake of its existence; that architecture

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<sup>85</sup> . Ibid, 45.

<sup>86</sup> . Ibid, 45.

<sup>87</sup> . Ibid, 45.

<sup>88</sup> . Brockelman, 1996, 446.

<sup>89</sup> . Soltan, 2008, 244.


should undercut its foundations.<sup>90</sup> It is possible to say that Eisenman’s belief is that tradition, meanings, and history are to be dislocated, displaced, misread, and to be completely re-read in a novel way.

### 2.1.7 Bernard Tschumi: Irreducible individuality of experience

The other major figure of deconstructivism with close affiliation with Derrida is Bernard Tschumi. Tschumi, who collaborated with Derrida on the project of Parc de la Villette, can be considered as the first architect who practiced deconstruction.<sup>91</sup> In his first works, Tschumi was interested in success of urban life through new interaction between people and their ideas. He was opposed to any institutionalization of architecture and homogeneity of urban landscape in favor of a revolutionary theory in architecture or at least put architecture into crisis.<sup>92</sup> Deeply affected by Ronald Barthes (for whom “the multiplicity of readings stemmed from the subjectivity of each reader”) and Derrida (for whom “there exists an abyss between signifier and signified” and for whom who wanted to “reveal the absence of a transcendental signified”), Tschumi developed his own theory of the “pleasure of architecture” in which he states that



Figure 24. Parc de la Villette, 1982-1998, Paris, Bernard Tschumi.  
(Source: <https://www.tschumi.com/projects/3>)



<sup>90</sup> . Patin, 1993. 98.

<sup>91</sup> . Louis Martin, “Transportations: On the Intellectual Origins of Tschumi’s Architectural Theory,” *Assemblage*, no.11 (Apr., 1990): 31.

<sup>92</sup> . Ibid, 23-24.

“architecture should be built and burned just for pleasure”.<sup>93</sup> His theory is based on what he refers as inherent paradox of architecture: The “conceived space” and “perceived space”. Martin says:

Bataille was obsessed with architecture. For this reason, Holier analyzed his work using an architectural metaphor borrowed from philosophy: the interplay between pyramid and labyrinth. More precisely, philosophy, caught in the labyrinth of experience, tries to erect a pyramid of reason (science) to overlook the labyrinth (nature) and understand it. ... For Bataille, the labyrinth could never be overlooked because of the impossibility of building the pyramid, that is, reason and its invention, science, could never explain nature. The labyrinth, constituted by language, was not a simple prison, for one never knew whether one was inside or outside. Therefore, in Bataille’s logic, writing was a game played with elusive reality.

Tschumi used Hollier’s model to explain his architectural paradox. He argued that architecture consisted of two interdependent but mutually exclusive terms: “conceived space” and “perceived space.” As the ultimate symbol of reason, the pyramid represented “conceived space,” or the dematerialized mental space where matter is molded by ideas. The pyramid was the very tradition of architecture. But Tschumi held that built space affected the sense long before reason. The labyrinth represented “perceived space”; it was the prison of sensations, an elusive model of spatiality that contemporary architectural theories had forgotten. For Tschumi, following Bataille, the labyrinth’s importance was precisely that it offered no point of transcendence and was thus radically opposed to “conceived space,” the space of reason. The paradox was that architecture was both pyramid and labyrinth and, as Tschumi wrote, “architecture is always the expression of a lack, a shortcoming, a non-completion. It always misses something, either reality or concept.”<sup>94</sup>

Tschumi suggested a third term for dissolving the paradox: “experienced space”. The term implies that architecture should be built and burned for the sake of pleasure; referring to architectural self-annihilation. In our interpretation, it means that architecture should not signify anything, letting the experience of individuals be its point. Martin says: “He [Tschumi] proposed that the only way to reconcile “conceived” and “perceived” spaces was to discover architecture’s eroticism, in other words, to reach the point where the subjective experience of space becomes its very

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<sup>93</sup> . Ibid, 25-26.

<sup>94</sup> . Ibid, 27.




Figure 25. Parc de la Villette, 1976-1981, Bernard Tschumi.  
 (Source: <https://tecnne.com/biblioteca/manhattan-transcripts/>)

concept.”<sup>95</sup> Later, in “*The Manhattan Transcripts*”, the three terms reorganized as “space”, “movement”, and “event”. In order to realize Tschumi, it’s better to look into his major works: Parc de la Villette, and *The Manhattan Transcripts*.

The Park was organized within three principles: point, lines, and surfaces. There are 35 points, grids, or “follies” structurally distributed within 135-acre site of the park. The follies, as dimensional points of reference of the park are unique and different, offering “sense of place through the large park”.<sup>96</sup> The lines consist non-organizational paths as means of communication. The lines “intersect and lead to various points of interest within the park and the surrounding urban area”.<sup>97</sup> The surface encompasses large area (85 acres from the 135) of grass and macadam. The surface the space to “interact, place, relax, and gather”.<sup>98</sup> According to Robert Holden, “each of these three systems is cross-referenced to an ever changing pattern of movement”.<sup>99</sup> The main

<sup>95</sup> . Ibid, 27.

<sup>96</sup> . Eduardo Souza, “Ad Classics: Parc de la Villette/Bernard Tschumi Architects,” accessed January 29, 2021, <https://www.archdaily.com/92321/ad-classics-parc-de-la-villette-bernard-tschumi>.

<sup>97</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> . Robert Holden, “Tschumi on Villette,” *Landscape Architecture Magazine* 76, no.3 (MAY/JUNE 1986): 86.





Figure 26. Acropolis Museum, Athens, 2001-2009, Bernard Tschumi.  
(Source: <https://www.tschumi.com/projects/2>)

point of the park, is its openness and welcoming aspect for all and more interactions or even generative (rather than interruptive) conflicts; the point is about constitution of meanings within the subjective eyes of visitors.

Another example of Tschumi is *The Manhattan Transcripts* in which there are three levels of disjoined realities of space, movement, and event grouped in 4 sequences of Park, Street, Tower, and Block. For instance, in the sequence of the Block, the first level of Space encompasses detailed pictures of street perspectives of buildings; the pictures are taken like the motion of a movie camera. The second level of Movement shows the trajectories of the subject of movement who took the pictures. The third level of Event are pictures of the “subjects of movements in the singular instant of photographic act”.<sup>100</sup> In other words, the first level of Space is what the subject of movement sees, the second level of Movement is the trajectories of the movement of the subject of movement, and the third level of Event is the instant picture of the subject of movement in its movement. Tschumi aims to find a synthesis between these disjoined realities, to “intersect with one another in a complex chaotic weave from

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<sup>100</sup> . Francesco Vitale, *The Last Fortress of Metaphysics: Jacques Derrida and the Deconstruction of Architecture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018), 73.



Figure 27. Alesia Museum and Archaeological park, Alesia, 2003-2012, Bernard Tschumi.  
(Source: <https://www.tschumi.com/projects/8>)

which another space emerges”, that ultimately stands for “gradual deformation of the traditional architectural space” and also openness to the *other*.<sup>101</sup> In our interpretation, these three levels indicates that the way one acts is autonomous from the way of movement, meanings, and functions that the buildings suggest; at the same time, it suggests that individual actions lead one’s movement, and this movement deforms the way of one’s view/perspective that ultimately deforms the buildings’ visuality, meanings, and experiences. The main point of the *Transcripts* is the irreducible individuality of experience that shapes the meaning, experience, and functions of buildings based on individual’s subjective interpretation, regardless of what a building or the tradition of architecture suggests or imposes. As Vitale and Tschumi say:

[Each sequence] requires the constructive intervention of the observer/interpreter. ... At first, the respective importance of each level depends only on how each is interpreted by the viewer, since each level can always be seen against the background of another. In this sense, looking at the *Transcripts* also means constructing them.<sup>102</sup> ... as opposed to logical transformation that proceeds from rules inherent in the nature of the object, the *Transcripts*’ sequences often proceed from “subjective” modes. Although an objective rule is given arbitrarily (compression or superposition, for example), its implementation, articulation, and final form depend upon the person who applies the rule. ... the pleasurable element of

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<sup>101</sup> . Ibid, 74-75.

<sup>102</sup> . Ibid, 71.

subjective arbitrariness enters the selection of endless images of fighter or facades. ... reality is made infinitely malleable.<sup>103</sup>

As can be seen, main idea of Tschumi revolves around subjectivity and freedom of individuals in making meanings and experiences beyond any totalitarian intentions like of tradition or of designers to impose some specific (range of) meanings. In this view, the role of architect is to carter the supplies for more and more interaction of meanings and experiences by visitors; the meanings that are beyond designer's intention. This kind of architecture can happen through gathering some fragmentations of reality, or assembly of some layers like what happened in the Parc de la Villette. In Tschumi's architecture, the power mostly transferred from tradition or from designers/architects to individuals for their sense-makings. While almost all the other deconstructive architects linked architecture to appearance, and specifically to exaggerated facades, and while Eisenman connected architecture to type of reading for anew re-reading and redesigning the past through the power of the architect/designer for a novel content that was absent from the tradition, Tschumi takes more radical step by letting meanings and experiences to be formed through the power of individuals' sense-making.

In summary, there is a variety of differentiation among the deconstructivist architects. Libeskind has unique representation of symbolic meanings through spatial experience that derives from his own interpretive creativity rather than traditional symbolism.



Figure 28. Bilogoy-Pharmacy-Chemistry Center, Paris-Saclay, 2015-2022, Bernard Tschumi.  
(Source: <https://www.tschumi.com/projects/71>)

<sup>103</sup> . Ibid, 76-77.



Gehry can be linked to a kind of formalist who believed in freedom and autonomy of forms as the source of meaning-making in direct opposition to limitation of traditional meanings and forms. Hadid in her desire for reforming the world through architecture follows her own totalitarian designs that imposes her specific forms and meanings to the environment. Koolhaas's idea of solid and void that challenges the border between inside and outside or between limitation and freedom is ultimately to make room for more recreation of causal meanings. Himmelb(l)au directly favors nihilism and meaninglessness among the major deconstructive architects. Eisenman presents the absent content, form, and meaning of the architectural tradition through his own subjective judgment. Tschumi gathers fragments and layers for more interaction of individuals and visitors to produce undesigned meanings by the power of individual experiences.

These major deconstructive architects are influenced by Derrida's deconstruction and used his concepts based on their own interpretation. Each one selected a few elements and keywords of deconstruction in a different method. However, what unites them as deconstructivists is their exaggerated formal appearance in contrast to historical form, function and meaning. For better appreciation of deconstructivism, an introduction to deconstruction is needed.

## **2.2 Deconstruction: An opposition to philosophical and metaphysical truth-claiming**

### **2.2.1 Deconstruction against unified meaning of text**

Deconstruction is a form of a philosophical and literary analysis which introduced by French philosopher, Jacques Derrida in the 70s. Deconstruction was an analytical reaction toward philosophy's self-construction or authority; its meaning or truth claiming; and its marginalization of the supposed secondary.

According to Ronald Barthes, text is multi-dimensional space which has no single meaning.<sup>104</sup> This argument is one of the main discussions that resulted in emergence of deconstruction. Margaret Soltan says: “In the late Seventies in America and Europe, literary theorists ... become intrigued with the process of reading texts not as coherent narratives or arguments, but as intrinsically incoherent, inevitably failed, efforts as signification.”<sup>105</sup> Hence, text, with its multi-dimensional space is confronted to author’s intention in imposing his/her reading on readers. Each reader by discovering the hierarchical opposition within the text, and converting their positions can create or rediscover new meanings that is different than other readers’ understanding or reading. Every reading or understanding becomes a mere misreading or misunderstanding. Deconstruction in the action of reversing the hierarchical oppositions within the text, emphasizes on self-referential moment in the text, and employs a portion of a text to analyze the whole relationship between textual level to another.<sup>106</sup> In this way, consensus on unifying meaning in text becomes impossible. Soltan says that Deconstructive literary critics acknowledged “the impossibility of integrated expression in text’s lucid and disseminated form. [...] [They demonstrated] tension between the writer’s desire to found meaning/value and language’s tendency to float free of the writer’s authority.”<sup>107</sup> Derrida defends this self-contradiction of writing as the structure of writing, not as mistake.<sup>108</sup>

Deconstruction celebrates the heterogeneity of text. It describes text as grafts or intertextual constructs, and it welcomes text’s power to its self-deconstructive efficiency. Hence, deconstruction becomes contradicted to the notion of organic-unity.<sup>109</sup> Deconstruction intervenes in philosophical activity in searching for one united truth. Deconstruction is not moving from one concept to another one, but it reverses and displaces conceptual and non-conceptual order articulated within it.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> . Jonathan D. Culler. 1983. *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*. New York: Cornell University Press. 32-33.

<sup>105</sup> . Margaret Soltan. 2008. “Deconstruction and architecture.” In *Reconstructing Architecture*, edited by Thomas A. Dutton and Lian Hurst Mann, 234-259. London: University of Minnesota Press.

<sup>106</sup> . Culler, 1983. 205.

<sup>107</sup> Soltan, 2008. 237.

<sup>108</sup> . Culler, 1983. 89.

<sup>109</sup> . Ibid, 200.

<sup>110</sup> . Ibid, 141.

Deconstruction is not a (better) philosophy to produce grounded truth. It just reverses and displaces by going in and out of philosophic seriousness.<sup>111</sup> According to Christopher Norris: “What deconstruction persistently reveals is an ultimate impasse of thought engendered by a rhetoric that always insinuates its own textual working into the truth claiming of philosophy.”<sup>112</sup>

### **2.2.2 Deconstruction in architectural literature: Concentration of Derrida’s terminology**

In architectural literature, mostly, deconstruction introduced without deeper reflection on Derrida’s thought against metaphysics or in affiliation with Heidegger’s philosophy with more general introduction (as the strategy that displays the inconsistency of the foundation of the text in its meaning-claiming), and also with more concentration on Derrida’s keywords. For instance, Soltan introduces Derrida’s deconstruction alongside of other movements as the epistemological shift of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that rejects unified meaning and traditional values in favor of fragmentation, dislocation, and plurality of meanings. She says:

Underlying this new interest in plural and contingent meaning was the great epistemological shift of the nineteenth century, in which the departure of common religious faith and shared cultural values left people intellectually and morally adrift. Nietzsche’s description of this new human condition, in which, all conceptual and spiritual foundation have been shattered, modern individuals were confronted with the task of recognizing the absurdity of the universe and attempting to create a new world, constitutes one of the most important sources of deconstructive thought. ... In this new understanding, the act of *interpreting* arguments and creations shifted from one of reconstructing a unified design, a controlled structure, to the playful business of discovering the elements in texts that undermined the texts’ pretension to univocality.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> . Ibid, 155.

<sup>112</sup> . Christopher Norris. 2002. *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge. 48.

<sup>113</sup> . Soltan, “Deconstruction,” 237.




Figure 29. Transition from metaphysical concepts to the concepts of deconstructivism.  
 (Source: drawn by author)

The main approach to deconstruction in architectural literature is the concentration on Derrida's main terminology. Patin states "*differance*", "supplementary", "free-will", "play", "dissemination" among others as some of main keywords of deconstruction.

He argues that main concept of deconstruction is based on opposition against self-sufficiency of binary oppositions in which the first term is preferred as the unquestionable fixed priority over the second term as supplementary; for instance, preference of speech over writing in philosophy. According to Patin, deconstruction is to dismantle this very idea by close reading of *how it says* on *what is says* through which the claimed fixed truth (*what is says*) comes to its own collapse. He says:

A deconstructive reading sees the pairs as written into a particular argument from the very start so as to give one term a privileged or ruling position over the other. The first term is presented as primary and ontologically prior (coming first in the presentation of the pair as well as being seen as having existed first), while the other term is secondary and serves as a supplement to the first, this opposition would control the meaning of the argument and restrict its possible direction and outcome. Through a close reading, a crucial point in a text or argument is located where its logic and rhetoric (*what is says* and *how it says* it) contradict one another. ... the first term announces its own partial complicity with dependence upon, and circumscription by the term it would suppress. The whole argument becomes suspect, destructed or decentered, and loses its power to convince.<sup>114</sup>

Here, it seems that Patin talks about strategy of deconstruction that uses the same elements of claimed meaning (by author of text, and by philosophy in general) by having close reading on how some meaning/truth is claimed. Then, through that close reading, a different outcome is generated that opposes the initial claimed meaning. (Derrida's strategy will be opened up in the following chapters.)

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<sup>114</sup> . Patin, "From Deep Structure," 94.

### 2.2.3 Deconstruction in tackling with metaphysical concepts

Probably, one of the comprehensive sources in elaboration of the keywords of deconstruction within architectural literature is within the article by Aida Hoteit<sup>115</sup>. According to her, deconstruction tackles with at least five ideas of traditional metaphysics. The first idea to be tackle is “the centrality of presence”. Metaphysics defines presence as present and now for which past and future are absent. Also, self is recognized as conscious, ego and the “I”; that “consciousness is self-presence”<sup>116</sup>. Derrida rejects this metaphysical idea and claims that “the future is and anticipated presence, whereas the past is a previous presence”.<sup>117</sup> What is happening now depends on those un-present moments. Furthermore, Derrida rejects philosophy of presence, in favor of believing in philosophy of absence in which consciousness is already involved in presence of unconscious part of consciousness (that is subconscious). However, Derrida is not to prevail absence over presence but to indicate that “there is no absolute presence or absolute absence, but there is the ‘trace’” as “a resides of previous experience”).<sup>118</sup>

The second term of metaphysics to be addressed is “logocentrism”. Logocentrism suggests existence of unquestioned authority and “external center that gives credibility to thoughts, expressions and patterns”.<sup>119</sup> By this idea, Western philosophy presumed that presence of structure involves an absolute center. Derrida refutes the idea by claiming that the center can be changed to margin/supplement and vice versa.

The third idea of metaphysics is “phonocentrism” by which speech is privileged over writing. The thought is that a speaker is present to clear any misunderstandings while in writing the author is absent, so there comes different interpretations through which the assumed original meaning could be lost. Derrida rejects the idea by his own idea of *differance* (that will be explained later in this chapter).

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<sup>115</sup> . Aida Hoteit, “Deconstructivism: Translation From Philosophy to Architecture”, *Canadian Social Science* 11, no.7 (2015).

<sup>116</sup> . Ibid, 118.

<sup>117</sup> . Ibid, 118.

<sup>118</sup> . Ibid, 118.

<sup>119</sup> . Ibid, 118.

The fourth term in metaphysics to take forward is “centrality of language”. Saussure claims that meanings of words are arbitrary attached to them from outside, and cannot be detached from them. In other words, there “is an arbitrary link between the signifier and the signified”.<sup>120</sup> Derrida comes to deny this signifier-signified pair that because of iteration in (re)writing, language become more collection of signifiers/words (without fixed signified/meanings) that refer to each other making for creation of different interpretations and meanings. The rejection of Derrida is that if any signifier/words had fixed signified/meaning then we shouldn’t have witnessed the existence of interpretations.

The next metaphysical term is “binary opposition”. In Western tradition, there is always oppositions like “reason/passion, presence/absence, the self/the other, speech/writing, inside/outside, signifier/signified, and man/woman”<sup>121</sup> in which the first one is preferred over the other. Derrida aims to dismantle the binary opposition without privileging one over the other that results in “uncertain hesitant”.

#### **2.2.4 Major concepts of deconstruction**

From the other hand, Hoteit enumerates at least five concepts within deconstruction. First one is *La Différance*. The word is the combination of the words “differ” and “difference” that indicates both deferment and distinction.<sup>122</sup> The idea is that by each reading and interpretation, the significance of words (or ultimate meaning of a text) is postponed and deferred. As we use words to refer to other unpresent and desired things and meanings (and we stop talking as soon as the desired things or meanings are achieved), language becomes a deferred presence of things and meanings (which are not present in language itself). Derrida had two points in *La Différance*. One is to indicate the priority of writing over speech as he changes the letter “e” with inaudible letter of “a” in which only in a written word it is distinguishable, not in a speech. Second, Derrida wanted to express that meanings of words are not present in them, but

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<sup>120</sup> . Ibid, 119.

<sup>121</sup> . Ibid, 119.

<sup>122</sup> . Ibid, 119-120.



the meanings are dependent to the relation and comparison to other words/signifiers.

The second concept of deconstruction is “dissemination”. Hoteit says:

Dissemination indicates that the meaning of a text, similar to scatter seeds in a field, is dispersed throughout a text. It also refers to the fragmentation of the meaning of a text and its proliferation in an uncontrollable way. This proliferation ultimately alludes to free play, which is not governed by any rules that can limit its continuous movement. This movement ultimately invokes pleasure, instability, and mutability. ... The sign (word) creates new shadows and meanings with every new reading ad infinitum.<sup>123</sup>

The third concept is “the supplement”. Related to tackling with logocentrism, Derrida rejects “center/margin duality” in which there is a complete central system to which something secondary/supplementary is added. For Derrida, structures are not self-contained and they are always in need of complement/supplement. Therefore, role of the supplement becomes not secondary anymore. For Derrida, there is no fixed center or fixed margin since their roles always can be switched to the other.<sup>124</sup> The fourth concept is “iterability”. It is to say that meaning of a text change throughout different contexts that ultimately results in instability of texts.<sup>125</sup> The next concept is “the trace”. The idea of trace is to decline any existence of originality, for instance original text or original meaning. As the trace involves both erasure and residue, no destructed thing is completely destroyed, but it remains by its mark of trace which would bear more possibilities for future creation or construction. In this view, trace precedes existence since every creation, existence, and assumed original thing is already based on prior trace. Hoteit says:

According to deconstruction, the concept of trace is connected to the concept of presence because presence involves a trace of its absence or its constant change. Thus, a concept can only be present through the absent it contains. A trace is a “mark of the absence of a presence, an always-already absent present” ... trace is neither presence nor absence.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> . Ibid, 120.

<sup>124</sup> . Ibid, 120.

<sup>125</sup> . Ibid, 120.

<sup>126</sup> . Ibid, 120-121.

Generally, these concepts of deconstruction are base context of deconstructivist architects. The architects concentrate on one or two keywords of Derrida's deconstruction, and in some point, they twisted the original idea for further appreciation of the concepts in the practice of architecture.

### **2.3 Deconstructivism in architecture and its transition from deconstruction**

As mentioned before, the summit of transition of deconstruction into architecture happened at the late 70s and the 80s. Alongside of postmodernism, deconstruction came to oppose Modernism's constraints. However, different from postmodernism, according to Benjamin, the intervention of deconstruction within architecture was a reaction to philosophy's prescription of contextualism, aesthetics, and continuity for architecture that deprived architecture from symbolic meanings in favor of spatial experiment that resulted in exaggerated appearance. Soltan also explains deconstructivism as a reaction against contextualism and constraints of urban fabric.<sup>127</sup>

Deconstructivism in general is known for its unprecedented appearances and forms against any totalitarian forms of the traditional (specifically, of Modernism's) through which it comes to face probable scarification of traditional meanings, functions, and programme. In this architecture, there is a visible deformation, fragmentation, and displacement of surface, structure, and elements that imposes inconsistency or even death to familiar forms and meanings. Mark Wigley in his introduction and classification of deconstructive architecture chose those works of architects that "dismantled the idea of total and pure form"<sup>128</sup>. Cholis introduces deconstructivism with complicated geometry, curved lines, rectangular shapes, fragmentation, dislocation of elements, displacement of skin and structure that is basically rejects the main ideology of Modernism architecture including "form follows function", "purity of forms", "truth to materials".<sup>129</sup> Criste describes deconstructivism with attributes like: non-rectangular forms, dislocation of fundamental elements including geometry, structure and surface, rejection of tradition and centrality, celebration of diversity,

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<sup>127</sup> . Soltan, "Deconstruction," 235-236.

<sup>128</sup> . Ibid, 122.

<sup>129</sup> . Cholis, "Reconstruction," 70.

unpredictability and controlled chaos, new experiences of habitation and meaning.<sup>130</sup>

He says:

Rejecting the historical reference, deconstruction dismembers architecture and the structure of functionality and dislocates its fundamental elements. Celebrating diversity and rejecting the certainty of rationalism, deconstructive architecture offers new solutions regarding the form and the structure of the surface, new experiences of meaning and habitation and the idea of controlled accident. ... deconstruction would seek to dismember architecture, rejecting any form of historic reference; its interest is not the function-ornament difference, but the structure of functionality itself. The fragmentation, the manipulation of ideas regarding the structure of the surface, or the non-rectangular forms are more cherished by the deconstructivist spirit, interested in dislocating the fundamental elements of architecture, like structure and appearance. Geometry becomes the fundamental element, applied to the functional, structural and spatial aspects of the building, hence the sensation of unpredictability and controlled chaos.<sup>131</sup>

Soltan describes deconstructive architecture as violence against social and traditional values that rejects any kind of univocal meanings. For her, difference, displacement, fragility, incoherence, drift, and disorientation are among those attitudes of deconstructive architecture. She says:

Like deconstructive literary theory, deconstructive architecture is about differences *within*. Architecture influenced by the poststructuralist theory of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault ... created *displaced* buildings with disseminated meanings, buildings that no longer express, say, shelter, domesticity, industrial productivity, beauty, truth, or social value, but instead do violence to the entire range of traditional values associated with architectural manifestation. If the coherent and culturally reassuring literary text is the object of critique for literary deconstructionists, the "finished" building communicating univocal meaning is the object of critique by architectural deconstructionist. Architects like Eisenman, Daniel Libeskind, Zaha Hadid, and Bernard Tschumi produce plans and buildings that communicate incoherence, fragility, drift, disorientation.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> . Criste, "The Deconstruction," 33-34.

<sup>131</sup> . Criste, 2011, 33-34.

<sup>132</sup> . Soltan, "Deconstruction," 236.

Beside these general descriptions of deconstructivism like displacement, dislocation, instability, fragmentation, curved lines, and diversity among others in architectural literature that revolves around being anti-historical, unfunctional, and meaningless, there are some texts that directly extracted and related the keywords from Derrida's deconstruction to deconstructivism.

### 2.3.1 Major concepts of deconstructivism

The main concepts of deconstruction in the transition to architecture have been varied through various interpretive approaches of deconstructivist architects. There can be found many transformed ideas derived from deconstruction in the ideology and projects of the architects. For instance, Hoteit enumerates at least ten concepts of deconstructivism in relation to Derrida's keywords. First concept is "deconstructing traditional architectural discourse"<sup>133</sup>. As deconstruction is to dismantle fixed constraints of metaphysics, deconstructivism is to dismantle geometric principles like compatibility, unity, and stability. Also, it is to distort the relation between interior and exterior. Furthermore, deconstructivism is to dismantle balance, horizontal and vertical lines. All in all, deconstructivism is generally to tear down old concepts for new ones. Second concept for Hoteit is "the non-centrality of construction"<sup>134</sup>. As Derrida tackles with logocentrism, and as the concept of supplement in which there is instability of center and displacement of center with margin; so, there is no visible center in the works of most deconstructivist architects.

Third concept is "presentness"<sup>135</sup>. This concept seems to be related to deconstruction's opposition towards metaphysical assumption of "centrality of language" in which there is fixed arbitrary relation between signifier and sign, and also the concept seems to be related to the deconstruction's concept of *differance* that denies any fixed relation of signified/signifier pair. Hoteit brings the example of Eisenman for *presentness*. Eisenman by the idea of "presence of absence" claim that architecture is different from language, and it needs presence. Deconstruction can easily subvert sign/signified pair

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<sup>133</sup> . Hoteit, "Deconstructivism," 122.

<sup>134</sup> . Ibid, 122.

<sup>135</sup> . Ibid, 122-123.

without further problems (to detach signified from signs), but in architecture the signified can't be detached from signifier; for instance, division of space can't be detached from walls, visibility of outside can't be detached from windows, weight bearing can't be detached from columns. Eisenman takes another process to dismantle signified from signifier that is to take apart the bond between form and function. He uses conventional forms in a way that is no more functional; that results in meaninglessness. For instance, he uses non-structural columns, non-functional openings like in floors, unfunctional walls for compositional purposes rather than dividing space. Eisenman's purpose is to display conventional forms to be seen meaningless.

Next concept of deconstructivism is "free-floating signifier"<sup>136</sup>. Related to many concepts of deconstruction like *differance* and *supplement*, the aim of free-floating signifier is again to dismantle the signified/sign pair. Eisenman in the process of designification of the signified from the signifier (walls, columns, windows) sometimes switches function of elements to each other; for instance, in House II, walls are weight-bearing and columns are just vertical elements (that probably one can sense division of spaces by columns). This switch of function to other forms which is called free-floating signifier leaves meaninglessness, perplex, paradox, and incomprehensibility.

Another concept of deconstructivism is "paradox".<sup>137</sup> One of the main results of dismantling signified from signifier and binary opposition (with privileged assumed original/central from secondary/supplementary) is the feeling of paradox that is left for visitors. For Eisenman, the concept of unfinished structure is one example of paradox in deconstructive architecture that is visible in his work of Wexner Center. Unfinished structure brings the sense of lacking absolute presence which denotes (the presence of) absence. In this way, paradox is generated as there is uncertainty of gravity of presence and absence over each other.

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<sup>136</sup> . Ibid, 124.

<sup>137</sup> . Ibid, 124.

The sixth concept of deconstructivism, which is also common in deconstruction in the rejection of originality, is the “trace”.<sup>138</sup> As the idea of trace is to say that everything is based on trace of some past things, Eisenman believes that every new design should have trace of the past; and every new construction should start upon trace (residue) of some presence. For this reason, Eisenman mostly starts with physical traces of the site, for instance in the project of City of Culture of Galicia. Also, Libeskind believed in traces; as for him architecture is a story that never starts with nothing, but begins with a trace of symbols, dreams, and stories of a certain place.

Next concept is “superimposition of layers”.<sup>139</sup> As the trace of past should be the starting point of a design, the search for deeper residues of the past might entail various contradictory elements for architects. In order to refrain from centralization of some elements over other ones, deconstructive architects like Eisenman and Tschumi used superimposition of layers. In this way, the site becomes locus of various possibilities. However, not all superimpositions are based on traces. For instance, Tschumi in Parc de la Villette superimposed three layers of arrangement which were not based on traces (but from the architect’s own subjective decision).

Related to the superimposition of layers, the next concept is “*differance*”.<sup>140</sup> As in *differance* the ultimate meaning is postponed, and also meaning of words are dependent on relation to other words, the superimposition of layers defers any concrete imposition of meanings. Also, production of meanings happens through relation, interrelation, and comparison of layers.

Another concept of deconstructivism is “iterability”<sup>141</sup>. Iteration in deconstruction is to say different meanings of words and text through different contexts and reads. The iteration in deconstructivism is usage of multiple (even redundancy) of elements and forms with different function and meanings. It is also application of multitude of elements which signifies no function or no meaning. For instance, redundancy of

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<sup>138</sup> . Ibid, 125.

<sup>139</sup> . Ibid, 125.

<sup>140</sup> . Ibid, 126.

<sup>141</sup> . Ibid, 126.

columns, opening, walls in the House of Cards or multiple follies with different functions (or having no specific function) in Parc de la Villette.

The last concept is “deconstructing binary opposition”.<sup>142</sup> It manifest itself through deconstructing the relation between “form and function, form and program, structure and economy among others”.<sup>143</sup> Beside major deconstructive works like Eisenman’s aim to detach conventional functions from forms, Tschumi’s Parc is an example in separation of form from program in which follies with their different forms and convertible functions put the program in constant change.

## **2.4 Relation of Eisenman and Tschumi with deconstruction**

In architectural literature, besides relating deconstruction’s keywords to deconstructivism, there has been less written and explained about the relation between deconstructive architects and their projects or ideas with Derrida’s deconstruction. One can find less to observe if the works of deconstructive architects (partially or wholly) is compatible or incompatible to Derrida’s idea. Thomas Patin and Francesco Vitale are among those authors who criticized Eisenman and explained Tschumi in relation to deconstruction.

As mentioned before, Eisenman proposed displaced architecture with four conditions. According to Patin, those conditions come from Derrida’s idea. To reconsider architecture as a text in relation to absence and otherness comes from deconstruction in which writing refers to absence of the presence of author. To rethink binary opposition initiates from Derrida’s critique of violent hierarchies that prioritizes the first term over the secondaries. In betweenness of displaced architecture is related to Derrida’s reversal of the hierarchy, but is inconsistent with reversal of the hierarchy in favor of the second one. In this view, Eisenman’s preference of absence over presence becomes inconsistent with Derrida’s deconstruction. Reference to interiority in Eisenman’s works, actually, is a misreading of Derrida’s *differance* that refers to

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<sup>142</sup> . Ibid, 127.

<sup>143</sup> . Ibid, 127.

dissemination of signification and postponement of meaning through various reads that indicates generation of meanings comes from outside of texts rather than inside.<sup>144</sup> According to Vitale, Derrida doubts and questions Eisenman's presence of absence because his works are open to religious interpretations. For instance, Derrida asks the difference between Eisenman's architectural space to that of a temple.<sup>145</sup> Eisenman replies that deconstruction is too metaphorical for architecture; deconstruction deals with architecture as metaphor, but he deals with architecture as reality. Vitale argues that Eisenman misread the concept of trace. For Eisenman, trace, similar to Husserl's living present of phenomenology, is something that contains the lost original; for Eisenman, trace is a presence of absence. Vitale says:

Here we can detect some hints of Eisenman's misreading, especially apropos the trace, which is understood as something that "has" in itself what it is not. We start seeing that, for Eisenman, the trace is the trace of the past as well as of the future, since it retains what is absent, precisely the past and the future, like the living present of phenomenology. ... Eisenman neither embraces nor understands Derrida's advice, as he keeps on interpreting Derrida's notion of trace as the presence of an absence, where the absence determines what is present, which is anything but the traditional – and metaphysical – definition of sign: that which stands for something else.<sup>146</sup>

For deconstruction, presence is effect of the trace, that only leads to further and further traces, not the living present or original. For that reason, there is novel totalitarian reformation of the past architectural forms as Eisenman thinks originality lies within trace of the past. Vitale argues that Eisenman privileged absence over presence because Eisenman speaks about presentness as the third condition that comes in the interplay of present and absent by which another face of the absent shows itself. In Eisenman's formula, this "presentness has the sense of essence" that the architect subjectively allows himself to represent a face of the absent. In this way, in my interpretation, the unknowability of the absent is eliminated. However, the preference of absence over presence seems contrary to metaphysics of presence that valued fixity of presence, but at the end, preferring one (absence) over the other (presence) lies

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<sup>144</sup> . Patin, "From deep," 97.

<sup>145</sup> . Vitale, "The Last," 80-81.

<sup>146</sup> . Ibid, 87-93.






Figure 30. Derrida's interpretation of architecture, Eisenman, and Tschumi.  
 (Source: drawn by author)

within the same strategy of metaphysics of presence. As Derrida advised Eisenman in this matter, Vitale quotes: “Well, you can strategically insist on absence as a disruption of the system of presence, but at a certain point you have to leave theme of absence”<sup>147</sup>.

Before explaining the relation of Tschumi with deconstruction, it is better to scan Derrida’s idea about relation of deconstruction with architecture. According to Vitale, the encounter of Derrida to architecture is not prescribe a model for architects, but to shed light on the traditional foundations that govern architectural discourse and practice. Derrida’s main concerns is the welcoming-ness and openness of architecture to the other and to what it comes: to-come; and also, responsibility of architects to respond to all to-come questions. For the sake of this to-come, he refuses to prescribe a method or model for deconstruction in architecture.<sup>148</sup>

Derrida argues the encounter of architecture and deconstruction is unavoidable because: First, the encounter of philosophy to architecture was there from the beginning through metaphors like house as the soul. Second, the deconstruction of philosophy was there from the outset through discussions against deterministic concepts of philosophy like presence, subject, identity, etc. In the traditional philosophy, as metaphysics of presence, the begin of beings are considered as mere presence, in which becoming (as irreducible element of our existence) is ignored. The presence that led to fixed, eternal, transcendent identity. Derrida, against metaphysics of presence, introduced *differance* (dynamic character of difference) as irreducible condition of possibility of presence and identity.<sup>149</sup> For Derrida, identity is not given but it is determined in relation to something else, different from itself.

Derrida argues for dissociation of architecture from religion, politics, economic, aesthetic, dwelling, etc., as they all are forms of metaphysics that inscribe specific meaning that commands architectural form, function, structure, syntax from outside

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<sup>147</sup> . Ibid, 93.

<sup>148</sup> . Vitale, 2018, Xi.

<sup>149</sup> . Ibid, Xiii

transcendental position. Also, Derrida argues from thinking architecture as writing: arche-writing. He defines architecture as writing of space.<sup>150</sup>

For Derrida, dwelling, traditionally, is considered as essence of architecture, which is legacy of specific historical determination, and still we think it as natural, fallen from sky; no more we think of architecture as artifact.<sup>151</sup> That historical determination (specific law of dwelling) is the Greek law of *Oikos*, rooted in archaic mythico-religious experience of place and space that identifies fixed identity for individuals and community within a specific territory. In the law of *Oikos*, as the heart of metaphysical system, there are absolutely detached, unrelated, and permanent oppositions like inside-outside, good-bad, God-evil, with fixed autonomous stable presence and identity which are immune from alterity and becoming, with no relation to the other in general.<sup>152</sup>

Derrida believes that the archaic spatial experience of dwelling – that there is an ideal city with permanent good identity inside the wall that belongs to the people of that place must be defended against other evil and different cities or people who have no place outside the wall – has haunted ontology, politics, and architecture.<sup>153</sup> The law of *Oikos*, in accordance to Plato's supposition, brought the phantasm of fixed autonomous identity, and self-identical origin, detached from any relation to the other. This phantasm still governs architecture, and Derrida calls for deconstruction of the law of *Oikos* for deconstruction of architecture; the task of deconstruction of architecture is to rethink dwelling by departing from *differance* as condition of spacing or as condition of taking place in general.<sup>154</sup>

In the law of *Oikos*, there is an economy of men and gods, destined architecture to be at the service of presenting men or gods. Architecture as always been the recall for this phantasma of origin. This economy ultimately depends on fine arts; the value of

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<sup>150</sup> . Ibid, Xiii-Xix.

<sup>151</sup> . Ibid, 1.

<sup>152</sup> . Ibid, 2-6.

<sup>153</sup> . Ibid, 11.

<sup>154</sup> . Ibid, 14-15.

beauty, harmony, and totality still must reign.<sup>155</sup> The city/polis with its inside-outside figured peoples' onto-cosmology that there is permanent good thing against must be repelled evil of difference. And this onto-cosmology lead to figure the configuration of the city according to that onto-cosmology, like building specific types of temples constructed by specialized class of architects with technico-artistic discipline. Those temples (specific architecture) configured people's social life, and the identity of the community to specific place; giving place an identity through elaboration of symbolic values. Thus, setting urban settlement using and merging religion, identity, territory to aesthetic skills in favor of political project (of self-privileged identity against other cities/outside) has become the paradigm of architecture and Western culture. So, it is in Athens and Acropolis that architecture is determined as the last fortress of metaphysics; the law of *Oikos* still governs our architectural culture.<sup>156</sup>

Derrida found a possibility of deconstruction of architecture in Tschumi, what he calls "writing of space", as a mode of arche-writing.<sup>157</sup> For Derrida, arche-writing is irreducible condition of possibility of experience and of elaboration of meaning. This arche-writing is different from traditionally imposed writing as element of expression of meaning, element of logos, subordinated to the ideal of linear phonetic-alphabetic writing. This new writing (writing of space) should be without lines for those possibilities of implicit meanings in arche-writing.<sup>158</sup>

Derrida indicates that architecture of deconstruction is writing of space; writing architecture means writing by drawing. This architecture is tracing, spacing, opening the space, without totality of the signified imposing its totality to the signifier.<sup>159</sup> For Derrida, architectural writing is multidimensional modality of spacing, empty from totality of meaning. This writing is against traditional axiomatic about both writing and architecture. In architecture, the axiomatic is that architecture must have (religious, political, etc.) meaning that commands its form, function, structure, syntax from outside. That the body of architecture is at the service of its supposed meaning.

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<sup>155</sup> . Ibid, 18-19.

<sup>156</sup> . Ibid, 24-25.

<sup>157</sup> . Ibid, 45.

<sup>158</sup> . Ibid, 46-47.

<sup>159</sup> . Ibid, 49-50.

Similarly, the axiomatic in writing puts signifiers external, and at the service of internal signified. That the valuable independent signified (like a soul) is imprisoned in the body of signifier (body).<sup>160</sup>

In defense of irreducible individuality of experience and meaning, Derrida explains that experience, for its existence, should be iterable through the traces (spaced out by memory); the traces which are different and external to the lost original (and ideal) experience. So, experiences and meanings are not absolute, but shape through interaction of individual consciousness with the traces.<sup>161</sup> Therefore, Derrida stresses on multidimensionality in deconstruction of architecture that allows for further elaboration of meanings and experiences. The multidimensionality which is called “mythogram”.<sup>162</sup>

Derrida calls Tschumi’s work as transarchitecture (not architecture, nor anarchitecture). It no longer offers its work for users, believers, or dwellers; but it calls on the other to invite, to invent, to sign, to consign, or countersign; advanced by an advance made for the other.<sup>163</sup>

Nevertheless, Vitale’s work and his interpretation of Derrida stands for irreducible possibility of experience and meaning for individuals; and that architecture should be devoid of any totalitarian meaning/signification, and letting individuals to have or construct their own interpretation of experience and meaning. In between, seemingly, architects are to provide more possibilities of elaboration of meanings and experiences for individuals to have their own other interactions and other interpretations. As it can be seen, more than criticism, Vitale approves Tschumi’s works in accordance to Derrida’s interpretation of deconstruction within architecture.

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<sup>160</sup> . Ibid, 51-55.

<sup>161</sup> . Ibid, 56-57.

<sup>162</sup> . Ibid, 59.

<sup>163</sup> . Ibid, 62.

## 2.5 Problem and gaps of deconstructivism within architectural literature

There seems to be at least six problems in deconstructivism and its argument in architectural literature. First, there is a lack of deeper reflection on Derrida's thought behind his famous keywords that deconstructive architects attempted to use. In majority of texts written in architectural literature Derrida's deconstruction is introduced with the known keywords like *differance*, trace, supplement among others. Moreover, in architectural literature, there can be seen an acknowledgement that deconstructive architects focused and applied a few keywords of deconstruction. For instance, Hoteit says:

Moreover, iconic deconstructivist architects were not committed to all concepts of this philosophy; they were known to focus on one or two concepts in deconstruction and make them fundamental principles of their personal styles in architecture. Peter Eisenman focused on the concepts of presentness and trace, Daniel Libeskind concentrated on the concept of absence, and Frank Gehry focused on binary oppositions and free play.<sup>164</sup>

Concentration on some surfaced keywords of deconstruction might endanger the application of the overall theme and strategy of deconstruction within architecture. As some critics argue, deconstructivism seems to have lacks in application of deconstruction. For instance, Brockelman admits that deconstructivism was a sudden movement without proper reflection on its meaning.<sup>165</sup>

He says Eisenman does not “anything like justice to the philosophical insight of deconstruction”<sup>166</sup>. In addition, Benjamin admits that deconstructivism “is not the application of Derrida's work to architecture”<sup>167</sup>. Hoteit, also, acknowledges that transition of deconstruction into architecture was not direct. She says: “The “transfer” of the concepts of deconstruction to architecture was not direct and literal; some concepts were modified and renamed to suit architecture.”<sup>168</sup> Furthermore, the possible

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<sup>164</sup> . Hoteit, “Deconstructivism,” 117.

<sup>165</sup> . Brockelman, “Getting,” 445.

<sup>166</sup> . Ibid, 446.

<sup>167</sup> . Benjamin, “Passing,” 44-45.

<sup>168</sup> . Hoteit, “Deconstructivism,” 117.

disjoint of deconstructivism from deconstruction can be felt from the fact that both Eisenman and Tschumi, as the closest architects to Derrida, separated their ways from Derrida because they lacked to apply true deconstruction within architecture.<sup>169</sup> Unfortunately, there are less criticism on deconstructivist architects in their application or miss-application of Derrida's deconstruction. Therefore, the second problem is the lack of researches on pursuing the possibility of missed link between Derrida's thought and deconstructivism. One of the major works in this matter is Francesco Vitale's book in which he criticized Eisenman in his misuse of the concept of trace. However, there was no criticism on Tschumi in application of deconstruction in his projects.

The second problem entails in itself the next problem. There is a lack on differentiation of deconstructive architects in their link or missed-link between their ideas and Derrida's deconstruction. One can find less in searching for differentiation of the deconstructive architects in their application of deconstruction based on Derrida's main idea. However, each deconstructivist architects have their own method in applying a few concepts of deconstruction, yet their application remains vague in compatibility of Derrida's thought. There is a need for deeper interpretation of Derrida's deconstruction beneath its keywords through which differentiation of the deconstructivist architects, in their relation with deconstruction, can be possible.

The Forth problem is the problem of meaninglessness, that encompasses both to be anti-historical and unfunctional, in deconstructivism. The link between meaninglessness and deconstructivism is obvious. For instance, Eisenman in his attempt to de-signify traditional elements (as signs) from signified (meaning, function, and history) aims to signify meaninglessness by the elements. Redundancy of elements in the project of House Cards, that breaks the hold of their traditional function and meaning from their forms, alongside of the project of Berlin-German Jewish Holocaust Memorial in which the aim is to devoid the forms from meanings are two examples of Eisenman's works. Hoteit says:

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<sup>169</sup> . Dayan, "Derrida," 77-85.

Meaninglessness, in contrast, is the absence of form's meaning, which leaves a meaningless form. ... This idea explains the presence of many incomprehensible, meaningless, and useless elements in deconstructivist projects because these elements are used merely to reject and deconstruct familiar architectural concepts.<sup>170</sup>

As mentioned before, meaninglessness is also apparently visible in Himmelb(l)au's designing attitude that tears apart any kind of codes, values, and conventions in favor of nihilism. In architectural literature, deconstructivism is bonded with meaninglessness that sacrifices function and tradition. For instance, Criste agrees that deconstructive architecture rejects historical references and function.<sup>171</sup> In another example, Soltan indicates the failure of deconstructivism for contemporary world as she sees deconstructive architecture as meaningless for The Empty Man with regard to nihilistic nature of our lives. She says:

They [deconstructive buildings] are typically fragile, unstable, quirky artifacts – they tilt, their walls have holes in them from which bricks tumble onto the ground, their edges don't meet cleanly. They are either excessively finished, with too much ornament and too many architectural features, or obviously uncompleted. They stand precariously, in pieces, with jarringly dissimilar architectural styles flush against one another, and with various elements – columns, walls, towers – simply stuck here and there, pointless and without function. The feel of a deconstructive building may be playful, celebratory, even infantile; on the other hand, the building may evoke melancholy and anxiety in its communication of vague unfulfillment or verge-of-collapse. But its true deconstructive nature will derive from its expression of a cold, hard acceptance of the failure of intellectual and moral supports in the contemporary world. ... Deconstructive architecture regards itself as uncompromising in its commitment to lucidity about the nihilistic nature of our lives; it positions itself as a kind of purgative, freeing us from every trace of nostalgia, regret, and passion. Its ideal user is the contemporary type whom Charles Jencks characterizes as “The Empty Man, the nomadic ‘man without qualities’ who can weave his way through all hierarchies showing them to be temporary and nonsensical”.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> . Hoteit, “Deconstructivism,” 123.

<sup>171</sup> . Criste, “The Deconstruction,” 33-34.

<sup>172</sup> . Soltan, 2008, 242-243.



Beside meaninglessness, there can be detected another problem with deconstructivist architects which is related to subjectivism and relativism. As it is obvious in the thoughts and projects of the deconstructive architects, there is an unquestionable authority of architect/designer in his/her subjective manipulation and (re)creation of forms and meanings against tradition. Libeskind with his subjective design of symbolic meanings, Gehry's personalized choice of bouncing body of fish, Hadid's authoritative designs for reforming the environment, Koolhaas's theory of Bigness to reform the face of cities, Himmelb(l)au's self-assured authority for destruction of forms, and at last but not least, Eisenman's subjective reformation of tradition to present the absent aspect of it are examples for identification of the existence of excessive subjectivity of designers/architects in their creation of forms and meanings. Moreover, different from the other deconstructive architects who gave the power to the designer, there is an excessive subjectivity of individuals in interpreting and meaning-making in the works of Tschumi who gave the authority to the visitors rather than the designer. Therefore, not only deconstructivism faces meaninglessness, but it also confronts subjectivism and relativism that might be regarded as other problem within deconstructivism.

Related to the problems of nihilism and relativism, the sixth problem with deconstructivism, in general, is the prescription of visual exaggeration to enhance the spatial experience for the issue of indifference. In evaluation of the cited deconstructive architects, the main motivation for the all is the idea that architecture should be the site of affect in direct opposition to indifference. For this problem of indifference, majority of the deconstructive architects refuted in visual external appearance that resulted in exaggerated facades and forms to accelerate the spatial experience. However, on reflecting the issue of indifference, it seems that the source of indifference derives from meaninglessness and relativism. In my interpretation, indifference and disengagement can be driven from three conditions. One, when there is a lack of meaning by which the bond between visitors, (or occupants) in their sense-making, and buildings is destructed. Second, when there is fixed totalitarian meaning that prevents further interaction of humans in their meaning-makings. Third, when there is overwhelming possibility of relative meanings that puts visitors on the verge

of disengagement and indifference. Hence, to find a solution (other than prescribed exaggerated appearance) for meaninglessness and relativism within architecture could be a remedy for the problem of indifference and disengagement in (deconstructive) architecture.

Therefore, to address the problems, this thesis first aims to have deeper interpretation of Derrida through Heidegger beyond mere concentration on deconstruction's keywords to find out the possible missed link between deconstructivism and Derrida's thought by which, from one hand, the differentiation of deconstructive architects becomes possible, and from the other, it could suggest a strategy that lessens the bond between (deconstructive) architecture and meaninglessness (including being anti-historical and unfunctional) of nihilism, chaos of relativism, and dogmatism of metaphysics.



## CHAPTER 3

### METAPHYSICS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ARCHITECTURE

Main aspect of Derrida's deconstruction and (and also Heidegger's philosophy) is to challenge traditional metaphysics. Accordingly, proper appreciation of deconstruction within architecture should be against metaphysical thinking. Therefore, there is a need for realizing the effect of metaphysics on architecture (to be avoided). However, it is not the aim of this thesis to cover all aspects of metaphysics within architecture, but to the point that the effect be realized. Before approaching to the relation of metaphysics and architecture, it is required to introduce metaphysics.

#### 3.1 Metaphysics of Presence

Metaphysics of presence is the mainstream of traditional Western thought. The entire history of philosophy, the traditional ontology, the Western metaphysics, from Parmenides to Husserl has always been the metaphysics of presence.<sup>173</sup> The main idea of traditional metaphysics is that there is innate, absolute, and fixed truth in the reality of materials, or in mind, which is the conception of body-mind dualism, that can be achieved by reason and logic. Caputo says:

The history of metaphysics is just this attempt to sweeten, blunt and falsify the sharp and dangerous edges of the "truth". "metaphysics": that means a faith in binary oppositions in which becoming is blunted by being, error by truth, time be eternity, body by soul, the sensible by the super-sensible. These oppositions are so many ways metaphysics has devised for itself to give us comfort, to soften and attenuate. Metaphysics means faith in "reason," as if reason were a clear and disinterested insight which captures the

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<sup>173</sup> . Fanny Soderback, "Being in the Present: Derrida and Irigaray on the Metaphysics of Presence." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 27, no. 3, (2013): 253.

secret rule of nature and history, as if it were clear to itself, as if it did not plead for its own prejudices. Metaphysics is also faith in mathematical physics, as if natural science held the key and were not only an interpretation.<sup>174</sup>

Hence, from one hand, metaphysics searches for the absolute fixed truth either in material/body or in mind, as the secret rule of nature. In metaphysics, as Helena De Preseter and Gertrudis Vijver say: “there is an absolute, *fixed* stabilizing anchorage of the structure ... the stabilizing function of a point of presence is absolute and universal”<sup>175</sup>. Fanny Soderback argues that this fixity of truth in metaphysics of presence originates from its understanding of time as linear line; the understanding of presence as eternal, as selfsame being or entity detached from the past. In metaphysics of presence, the sensible realm is subject to change, but the intellectual realm is not subject to change or becoming or time; hence, in this view, Being has been taught to be immune from time and changing.<sup>176</sup> Primordial presence is the selfsame Being above the realm of time, and immune to time, for the sake of identity.<sup>177</sup> This derives from perceiving Being as mere fixed presence and appearance in which it become controllable identifiable subject by truth. Metaphysics of presence tends to believe in absolute origin and ultimate goal; it is about absolute past or ideal future.<sup>178</sup>

From the other hand, in traditional metaphysics, there is body-mind dualism or subject-object detachment. As Caputo indicates, metaphysics uses the metaphor of ocular in which there is a distance and detachment between subject and object.<sup>179</sup> Human being as the subject is completely pre-assumed detached from the world of materials (as object). This dilemma of subject-object dichotomy, or body-mind dualism that continued to modernity, is the result of the idea of Descartes (the father of modern philosophy) through which Being becomes the subject possessed by the control of subjective positioning. Caputo says:

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<sup>174</sup> . John D. Caputo, “Three Transgressions: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida.” *Research in Phenomenology* 15. (1985): 62

<sup>175</sup> . Helena De Preseter, and Gertrudis Van De Vijver, “Evidence and Structure: Perspectives on the metaphysics of presence and non-presence,” *Analecta Husserliana LX X X VIII* (2005): 288-9.

<sup>176</sup> . Soderback, “Being in,” 254.

<sup>177</sup> . *Ibid*, 254.

<sup>178</sup> . *Ibid*, 255.

<sup>179</sup> . John D. Caputo, “The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 36, no.3 (March 1983): 670.

tendencies embedded in metaphysics to bring Being under the domination of the subject [...] Value [embedded in traditional metaphysics] involves the distinction between objective facts and subjective values [...] Values are what is added on by the subject, what is posited by subjective positing, and hence possible only where thinking is conceived in terms of *vor-stellen*, that is, in modern Cartesian terms. [...] metaphysical tendency to submit the world to conceptual control [...] treating the world as something essentially subject to human positing and control [...] pretension of metaphysics to mastery and conceptual control [...]<sup>180</sup>

In another place, Caputo explains that the tradition of metaphysics is continued in modernity as subject-object detachment, in which presentation becomes the concerned issue. He says:

The whole of modernity is looked upon, not as a period of breakthrough and discovery of the contribution of the subject (and hence of Dasein), but as a subjectivizing of Being. Modernity is the age of the *Weltbild*, of the world as picture and representation, as an object for the thinking subject which sets itself up as the measure of all that is and is not.<sup>181</sup>

Through this detachment, human subject attaches his/her perceptions to the unknown already pre-assumed existing thing (body or mind), and finds that perception as the truth. Heidegger says: “Our thinking has of course long been accustomed to *understate* the nature of the things. The consequence, in the course of Western thought, has been that that thing is represented as an unknown X to which perceptible properties are attached.”<sup>182</sup> Accordingly, Caputo says: “Metaphysics suffers from the illusion – first instigated by Plato’s notion of a pure *nous* looking on the one side and a subject-free object-in-itself on the other. And metaphysics holds that the bridge over this abyss is propositional rectitude.” However, the detachment or dualism of body-mind, and consequently truth as the absolute innate secret knowledge within body/object or mind/subject is invigorated from Descartes, it first began with Plato.

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<sup>180</sup> . Caputo, “Three Transgressions,” 66-76.

<sup>181</sup> . John D. Caputo, “Demythologizing Heidegger: “Aletheia” and the History of Being,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 41. no. 3, (Mar. 1988): p. 521.

<sup>182</sup> . Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, ed. Albert Hofstadter (New York: HARPER PERENNIAL MODERN CLASSICS, 2001), 151.

Metaphysics of presence is started with Plato, and with mistaken conception of truth as correctness.<sup>183</sup> While “Greeks experiences of Being as the open and manifest realm in which things appear and are manifest”, the trouble of traditional metaphysics arouses from definition of truth as mere correctness by Plato and Aristotle.<sup>184</sup> By their definition, they tried to dominate the Being by capturing its beingness as mere presence.<sup>185</sup> The wrong turn of traditional ontology or metaphysics of presence that Heidegger wanted to destruct can be perceived through the misunderstanding of *aletheia*. Caputo says:

*aletheia* as the realm of unconcealment is the concealed clue, the implicit horizon, the unconceived realm, *within which* the Greek experience of Being unfolds. [...] *Aletheia* functions like a hidden clue, not a manifest theme. *Aletheia* is what it is when it is not to be found, when it constitutes the silence of the opening itself whose sole function is letting-be. [...] *Aletheia* itself cannot appear; it can only be pointed out subsequently as the element within which a given historical form of life unfolds.<sup>186</sup>

According to Heidegger, there are two understanding of being as *on aletheia* and *aletheia as such*.<sup>187</sup> Early Greeks considered both of them in unconcealment of being. *On aletheia* relates “the correctness of assertions to the manifestness of the being” while *aletheia as such* relates to “manifestness of the being to the openness of Being, to Being as the open”.<sup>188</sup> *Aletheia as such* (as the quality of Being, as unconcealment) is a hidden clue (which itself cannot appear) that points towards the openness of the Being in which entities/beings become manifest. *On aletheia* (as another quality of Being) is the manifestation of those entities/beings in their phenomenality. In the history of metaphysics, *aletheia as such* has been neglected in favor of *on aletheia*. Furthermore, *on aletheia* also got Romanized, Christened as, and modernized as *veritas* [goddess of truth], *certitudo* [certainty], and *Richtigkeitgod* [accuracy].<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> . Caputo, “The Thought,” 663.

<sup>184</sup> . Caputo, “Demythologizing,” 523.

<sup>185</sup> . Ibid, p. 525.

<sup>186</sup> . Ibid, p. 524.

<sup>187</sup> . Ibid, p. 527.

<sup>188</sup> . Ibid, p. 527.

<sup>189</sup> . Ibid. p. 525.

*Aletheia* has been misunderstood as merely correctness (or truth) in which entities show themselves. The traditional history conveyed (and distorted) only the first notion of *aletheia* as truth in which it relates about appearance and presence of entities. It opened up the notion of subject-object understanding. But in *aletheia as such* which it refers to the opening of the Being, the meaning or truth or content is not the concern. It mainly concerns the Being as the realm in which entities come to presence.

All in all, metaphysical thinking which began and continued to the modernity from Plato and then from Descartes, has subject-object dichotomy with no sense of unity and belonging; it searches for absolute knowledge as the innate secret of things in material or mind. As Caputo indicates, metaphysics suppresses the authentic preunderstanding that we are already belong to Being; it seeks anti-dote for finitude, limitation, and mortality of man; and it seeks absolute knowledge.<sup>190</sup> This metaphysical thinking was the result of owning and determining Being by the human subject; the pre-assumption of Being to be already there in body or mind without questioning it.

### **3.2 Metaphysical thinking within Architecture**

As mentioned above, metaphysics is based on misconception of Being as presence, and searches for fixed truth, structure, ground, unity, and whole. In the metaphysical thinking, human being is considered a detached subject from the world (objects) that resulted in subject-object detachment. Due to these main axioms of metaphysics, various concepts are related to metaphysics like (as mentioned in chapter 2) the centrality of presence, logocentrism, phonocentrism, centrality of language, and binary opposition.

The influence of metaphysics on architecture can be observed from various points. For instance, in the binary opposition, many prioritized first terms over secondary terms can be founded in the history of architecture (like structure/ornament, function/form,

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<sup>190</sup> . Caputo, "The Thought," 682.



presence/absence, whole/part, etc.) In this chapter, the influence is to be introduced through two main points. First, as Being is understood as fixed presence, unity, and whole within metaphysics, its influence on architecture can be observed within the part-whole relationship in architecture in which there is a preference of whole over the parts from Plato to the 60s. It is also within the metaphysical concept of binary opposition in which the first (whole) is preferred over the second (parts). Second, as there is subject-object detachment in metaphysics, the influence of objectivism and subjectivism (as two main wings of metaphysics) on architecture can be observed. (It is not within the aim of this thesis to cover all aspects of part-whole relationship, subjectivism, and objectivism in the history of architecture, but to the point to display the effect of metaphysical thinking upon architecture.)

### 3.2.1 Part-whole relationship in architecture

The relation of parts and wholes (mereology) in the history of philosophy has deep and complex roots that is beyond the goal of this thesis. However, it can be pointed out that in the reign of metaphysics since Plato to the 60s, there has been the preference of whole over parts – as there has been the preference of assumed original over secondaries in the binary opposition. For instance, Verity Harte<sup>191</sup> about Plato's accepted model of part-whole relationship signifies that wholes are the structure and identity in which parts can only be determined in the context of the whole.<sup>192</sup>

As *the whole* and *unity* has been one of the main problematics of philosophy<sup>193</sup>, it has its ground in history of architecture. Ancients believed in *unity* as *coherence*, in which “elements of architecture had to be related to form a unified whole, within the building and in connection with the universe”<sup>194</sup>. But understanding *the whole* requires its *relationship* with *the parts*. Hence, “architecture already participates in the question of

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<sup>191</sup> . Verity Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure* (Oxford: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>192</sup> . N. D. Smith, Review of *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure*, by Verity Harte. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 42, no.3 (2004): 333-334.

<sup>193</sup> . Adrian Snodgrass and Richard Coyne, *Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a way of thinking*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 3-22.

<sup>194</sup> . *Ibid*, 11.




Figure 31. Influence of metaphysics on architecture.  
(Source: drawn by author)

hermeneutical inquiry ... More specifically, interpretation is a question of relationship between the parts and the whole”<sup>195</sup>. To understand through the *part-whole relationship* of hermeneutics, “reader needs to grasp the parts to understand the whole, and the whole is needed to understand the parts”<sup>196</sup>.

This model of *unity/whole* and *part-whole relationship* have roots in two major ideologies: first one from premodern era, was Stoicism that its connection to the modern era can be found in Renaissance, Neo-classic, and French Rationalism. This ideology more inclined to Conservatism and Rationalism. For Stoicism, unitary resides around us, by the virtue of interrelationship between all things. It conceives architecture, generally, related to natural laws, geometry, and reason. Vitruvius, who took ratio, proportion, symmetry, and organic unity of the




Figure 32. Vitruvian Man, an illustration about importance of human proportion and geometry in Vitruvius’s writings. (Source: <https://checkpointtech.com/quality-vitruvius-and-leonardo-da-vinci/>)

worldly human body is categorized in the scope of Stoicism. In this way, a building like a human body sits as the *coherent whole* in which its *parts* need to have their proportionate *place*; so, the ratio between *the whole* and *the parts* become the interpretational *relationship* between them.<sup>197</sup> Snodgrass and Coyne say: “the ancient question of architecture focuses on unity, and the relationship of the parts to that unity, understood as a matter of symmetry and ratio ... ratio was a matter of relation, bond.”<sup>198</sup>

According to Snodgrass and Coyne, Renaissance’s geometry, precision, symmetry and ratio, and also Leon Battista Alberti’s *lineaments* share the same position of Stoicism. They both are involved in interpretation as the *relationship* between geometrical *parts* and *whole*. Furthermore, the Stoicism infused with modern era’s French Rationalists

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<sup>195</sup> . Ibid, 13.

<sup>196</sup> . Ibid, 13.

<sup>197</sup> . Ibid, 11.

<sup>198</sup> . Ibid, 12.

and Positivist like R. Descartes, G.H. Leibniz, M.A. Laugier, J.N.L. Durand, and V. Le-Duc. They converted the Platonic *mimesis* (which was externally ideal) into some internal ideal precision and ration.<sup>199</sup> The essence of French Rationalism is to rationally seek for an internal origin in the past as the *whole*; searching for organic unity; exploring some fact in ancient origin which is fixed for all time and for everyone. A distinct example is Laugier's primitive hut. Descartes, Durand and Le-Duc took a kind of Reductionist approach and conceived *the whole* as method, typology, composition, fitness, and economy.<sup>200</sup> For Durand, *the whole* is the combination of its *parts*, so, buildings as *the whole* can be reduced and explained by the *parts*, and vice versa (typology). And for Le-Duc, "architecture requires methodically applied, where method is a process of putting everything in its right place and doing everything at the right time"<sup>201</sup>. In this view, a building as a *whole* is complete in itself with respect to reason, ration, geometry, symmetry, composition, and architectural history. There remains no need for spirit of epochs to complete it.



Figure 33. Laugier's primitive hut, 18th Century, an illustration to argue originality of architecture. (Source: <https://www.archdaily.com/1005956/what-primitive-huts-teach-us-about-architecture/64e88249fbc6580ae16751a9-what-primitive-huts-teach-us-about-architecture-image>)

*The unity/whole and part-whole relationship* can be traced in the second tradition of Platonism which is connected to German Idealism and Historicism in modern era. Platonic *whole/unity* is a transcendental one in which the belief is that there exists an external and fixed unitary realm outside human experience.<sup>202</sup> In this way, *the part-*

<sup>199</sup> . Ibid, 14-16.

<sup>200</sup> . Ibid, 16.

<sup>201</sup> . Ibid, 16.

<sup>202</sup> . Ibid, 10.

*whole relationship* in architecture becomes the *relation* of human with the divine.

Snodgrass and Coyne say:

Architecture is positioned within a Platonic schema of meaning and significance. Architecture provides the quintessential interpretation of divinity, or at least the relationship between the human and the divine.<sup>203</sup>

Platonic *part-whole relationship* is evident in the notion of *mimesis* (that also encompasses another essential notion in architecture: *beautiful*. Plato asserts that “the heavenly order of the cosmos provides true vision of the beautiful”<sup>204</sup>). In the Platonic *part-whole relationship*, artists copy the ideal or archetypal *whole*, in which parts take part in the *whole* as its analogous representation; so, any artwork become the imitation of an ideal. Snodgrass and Coyne say: “The principle of mimesis, ‘understood as an analogous participation of the part in the whole, lies at the heart of Platonic cosmology. Mimesis implicates the dialectic between the part and the whole.”<sup>205</sup>

In connection to Platonism, there is German Idealism and Historicism. Historicism characterizes each epoch of history for its spirit. This comes from German idealism (F. Schleiermacher, J.G. Harder, W. Humboldt, G.W.F. Hegel, L. Ranke) that is concerned with “contextual nature of historical grounding; a concern with peculiarities of time and place in which events unfold, and with the character of a community”<sup>206</sup>. Hence, a building (and history of architecture) is not complete itself (like French Rationalism) and it needs to be uncovered through the spirit of its epoch. About Historicism and its effects on architecture Snodgrass and Coyne say:

According to historicism, architecture distils the spirit of a time and a people in its unitary artefacts. ... historians must penetrate the essential spirit of a country or period. According to Alan Colquhoun, this was ‘to reveal the idea beneath the empirical surface of historical events. ... Historicism in architecture treats interpretation and history as the processes

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<sup>203</sup> . Ibid, 13.

<sup>204</sup> . Ibid, 18.

<sup>205</sup> . Ibid, 14.

<sup>206</sup> . Ibid, 6.

of uncovering the grand idea, the Spirit of a People (*Volkgeist*) and the Spirit of the Age (*Zeitgeist*). ... [according to Schleiermacher,] interpretation is a reconstruction, and one has only understood what one has reconstructed in all its relationships and in its context.<sup>207</sup>

Hence, German Idealism and Historicism relates to organic coherence of an epoch (epochal organicism) in which each epoch can be observed and explained. Historicism was a reaction to French Rationalism's *disengaging* attitude from people and community. Concerning this unity and *disengagement* with the world, Harries calls for interpretive architecture; architecture as the "interpretation of a way of life"; that architecture is not "decorated shed", but as "issue of dwelling".<sup>208</sup> Harries in accordance to Historicism, stresses on our incompleteness, and in need of others, community, and love. Subsequently, buildings and history are not complete in themselves, and they need people and community to complete the *whole* of artwork or building. Specifically, in architecture, G. Semper linked spirit of epoch – epochal historicism – to architecture by the concept of *style* in respect to "aesthetic-organic unification of a critical age"<sup>209</sup>.

In both ideologies of Platonism (and then French Rationalism and Positivism) and Stoicism (and German Idealism and Historicism), the primacy on *part-whole relationship* was *the whole* as coherence. The reason was to achieve *the whole* as Platonic transcendental and external unity or as Stoicism's worldly internal unity for imitation. In this respect, French Rationalism was denounced by Historicists as it *disengages* us from the world and communication. Historicist brought the human sense-making (significance and meaning) into Positivism. Main argument was that history (of architecture) can't be understood and can't be complete in itself, and it needs to be interpreted in its context and spirit of its epochs.

However, in late modernism, historicists themselves criticized by those who claimed that Historicism's features are not much different from Rationalists. Snodgrass and

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<sup>207</sup> . Ibid, 5-8.

<sup>208</sup> . Ibid, 17.

<sup>209</sup> . Ibid, 16.

Coyne say: “the search for and promotion of this spirit represents no deviation from the rationalist tenets of modernism.”<sup>210</sup> The criticism lies at the heart of what Historicist founded upon. If history needs to be interpreted in its spirit and context, then, those interpretations expressed in this respect are already happened in particular time and place; those interpretations were some events, not some holistic truth or meaning about the epochs. As Snodgrass and Coyne approves “all historical study is conducted from a particular point of view, within a particular horizon, whether one is operating within the historicist tradition of the scientific”<sup>211</sup>. In this view, there is an implication of excessive *reinterpretation* rather than interpretation; it shattered *the whole* to its *fragments*. In this way, *fragmentation*, *multiplicity*, and *the parts* become the focal point in *the part-whole relationship*. Snodgrass and Coyne, for instance, mentions Gadamer’s hermeneutics to be against both French Rationalists and German Idealists in searching for *the whole*.<sup>212</sup> They says:

Buildings are also incomplete in the sense that their meanings are never stabilised and fixed. ... Coherence is a transitory phenomenon, an interpretation of particular time and place, and prone to revision and renewal. Histories and buildings are never complete, a metaphor of the play that is interpretation. ... the fragment has more value than the whole in certain quarter of contemporary design theory.<sup>213</sup>

However, this primacy of *fragmentation* and *multiplicity* for modern thinkers seems to be destructive, but it has healing aspects which mainly considered as “restorative mapping and articulation of the world”.<sup>214</sup> Snodgrass and Coyne explain and extend this attitude of *fragmentation* against *unity*, to other concept like *irony*, *discontinuity*, *alienation*, *dislocation*, *narration*, and *play*.<sup>215</sup> This approach in architecture can be seen in postmodern architecture (Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, Deconstructivism, and Hermeneutics). Snodgrass and Coyne say: “contemporary approaches to design

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<sup>210</sup> . Ibid, 5.

<sup>211</sup> . Ibid, 7.

<sup>212</sup> . Ibid, 18.

<sup>213</sup> . Ibid, 19.

<sup>214</sup> . Ibid, 19.

<sup>215</sup> . Ibid, 19-21.

attest to the vigour of such unsettling strategies, suggesting that architecture is not only about finding a place and a time, but about dislocation.”<sup>216</sup>

All in all, architecture is interpretive in respect to its *part-whole relationship*, and this *relationship* is evident in two major attitudes in history of architecture from early Greeks to the contemporary approaches. In *the part-whole relationship*, from early Greeks to the late modernism (can be assumed around the 60s) the primacy was upon *the whole/unity*, and then, the primacy substituted to *fragmentation/multiplicity*. Stoicism, French Rationalism and Positivism failed and ignored human meaning, and Platonism, German Idealism and Historicism failed by its own reason to provide united meaning. In the failure of *coherence of the whole/unity*, philosophy and architecture inclined toward *multiplicity/fragmentation*. This brought *irony, dislocation, and play* to architecture like postmodernism and deconstructivism. This procedure seems to be continued since then.

### **3.2.2 The Relation of Objectivism and Subjectivism with Architecture**

It is required to introduce objectivism and subjectivism as the two main structures of metaphysics, before displaying their effect on architecture.

#### **3.2.2.1 Objectivism and Subjectivism**

Objectivism is an ideology that first asserts for the independent existence of objective reality outside of human perception. So, the truth lies outside in the reality within the materialistic property of objects and entities; and it does not include human sense-making in his judgment, prejudice, culture, tradition, religion, society, ethics, and generally in his quest for meaning and significance. Also, objectivism believes that the nature of objective reality can be achieved through reason in an overarching framework. However, such a foundational framework has not been achieved to secure reality and knowledge. R. J. Bernstein says:

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<sup>216</sup> . Ibid, 21.



We cannot avoid the “primordial intuition” that there is a world that is independent of our beliefs and fancies that forces itself upon us willy-nilly and constrains what we can think, say, and do. ... By “objectivism,” I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. An objectivist claims that there is (or must be) such a matrix and that the primary task of the philosopher is to discover what it is ... Objectivism is closely related to foundationalism and the search for an Archimedean point. ... “objectivism” has frequently been used to designate metaphysical realism – the claim that there is a world of objective reality that exist independently of us and that has a determinate nature or essence that we can know. In modern times objectivism has been closely linked with an acceptance of a basic metaphysical or epistemological distinction between the subject and the object. What is “out there” (objective) is presumed to be independent of us (subjects), and knowledge is achieved when a subject correctly mirrors or represents objective reality.<sup>217</sup>

Hence, objectivism deals with the natural codes and material properties of entities outside. A. PH. Lagopoulos says: “*the objectivist paradigm approaches space as a material entity*”<sup>218</sup>. Additionally, from A. Huizing’s article<sup>219</sup>, it can be understood that objective knowledge searches for inherent properties of an object. On the other hand, objectivism ignores the human part and his/her sense making aspect with respect to meanings and significances. Huizing says: “Searching for universal laws, objectivism cannot deal with human sense making, ... in objectivism, these all too human aspects are silenced. In the objectivist search for economic rationality and disembodied truths, human beings are separated from the objects in their environment.”<sup>220</sup> Objectivism has been developed by Ayn Rand. She says: “My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of

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<sup>217</sup> . Richard J. Bernstein, *BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 4-9.

<sup>218</sup> . Alexandros PH. Lagopoulos, “Subjectivism postmodernism, and social space,” *Semiotica* 183, no. ¼ (2011): 129.

<sup>219</sup> . Ard Huizing, “The Value of a Rose: Rising above Objectivism and Subjectivism,” University of Amsterdam, Netherlands. *Sprouts: Working papers on Information System*, 7(11). <http://sprouts.aisnet.org/7-11>

<sup>220</sup> . *Ibid*, 3-8.

man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute.”<sup>221</sup> Her philosophy is mainly founded upon individual freedom against all cultures, traditions, social communication, and any ideology that limits individual freedom.

Subjectivism and relativism<sup>222</sup> succeeded after failure of objectivism in providing the overarching framework to explain the reality. Subjectivism and relativism are concerned with human sense making out of objective reality with its objects and entities. Relying on personal or social opinion, they provide meaning, significance and coherence for the purposes of communication with other humans and objects in the environment; they are about value judgments. Huizing says:

What motivates subjectivism is the awareness that understanding, truth, and meaning are relative to the cultural and physical context people live in as well as to their mental frameworks of how the world functions. ... Interactional properties are the intersubjective meanings given to objects that arise out people making sense of their world in situated processes of human communication and negotiation, reflecting what they believe is important to their private and organizational lives. ... understanding, truth and meaning are therefore neither fixed nor entirely residing in objects, waiting to be ‘conveyed’ and ‘extracted’, but are dynamically and socially negotiated and constructed. Being a symbol of love is not an inherent property of rose, but an interactional property that has emerged from people’s imagination. We learn to understand such meanings by engagingly interacting with the world.<sup>223</sup>

In accordance with the idea that subjectivism (and relativism) is a value judgment (or a meaning quest) that arises from people’s subjective ideologies (cultural, religious,

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<sup>221</sup> . Horowitz, Daniel. 2018. “Objectivism (Philosophical System).” Salem Press Encyclopedia. <http://0-search.ebscohost.com.library.metu.edu.tr/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=ers&AN=113931193&site=eds-live>.

<sup>222</sup> . I brought here both subjectivism and relativism, not to signify that they are same. Subjectivism seeks for universality of its meaning claiming; but, relativism respects for meaning claiming of all individuals, cultures, societies. The main reason I brought them together is that they both are related to human sense making and his value judgment. They both are on the contrary side of objectivism that seeks for value-neutral code and framework to explain the reality.

<sup>223</sup> . Huizing, “A Value,” 7-9.

social, individual, etc.) constructed upon objective reality outside, Lagopoulos says: “*Subjectivism ... [as] the conceptual paradigm studies the conceptual world of social subjects, either the meaning that spatial objects have for them or the ideas associated with them. Thus, the conceptual orientation is a semiotic orientation in the wide sense and hence a cultural orientation.*”<sup>224</sup>

In short, objectivism is a search for foundational bedrock (*unity/whole*) in which the objective reality can be discovered as it is based on pure reason; and subjectivism is a search for *unity/whole* in the realm of human sense-making and meaning; (and relativism is the acknowledgment of this failure of *unity* (of both natural codes/facts and meaning) that accords to *fragmentation/multiplicity*.)

There has always been a gap and conflict between subjectivism and objectivism that comes from objectivism’s failure in providing the overarching framework to explain the reality, and subjectivism’s failure in providing united meaning for all human cultures, (and relativism’s outcome of chaos). Relativists accuse objectivists that their fixed and firm foundation are open to question, and objectivists accuse relativism as “self-referentially inconsistent and paradoxical”.<sup>225</sup> For instance, relativists claim their position is true, but if truth is relative, relativists’ assumed true position can be false.<sup>226</sup> Bernstein about the affinity of relativism with pessimism says: “The fashionable varieties of relativism that are spreading everywhere frequently lead to cynicism and a growing sense of impotence.”<sup>227</sup><sup>228</sup>

It seems that the main conflict between objectivism and subjectivism lies in the nature of outside/external reality, and inside/internal human sense-making. Objectivism, relying on the objective reality outside, failed to catch the reality; the reality with its infinite different entities and codes. The unknown reality remained elusive with its

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<sup>224</sup> . Lagopoulos, “Subjectivism,” 129.

<sup>225</sup> . Bernstein, “Beyond,” 9.

<sup>226</sup> . Ibid, 9.

<sup>227</sup> . Ibid, 4.

<sup>228</sup> . As subjectivism differs in detail with relativism, their accusation also differs. Relativism is accused to bring pessimism and accordingly it would bring chaos. On the other hand, subjectivism is accused to bring dogmatism and terror since it believes its meaning-claiming is right for everyone.

multiplicity of entities, beings, materials. Objectivism failed to grasp the one overarching natural fact/code within the different multiplicity of entities, facts, codes (or it failed to grasp one overarching bedrock for philosophy within multiplicity of different attitudes and ideologies of philosophers to explain the reality). On the other hand, subjectivism, relying on the subjective sense-making of humans, failed to catch the (ultimate) meaning and truth for all humans (with different cultures) to accept. it failed to grasp the one meaning outside in the ideal realm.

### 3.2.2.2 Objectivism and subjectivism in architecture

According to the discussion, objectivism searches for fixed and value-neutral truth and unity through pure reason, independent from human sense-making, his culture, religion, and whatever that belongs to the domain of human context, community, and meaning. Respectfully, objectivism in architecture can be observed through some factors. One of them, is the emphasis on the pure reason that subsequently would lead to precise proportion, geometry, ratio, constraints and rules. Snodgrass says:

*Objective design evaluation requires that the criteria for assessment be unambiguously specified and that these criteria be applied in accordance with strict procedural rules. ... In the objectivist's view the choice is between rational procedures, strictly governed by constraints that guarantee that judgments will be disinterested, and a wholly irrational, emotional and uncontrolled subjectivism.*<sup>229</sup>

B. Mitrovic and I. Djordjevic relate the “The Great Theory”<sup>230</sup> to objective truth in proportion.<sup>231</sup> In this way, they come to a rational mimesis, in a sense that there is no difference between original and copy since they both have same proportion.<sup>232</sup> They

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<sup>229</sup> . Adrian Snodgrass, “CAN DESIGN ASSESSMENT BE OBJECTIVE?,” *Architectural Theory Review* 1, no. 1 (1996): 30-34.

<sup>230</sup> . Mitrovic and Djordjevic say: “The Great Theory” is a term first use by Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz to denote all aesthetic theories that reduce the beautiful (partly or entirely) to a system of numerical relationships.”

<sup>231</sup> . Branko Mitrovic, and Ivana Djordjevic, “Objectively Speaking,” *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 52, no. 1 (March 1993): 59.

<sup>232</sup> . *Ibid*, 59.

say: “objectivist supporters of the same theory, who claim that an object owes its beauty to its proportions regardless of the angle under which it is viewed.”<sup>233</sup>

This stress on precise proportion and strict constraints (or methods) in objectivism can be seen in architectural history, for instance: in Vitruvius’s (as a Stoic) perfection of proportions and ratios;<sup>234</sup> in Alberti’s precise lineaments and geometry;<sup>235</sup> in neoclassical architecture that obeys natural laws and “the authority of geometrical and absolute principles of reason”;<sup>236</sup> in the Enlightenment whose thinkers took Platonic mimesis, and converted it through reason and rationality, to ratio;<sup>237</sup> or in Renaissance’s insistence on ratio, reason, proportion, and calculations;<sup>238</sup> in French Rationalist thinkers like Durand and Le-Duc who related architecture to methods, fitness, and methodical rules;<sup>239</sup> or in Modern Movement’s logical positivism and in its quest for rational and value neutral architecture.<sup>240</sup>

Another factor of objectivism in architecture can be traced through discarding the human sense-making by believing in the completeness of buildings in themselves and in their design, independent from any imposed meanings by historical, social, cultural, or spiritual context. About the conflict of objectivism and tradition, Raman and Coyne say: “Objectivism has pitted itself against orthodoxy and tradition”.<sup>241</sup> Mitrovic and Djordjevic indicate that in the objectivistic attitude of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, universe had been understood as “mechanical laws with no ulterior plan”<sup>242</sup>. They probably intended the end of traditional metaphysics with its meaningful context. Ayn Rand, according to B. Bilgehan Ozpek, who relates objectivism to modern architecture (specially to F.L. Wright’s works) generates objectivism in contrast to state (in favor of capitalism,

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<sup>233</sup> . Ibid, 61.

<sup>234</sup> . Snodgrass and Coyne, “Interpretation,” 11.

<sup>235</sup> . Ibid, 13-14.

<sup>236</sup> . Ibid, 6.

<sup>237</sup> . Ibid, 14.

<sup>238</sup> . Ibid, 11.

<sup>239</sup> . Ibid, 16.

<sup>240</sup> . Pattabi Raman, and Richard Coyne, “The Production of Architectural Criticism,” *Architectural Theory Review* 16, no. 2 (2011): 103.

<sup>241</sup> . Raman and Coyne, “The Production,” 104.

<sup>242</sup> . Mitrovic, and Djordjevic, “Objectively,” 61.

democracy, and individual rights), society (in favor of self-interest), tradition, religion, and culture (in favor of reason or rationality).<sup>243</sup> He says:

According to Rand, state, traditions, social solidarity, religions or any kind of relationship which is not the result of human reason is invented by the human being in order to hide human insufficiencies. ... In analyzing the relationship between Rand's objectivism and architecture, it is necessary to understand architecture as against state, society and history. ... she apparently made Wrightian architecture as the center of objectivism's architectural interpretations. By Wrightian, I initially mean an understanding of architecture that refuses the sacrifice of the individual for society and traditions.<sup>244</sup>

Accordingly, Lagopoulos who relates "modern rational structural, universalizing, and static approach to architecture as autonomous spatial entity"<sup>245</sup> states: "the modern movement in architecture eliminated the relation with the past, simultaneously eliminating the differences between places and communities."<sup>246</sup> The opposing attitude of objectivism towards human context or sense-making is the belief that buildings are complete in themselves, and there is no need for attributing meanings. As Snodgrass indicates, objectivism assumes: first, that design is an object detached from subject and "in isolation from a context"; and second, that value is inhered within design.<sup>247</sup> In summary, this fact of objectivism in architecture can be seen: in Vitruvius's (as a Stoic, so eventually, in Stoicism's) restricted rigorous rules that did not allow reason and rationality become stained by meanings; in French Rationalism who believed in completeness of buildings; in modern architecture that according to Rand is against society, tradition, and culture.

Parallel to this autonomy of objectivism from human subjectivity and his searching for some ideal united meaning, there stands a search for a worldly factual unity and

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<sup>243</sup> . Burak Bilgehan Ozpek, "AYN RAND, OBJECTIVISM AND ARCHITECTURE." Master diss., Middle East Technical University, 2006.

<sup>244</sup> . Ibid, 28-38.

<sup>245</sup> . Lagopoulos, "Subjectivism," 167.

<sup>246</sup> . Ibid, 173.

<sup>247</sup> . Snodgrass, "Can Design," 35-36.

originality in the ancient practice. This worldly quest is visible in Vitruvius who takes the human body as perfection of proportions and ratio, and also in Laugier's rustic hut. However modern movement and modern architecture, in accordance to objectivism of Rand, does not search for originality in ancient practices<sup>248</sup>, like what we see in French Rationalism as another aspect of objectivism, but they both have commonality in the respect of discarding from subjective meanings. French Rationalism, to discard subjective meanings, rest upon some worldly originality in the history, and modern architecture of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to discard subjective meanings denied tradition and history for its context that might bring subjective meanings into architecture.

Furthermore, objectivism in architecture can be observed through its relation to natural facts or codes, rather than imposed meaning. For Rand, metaphysics is about natural codes<sup>249</sup> that can be converted to human object against mysticism. This implies that, in objectivism, natural codes perceived and stressed without ulterior or transcendental meanings. Also, for Rand, aesthetics is about art that recreates reality in accordance to architect's metaphysical judgment.<sup>250</sup> However, it is not to bestowing meanings or higher notions to reality and nature, but it is a recreation and interpretation of natural codes. It seems that, for Rand, recreation of natural codes in architecture shows itself in stressing on the nature of material by innovative attitude of architects. For instance, she implies that buildings are special; they can't be designed universally with any material in every place, with a same purpose.<sup>251</sup> It seems that she intends to say that each material used in a building should vividly show its characteristics or its natural codes.

In general, objectivism in architecture can be observed through: application of pure rationality, precise proportion and geometry, restricted criteria and procedural rules; abandoning human sense-making (that includes culture, religion, society, spirit, and tradition) in favor of a belief that truth (*whole/unity*) resides with the design or building, autonomous from any subjectivity; searching for some originality in the

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<sup>248</sup> . However, this claim is discussible. For instance, Laugier's rules can be seen in some practices of Le Corbusier.

<sup>249</sup> . Ozpek, "Objectivism," 17.

<sup>250</sup> . Ibid, 20.

<sup>251</sup> . Ibid, 66.

(worldly) ancient practice rather than searching for some metaphysical, spiritual, ideal, transcendental, and imaginative meaning; and its relation to natural codes and facts rather than subjective meanings imposed upon those codes. These notions can be seen in Stoicism, Renaissance, French Rationalism, Positivism, Modern Movement, generally in modern architecture of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, and specifically in F.L. Wright's works.

As discussed before, subjectivism searches for fixed and value-laden unity of meaning through human sense-making for the sake of communication and significance, and through historical context (culture, religion, spirit, etc.) which is in the contrary to pure and objective rationalism. Therefore, subjectivism in architecture can be observed through some factors: in searching for some unified ideal or imaginative meaning that its source is transcendental divine, religion, culture, or spirit; incompleteness of buildings in themselves and need for subjective human part to complete them; meaning signification of buildings or symbolic architecture.

Raman and Coyne say: "In tension with this objectivism is the subjectivist, or romantic, conservative tradition, that valorizes the concepts of genius, imagination and the pursuit of beauty as a quest for unity. ... The appeal to the 'natural spirit' is both a romantic and a liberal aim."<sup>252</sup> Accordingly, they relate subjectivism and romanticism with symbolism; symbols that "frequently used to signify life, cosmos and God".<sup>253</sup> In this way, Platonism (and architecture influenced by Platonism) can be regarded as subjectivism. Snodgrass and Coyne say:

Stoicism ran counter to Plato's model of transcendent unity. Platonic doctrine placed the significant, the important, the immutable, the idea and the unity, in a realm outside human experience, in the celestial realm of the intelligible. Architecture is positioned within a Platonic schema of meaning and significance. Architecture provides the quintessential interpretation of divinity, or at least of the relationship between the human and the divine.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> . Raman and Coyne, "The Production," 103-104.

<sup>253</sup> . Ibid, 108-109.

<sup>254</sup> . Snodgrass and Coyne, "Interpretation," 10-13.



Accordingly, in the Platonic mimesis, the ideal or archetypal is something imaginatively and subjectively divine to be copied by artists.<sup>255</sup> Additionally, German Idealism and Historicism fit to the mentioned features of subjectivism. Snodgrass and Coyne say:

In contradistinction to rationalism there developed a different form of idealism, concerned with the contextual nature of historical grounding, a concern with the peculiarities of the time and place in which event unfold, and with the character of a community. ...Historicism in architecture treats interpretation and history as the processes of uncovering the grand idea, the Spirit of a People (*Volkgeist*) and the Spirit of the Age (*Zeitgeist*). ... The historicism also bolstered the Romantic movement in art and literature, with its emphasis on subjectivity, imagination and genius.<sup>256</sup>

As pointed out before, German Idealism and Historicism was against French Rationalism's belief in fixed truth and unity for all time and people, which brought methodology or typology in architecture. Historicism's argument was that buildings are not complete in themselves (as Rationalists say) but they can be completed by the human part; by the spirit of people and time. One of examples in architecture was Semper's style.

Moreover, subjectivism and relativism are the characteristics of postmodern architecture. Lagopoulos relates subjectivism as conceptual paradigm "with emphasis placed on postmodern approaches to space".<sup>257</sup> Raman and Coyne say: "there have clearly been Modernist attempts to rehabilitate the concept of meaning, and to create buildings rich with meaning, which is to say a 'metaphoric' and 'expressive' architecture, as in futurism, expressionism and more recently 'postmodernism'".<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> . Ibid, 14.

<sup>256</sup> . Ibid, 6-7.

<sup>257</sup> . Lagopoulos, "Subjectivism," 129.

<sup>258</sup> . Raman and Coyne, "The Production," 108.

The shortcomings of objectivism and relativism in architecture can be explained through flaws and arguments that affected architecture of Stoicism and Platonism, Rationalism and Historicism, modernism and postmodernism. Snodgrass and Coyne say: “In contemporary terms the contest is between a value-laden historicism and the value-neutral empiricism of ‘objective’ history.”<sup>259</sup> Accordingly, I would like to expand this difference to objectivism and subjectivism: objective architecture failed or ignored to bring human context, meaning and sense-making; and subjective architecture failed or ignored to connect us with reality. One of the examples of this ignorance can be observed between early modern architecture of the 20th century and postmodern architecture. First one rejects human culture and tradition, and second one rejects reason and reality.<sup>260</sup>

All in all, metaphysical thinking, including objectivism, subjectivism, and preference of fixed truth, whole, and unity (and metaphysical effect on architecture) is derived from consideration of Being as mere presence in which human being is regarded as detached subject from the objects of the world. As the main quest of Derrida was to challenge metaphysics of presence, application of deconstruction within architecture should follow this quest against metaphysical thinking in a deeper sense. Before Derrida, it was Heidegger (as one of the main sources of Derrida) who prescribed Being different from metaphysical thinking in which Being is not mere presence, but as the abyss and as the groundless ground; and human being (authentic Dasein) not as a detached subject but as the ground of Being.

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<sup>259</sup> . Snodgrass and Coyne, “Interpretation,” 7.

<sup>260</sup> . furthermore, postmodern architecture also failed to bring unified meaning. It is denounced by its shallow eclecticism.



## CHAPTER 4

### INTERPRETING DERRIDA THROUGH HEIDEGGER

In compliance with addressing the first problem (that is lack of deeper reflection on Derrida's thought through his main source), there is a need to go beyond Derrida's thought to the philosophy of which that influenced Derrida. In this case, it seems that Derrida's deconstruction is a further step of Heidegger's philosophy in literature. Derrida's deconstruction is conducted from Heidegger's *destruction* of metaphysics. If Heidegger is the father, Derrida is the son; the first is the right wing of Icarus, the second is the right wing.<sup>261</sup> There are much acknowledgement of relation of Derrida's deconstruction to Heidegger's philosophy in philosophical literature. For instance, Norris says: "there is clearly much in common between deconstruction and the Heideggerian project of undoing the conceptual knots and ties implicit in Western philosophy."<sup>262</sup> Caputo also says:

For Derrida, Heidegger takes the first, necessary step in the overcoming of aesthetics and the liberation of the work of art from the rules of metaphysics. As Derrida says, any work of deconstruction must first "catch up" with Heidegger, must begin by placing itself within the opening of his questions. [...] We cannot help but notice that Derrida's disseminative gesture which disseminates even the truth of Being, is made in the language of Heidegger. [...] This wandering produces an odd, mutant effect, a more deconstructive, leftist Heidegger, and a Derrida with a different twist. It produces an altered reading of Heidegger which shows that the dissemination and delimitation of the truth of Being has already taken place in Heidegger's text.<sup>263</sup> [...] I believe that there is a good deal more of Derrida in this "Heidegger" than Heidegger himself. [...] Derrida who has adopted the

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<sup>261</sup> . Ricardo Gil Soeiro. "From the Meaning of Meaning to Radical Hermeneutics." *Electronic Journal for Philosophy* 24. no. 2, (2017): 39.

<sup>262</sup> . Christopher Norris. 2002. *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge. 68.

<sup>263</sup> . John D. Caputo. "Telling left from right: Hermeneutics, Deconstruction, and the work of art." *The Journal of Philosophy* 83. no. 11, (Nov. 1986): 681-683.

deconstructive phase of Heidegger's thought.<sup>264</sup> Derrida's transgression of metaphysics thus is deeply and profoundly affected by Nietzsche. But the very project of a transgression of metaphysics, of the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, is Heidegger's doing.<sup>265</sup>

It seems the path of proper appreciation of deconstruction (against metaphysics) passes through Heidegger who started to question Being.

## 4.1 Heidegger, against Metaphysical Detachment, and Towards Unity

### 4.1.1 Question of Being

Heidegger's understanding of Being is against mainstream western philosophy that understood Being "as something permanent and unchanging" that derived from Plato's assumption of Being as "eternal and fixed (Forms, essences, scientific laws, etc.)".<sup>266</sup> Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, starts with the question of Being: What is the meaning of Being? In what sense we can say something is, or are, or exist? What is the essence of existence?<sup>267</sup> Resulted from western metaphysical thinking, today we are inclined to assume if something exists, it "must be a material substance that continuously present in space and time".<sup>268</sup> Heidegger says this tendency is a result of modern world's aura of self-evidence derived from time of Plato, at which "Being is defined by enduring presence".<sup>269</sup> Such assumption constitute the modern era about the Being of human being as mind (understood as unchanged eternal soul), or "as physical being of humans regarded as organism in a natural environment".<sup>270</sup> Since for western tradition, substance is what endures through change, then, Being understood as substance with attributes.<sup>271</sup> It is metaphysical substantialist conception of Being, or

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<sup>264</sup> . John D. Caputo. "The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty," *The Review of Metaphysics* 36. No. 3, (Mar. 1983): 676.

<sup>265</sup> . John D. Caputo. "Three Transgressions: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida." *Research in Phenomenology* 15. (1985): 73.

<sup>266</sup> . Charles Guignon, "Martin Heidegger: *Being and Time*," in *Central Works of Philosophy Volume 4: The Twentieth Century: Moore to Popper*, ed. John Shand (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 92.

<sup>267</sup> . Ibid, p. 93.

<sup>268</sup> . Ibid, p. 93.

<sup>269</sup> . Ibid, p. 93-94.

<sup>270</sup> . Ibid, p. 94.

<sup>271</sup> . Ibid, p. 94.

Heidegger questions Being: | What should entities be like so they can enter into our understanding?  
| What should be like so we can understand/differentiate entities?



Question of Dasein  
(seeking highest life to become as whole)

Throwness (world of possibilities: context, culture, tradition, meaning.)

Projection (unknown future to become)

Care → Disclosedness (Dasein as manifestation of the world's existence.)

Figure 34. Heidegger's question of Being and Dasein against metaphysics.  
(Source: drawn by author)

substance ontology. Guignon indicates that such substance ontology did not exist in pre-Platonic philosophy (like Heraclitus) or in non-western thinkers (like Buddhists); So, Heidegger requests to rethink the question of Being.<sup>272</sup>

As Being for Heidegger is not substance ontology anymore (self-evident unchanging presence of substance), then it becomes the question of our senses about reality: how can we know there something exists or does not exist?<sup>273</sup> So, there happened a shift in our question: from what is the meaning of Being? (what is to be?) to how things show up as existing or non-existing? Or “how entities enter into our intelligibility”.<sup>274</sup> This shifted question – how things show up as existent for us? – which is the question about “condition for the possibility of intelligibility is called *fundamental ontology*”.<sup>275</sup> Heidegger, by this shifted question of fundamental ontology enters into both realms of phenomenology (how things show up, not as they might be in their innate essence), and hermeneutics since the knowledge about beings and Being comes through continuous, everchanging, and ever-growing interaction of man with beings and with its own Being. The shifted question is hermeneutical because it is not a question of essence of things detached from us, or it is not a question of essence of human being detached from things, but it is a question of inherent relation of human to things. As Guignon indicates, Heidegger uses a hermeneutic method because our pre-theoretical experience or our pre-understanding of Being or existence of something is already interpretive.<sup>276</sup>

Nevertheless, the shifted question of fundamental ontology, in itself, entails two subsequent questions: first, “what must entities be like such that they can enter into our understanding in the ways they do[?]” Second, “what must we be like such that we can understand what entities of various type are[?]”.<sup>277</sup> Heidegger starts his project of

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<sup>272</sup> . Ibid, p. 94.

<sup>273</sup> . Ibid, p. 94.

<sup>274</sup> . Ibid, p. 94-95.

<sup>275</sup> . Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>276</sup> . Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>277</sup> . Ibid, p. 95.

Heidegger's question: How Dasein shows up as existent?




Figure 35. Heidegger's question of Authentic Dasein  
(Source: drawn by author)



fundamental ontology through the second question, with the analysis of human existence, or “analytic of *Dasein*”.<sup>278</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Dasein

Heidegger in pursuing the question of meaning of Being in general, which is related to fundamental ontology, begins the investigation by Dasein who understands what it means to be.<sup>279</sup> This investigation is the existential analytic that examines human existence as the horizon in which understanding of Being becomes possible.<sup>280</sup>

Heidegger’s term of Dasein arises from Aristotle’s analysis of characteristics of humans that includes two types of motion: *poiesis* and *praxis*.<sup>281</sup> Poiesis has the sense of making or producing in which the aim is outside of the activity of making, and the activity will end when the goal is achieved.<sup>282</sup> For instance, the built house is different from activity of building. Praxis, on the other hand, has more fundamental sense than mere making, in which it lays the essence of Dasein. Guignon says: “there is an overarching goal or purpose present in all praxis: the goal of *becoming* a person of a particular sort. It is the nature of human beings, on this view, to seek the highest life (bios), a life that achieves “the highest possibility of existence.”<sup>283</sup>

As Dasein is not merely constituted by sheer appetite, and it can think and project itself toward future, the ultimate goal of life (or existence) for Dasein becomes Being-a-whole.<sup>284</sup> Guignon says: “its [Dasein’s] Being consists in its taking a stand on what it is throughout the course of its life as a whole, “from its ‘beginning’ to its ‘end’” ... [Dasein] “in its very Being” ... refers to one’s life as a whole”.<sup>285</sup> Heidegger explains

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<sup>278</sup> . Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>279</sup> . Charles Guignon, “Authenticity and the question of Being,” in *Heidegger, authenticity and the self: Themes for division two of Being and Time*, ed. Denis McManus (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 9.

<sup>280</sup> . Charles B. Guignon, “Heidegger’s “authenticity” revisited,” *The review of metaphysics* 38, no.2 (December 1984): 324.

<sup>281</sup> . Guignon, “question of Being,” 11.

<sup>282</sup> . Ibid, 11.

<sup>283</sup> . Ibid, 12.

<sup>284</sup> . Guignon, “revisited,” 331.

<sup>285</sup> . Guignon, “question of Being,” 11-12.

Dasein's Being as an event stretched from birth to death. In this way, the event would be defined in totality of Dasein's achievement of its life as a whole.<sup>286</sup>

Dasein can be investigated as having two aspects in its character: essence and existence.<sup>287</sup> Regarded as essence, Dasein is thrown in to the world; the world with its cultural and historical context provides specific range of possibilities to be.<sup>288</sup> Benjamin Crowe says: ““Thrownness” indicates our basic experience of finding ourselves already embedded in a “world” of meaningful relationships as soon as we are able to become conscious of it.”<sup>289</sup> Dasein has to take up a task of living only by choosing and standing on the possibilities or potentialities-of-Being provided by its thrownness into a specific culture. Relating to the existence aspect of Dasein, Dasein is beyond and ahead-of-itself in projecting itself toward the whole totality of its life by standing on specific role provided by the essence.<sup>290</sup>

Dasein's character, in another version, is ascribed with three essential structures. The first one is the essence or thrownness of Dasein into the midst of a [cultural] world in which it becomes “part of a wider context of meaning”.<sup>291</sup> Second structure is Dasein's existence or its *understanding* as ongoing activity of projection towards the possibilities provided by thrownness. The third structure of Dasein is that it is always discursive. In this way, Dasein always articulates the world “in terms of the scheme (or *logos*) of a shared public language” that makes a culture with specific pattern of synthesis that differentiates that culture from other cultures.<sup>292</sup> In other words, it is to say that whatever we choose by our understanding out of the possibilities provided by our thrownness to a culture, that chosen possibility is already colored by the specific pattern of our culture. Nevertheless, these tripartite structure makes the phenomenon of *care* as the character and as Being of Dasein. Guignon says:

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<sup>286</sup> . Guignon, “revisited,” 330.

<sup>287</sup> . Ibid, 333.

<sup>288</sup> . Ibid, 331.

<sup>289</sup> . Benjamin D. Crowe, *Heidegger's religious origins: destruction and authenticity* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 186.

<sup>290</sup> . Guignon, “revisited,” 331.

<sup>291</sup> . Guignon, “Martin Heidegger,” 98.

<sup>292</sup> . Ibid, p. 98.

Heidegger characterizes human existence or *Dasein* as *care*: to be human is to be a being for whom things matter in some way of other, for whom things show up *as* such and such (as hammers or beautiful sunsets or threats) because their lives are *at issue*. Because care is definitive of human existence, *Dasein* is said to be a *clearing* or *disclosedness*, that is, a “there” or space of meaning in virtue of which entities of various sorts can come to show up *as* the beings they are. In so far as the “*as*-structure” of entities defines the *Being* of those entities, it is evident that Heidegger holds that human agency [...] determines the Being of entities that show up in a world.<sup>293</sup>

Thus, care is the character of *Dasein* by which things show up as existent (in differentiate various types). As we care about things, they show up as differentiated; and because we care about ourselves or about our being, we show up as differentiated personalities. Care as the character of *Dasein* makes *Dasein* to be a locus of manifestation through which world comes to existence.

Therefore, the first main point in the description of *Dasein* is that it is the place for manifestation of world’s existence. The other main point is that it is not a detached being from the world of things, but its existence (projection towards future within a coherent life) is already related and constituted by its essence (its thrownness); *Dasein* and its existence is already involved within the world via its care. (This involvement of *Dasein* within the world happens through five steps of: 1. A with-which. 2. An in-which. 3. An in-order-to. 4. A toward-this. 5. A for-the-sake-of-which. For instance, working with a computer, in an office, in order to write a paper, aiming toward introducing Heidegger, for the sake of my academic career. The for-the-sake-of-which is the final unifying step of involvement that orients *Dasein* to stand on a possibility of its being.)

#### **4.1.3 *Dasein* as disclosedness**

As mention before, *Dasein* is the locus of manifestation, clearing or disclosedness through which the world come to an existence. To clarify disclosedness, it is needed to distinguish it from *discovery*. Guignon says:

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<sup>293</sup> . Ibid, p. 104-105.

This conception of *Dasein* as a clearing makes it possible for Heidegger to distinguish between *disclosedness*, which refers to the opening up or illuminating of things in general, and *discovering* or *uncovering*, which is the concrete way some entities come to show up within a pregiven context of intelligibility. So, for example, a simple piece of equipment such as a needle-threader can present itself as something to be used for threading needles only in a world in which there are practices of sewing with needles that are not easy to thread. This context of intelligibility making possible the practice of sewing defines the realm of disclosedness in which seamstresses, needles, cloth, thread and so forth can show up as equipment for sewing. In contrast, *discovering* refers to the process by which particular entities of some sort comes to show up *as* such and such in a world, for example, the way this strangely shaped item becomes manifest as a needle-threader by being used to thread a needle.<sup>294</sup>

This idea of disclosedness leads Heidegger to view truth. Traditionally, truth is the correspondence between “our thoughts, beliefs or propositional states”, and “a fact or state of affairs in the world”.<sup>295</sup> For instance, if I say “the picture is askew”, my saying would be true if only it corresponds to a fact that picture is actually askew. Heidegger is not completely opposed to this view of truth, but he asserts that to call such a saying to be true, we already need to know what picture or askew is. So, traditional view of truth is only possible if there is background of intelligibility. Heidegger calls this background of intelligibility as disclosedness. In this view, discovery of truth depends on prior disclosedness. Guignon says:

The claim is that any *discovering* of entities [...] depends on a prior *disclosure* of a space of intelligibility or clearing that lets thing appear in some determinate way or other. Such a disclosure can be thought of as an *unconcealing*, in the sense that it lets things come out of concealment and into the light.<sup>296</sup>

This idea of truth as disclosedness, has the same connotation of the Greek word of *aletheia* as not-concealment or not-forgetfulness. According to Guignon, this suggest that truth should be used in its original ancient term of *aletheia* as unconcealment or

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<sup>294</sup> . Ibid, p. 105.

<sup>295</sup> . Ibid, p. 105.

<sup>296</sup> . Ibid, p. 106.

disclosedness.<sup>297</sup> Guignon calls this truth or disclosedness as an event that makes possible for other things to show up in its light.

It might be better to differentiate truth from the Event of Truth as the Event of discovery. As indicated before, truth should be treated as *aletheia* or disclosedness. This disclosedness as background of intelligibility is like a pre-given spot light of a culture. It is a world of familiarity of practicality, like a world of sewing. As there are many cultures, and as there are many ways of practicality, so there are many truths. Also, this truth as disclosedness is already there within a culture like a continuous spot light (however it evolves or changes in the course of time). Therefore, this truth as disclosedness can't have the character of event; as event has temporality in its essence, and as it has uniqueness in itself. On the other hand, discovery is the process or the way by which things come to manifestation by their practicality for the first time. As there is the spot light of disclosedness, so new discoveries of things come to manifestation by the light of the spot light. For instance, the disclosedness of a needle-threader is its useful or practical familiarity to the world of sewing. The discovering is the way this needle-threader become manifest by being used for the first time. After it is used for the first time, it is no longer a discovery but it becomes part of practical familiarity to the world of sewing; it becomes disclosedness or truth. As can be seen, discovery has both uniqueness and temporality in its essence. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Event of Truth is the Event of discovery different from truth as disclosedness.

Nevertheless, Dasein as disclosedness is the place for the manifestation of the existence of the world. However, it is not to say that Dasein gives existence to things but it gives mattering to them, and in this mattering, their existence come to the light. This idea follows that things can't be known as they are, but as they are manifested in the light of Dasein as disclosedness. Guignon says:

*Dasein*, as the “being of a there”, is the condition for anything making sense or counting as real. [...] The claim is not that human thinking brings entities into existence, but that it is only where

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<sup>297</sup> . Ibid, p. 106.

things can matter in some way or other, where there are capacities for discernment, inference, differentiation and synthesis, that anything can stand out as counting as, say, a dinosaur. The fact that something can show up for us as a dinosaur means that identifying and talking about something as a dinosaur depends on the prior opening of a space of intelligibility in which such identifications and talk make sense. From this it follows that we have no way to gain access to things as they *really* are *in themselves*, independent of human ways of taking things.<sup>298</sup>

Therefore, the idea of Dasein as disclosedness, and its existence as already involved within the world, changes and opposes the traditional ideas of realism and anti-realism that searches for innate truth in mind or matter.

#### **4.1.4 Against Subject-Object Detachment or Metaphysical Realism and Idealism**

Metaphysical thinking, as mentioned before, has subject-object detachment in its essence; and it searches for fixed innate truth in material (materialism, realism) or in mind (idealism). Traditional realism, the predicament inherited from Descartes, assumes that “humans are subject or minds collecting bits of data and forming beliefs about the world”; the world that exist outside of our minds as medium-sized objects with various properties.<sup>299</sup> Guignon says: “The traditional *realist* view holds that: (i) those objects and properties really do have a determinate Being independent of our thought and practices; and (ii) we can know those objects and their properties as they are *in themselves*.”<sup>300</sup> Another aspect of the predicament inherited by Descartes is the traditional anti-realism or idealism that holds “what we encounter as real, independently existing objects are actually products of our own minds, with no mind-independent features that can be encountered or known”. Guignon says: “Idealism therefore claims that: (i) objects and their properties have no determinate Being independent of our thought and practice; and/or (ii) we can never know reality as it is in itself, since reality is always in some crucial sense mind-dependent.”<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> . Ibid, p. 106-107.

<sup>299</sup> . Guignon, “Martin Heidegger,” 107.

<sup>300</sup> . Ibid, p. 107.

<sup>301</sup> . Ibid, p. 107.

Heidegger challenges the basics of traditional realism and anti-realism, which is the distinction and detachment of human (as mind or consciousness) from set of objects.<sup>302</sup> Heidegger is neither realist nor idealist. He rejects idealistic view that says reality exists only in the mind, because for Heidegger, Dasein is already thrown into the midst of real entities in the world; and he rejects the idea of realism that says things in themselves and detached from Dasein can be known. Because to know something, there is already needed a disclosedness through which things can show up themselves; a world of disclosedness that is inseparable from Dasein.<sup>303</sup>

#### **4.1.5 Existence of Beings as Unity of Dasein with Being: Being-in-the-World**

To the first question of the fundamental ontology (what must entities be like such that they can enter into our understanding in the ways they do?), Heidegger explains being-in-the-world. Heidegger, against western acceptance of human as mind or body, describes essential structure of Dasein or human existence in its untheoretical experience of everyday activity, and the character of those everyday activities is being-in-the-world.<sup>304</sup> The term is hyphenated to express a “unitary concept”, rather than detached relationship between self and constituents of the world.<sup>305</sup> In the term, the words “in” and “world” must not be understood as containment in the planet earth. Guignon says:

Heidegger says that the word “in” in this expression is used not in the spatial sense of being *contained in* (as a knife is in a sheath), but in the existential sense of being *involved in* [...], the sense implied in such expressions as being “in the army” or being “in love”. And the word “world” should be understood not as the totality of what is on the planet earth, but in the existential sense implied by such expressions as “the world of theatre” or being a “man of the world”. For the most part in our everyday practical lives, our Being is characterized by being-in-the-world in the sense that we are absorbed or engrossed in handling familiar equipment in such a way that there is no way to drive in a wedge between a “self” component and the entities we find around us.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> . Ibid, p. 107.

<sup>303</sup> . Ibid, p. 107-108.

<sup>304</sup> . Ibid, p. 96.

<sup>305</sup> . Ibid, p. 96.

<sup>306</sup> . Ibid, p. 96.

Hence, the essence of being-in-the-world is unity of the self with familiar equipment and entities. For instance, in the ordinary activity of nailing boards in a workshop, there is no separation between self and those things. In this unitary between self and equipment, the Being of equipment shows itself in meaningful totality and dynamism (motion); in other words, show itself as “ready-to-hand” or “handy” in relation to certain purposes.<sup>307</sup> In this way, things are existent for us, if they are handy; and “reality at the deepest level is ready-to-hand”<sup>308</sup>.

Lastly, being-in-the-world emphasizes the unity between self and things in the involved world (like a world of theatre); it emphasizes the shared “we-world”, the world we have in common, or our “co-being” or “being-with”.<sup>309</sup>

#### **4.1.6 Existence of Dasein as Unity of Dasein with Being in early Heidegger: Authentic Dasein**

In dealing with the question of fundamental ontology (how things show up existent to us?) we reached to Heidegger’s answer of Dasein’s practical comportment in dealing with ready-to-hand things; and it seems that he raised the concept of authenticity to answer the question of: how Dasein itself shows up as existent?<sup>310</sup>

As discussed before, the essence of Dasein lies in range of possibilities provided by its thrown culture, the existence of Dasein lies in its projection towards those possibilities in its life as a whole. These two aspects of Dasein are related to *existentialia* mode of Dasein that includes *Anyone* and authentic-self.<sup>311</sup> Guignon says: “In our everyday affairs, we tend to handle equipment in standardized ways and drift into socially

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<sup>307</sup> . Ibid, p. 96.

<sup>308</sup> . Ibid, p. 96.

<sup>309</sup> . Ibid, p. 97.

<sup>310</sup> . In this case, it is obvious that for Heidegger, Dasein is the answer to the second question (of what must we be like such that we can understand what entities of various types are?) in which Dasein somehow understands existence of various entities. It seems that Heidegger meant to designate the real existence of things and of Dasein. As we will see, ready-to-handness for things, and authenticity to Dasein are the keys for real existence.

<sup>311</sup> . Ibid, 329.



approved slots laid out in the public world. We act as anyone does. ... it is "*das Man*," the anonymous "one" or the "Anyone".<sup>312</sup> As anyone, we handle the tools around us based on norms and conventions that are provided in our social world that we are thrown.<sup>313</sup> Another equivalent word for the Anyone is the *They*. The They provide us the possible roles or potentialities-of-Being in a society through the cultural context of our thrownness.<sup>314</sup> However, the Anyone is the existentialia and essential mode of each Dasein, but there is a danger of being lost in the They. It may "keep us from facing up to our unique responsibility for our lives"<sup>315</sup>. Guignon in accordance to Heidegger states that this danger of lostness to the They would result in adrift, dispersed life that would cause the concealment of another dimension of our lives.<sup>316</sup>

Authenticity is not about existentialia mode of Dasein, but it is the existentiell modification of the Anyone.<sup>317</sup> It is not exceptional condition of the subject, detached from the Anyone. The existentiell mode of Dasein encompasses authentic Being-one's-self and inauthentic Anyone-self. The differentiation of authentic Dasein (which is Being-one's-self) and inauthentic Dasein (Anyone-self) comes not from the *what* specific possibilities one chooses but derives from how one lives.<sup>318</sup> The difference arises from integration and coherent life of authentic Dasein and dispersed and uncentered life of inauthentic Dasein.<sup>319</sup> Authentic Dasein is one's being as *individual*.<sup>320</sup> Guignon describes the individual: "[Individual is] the agent makes his or her goal "the highest possibility of existence, the mode of Being in which a person satisfies to the highest degree the proper human potentiality for Being, in which the person genuinely is""<sup>321</sup> Hence, authentic Dasein is not detached from the existentialia mode of the Anyone, or from the thrown social/cultural world. Crowe says: "authentic individual is not somehow withdrawn from or detached from the world. "the 'world',"

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<sup>312</sup> . Ibid, 329.

<sup>313</sup> . Ibid, 333.

<sup>314</sup> . Guignon, "question of Being," 12.

<sup>315</sup> . Guignon, "revisited," 334.

<sup>316</sup> . Guignon, "question of Being," 13.

<sup>317</sup> . Guignon, "revisited," 329.

<sup>318</sup> . Ibid, 334.

<sup>319</sup> . Ibid, 334.

<sup>320</sup> . Guignon, "question of Being," 15.

<sup>321</sup> . Ibid, 15.

he says, ... are now given a definite character in terms of the ownmost ability to be oneself.”<sup>322</sup>

However, authentic Dasein is not detached from the They, but it differs from the They-self. The differentiation lays in the mood of *anxiety*. Guignon says:

Individuality is not a *given* for humans, though all humans have a “potentiality-for-Being” individuals. As everyday being-in-the-world, we are “proximally and for the most part” the “They” or “a they-self,” doing what anyone would do in the common circumstances of life into which we are thrown. Our capacity for being individuals – entities who can own their actions and own up to what they are – is something that is first revealed in the mood of anxiety. In the mood of anxiety, we discover ourselves as individualized, as *solus ipse*, in the sense that our usual dependence on the world and others breaks down and we find that our lives are up to us alone to live.<sup>323</sup>

Death is the element in which the signification of individuality can be appreciated.<sup>324</sup> Guignon says: “Facing death reveals not only that one is alone in undertaking one’s life, but that this undertaking itself has the form of a happening that is finite: it is directed toward “being-a-whole,” which is “constituted by Being-towards-the-end [or Being-toward-death].”<sup>325</sup> In this way, death enacts being toward something to be which has worth to dedicate the whole life to achieve.<sup>326</sup> Hence, anxiety and being-toward-death become the components of authentic Dasein that can give unity and wholeness for Dasein’s existence.<sup>327</sup>

Guignon says: “To be authentic is to be resolute about one’s ability to live one’s life as a coherent totality”<sup>328</sup>. Authentic Dasein, to bring unity and wholeness to its life, needs to stand firmly to a possibility of to be, provided by cultural context. Heidegger labels this steadfast stance of Dasein as *anticipatory resoluteness*.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> . Crow, “Heidegger’s religious origins,” 188.

<sup>323</sup> . Guignon, “question of Being,” 15.

<sup>324</sup> . Ibid, 15.

<sup>325</sup> . Ibid, 15.

<sup>326</sup> . Ibid, 16.

<sup>327</sup> . Ibid, 16.

<sup>328</sup> . Guignon, “revisited,” 333.

<sup>329</sup> . Guignon, “question of Being,” 16.

Moreover, authenticity is related to what Heidegger calls “call of conscience” or “voice of conscience”. Conscience, with its underlying meaning of responsibility, provides the possibility of having authentic life. Crow says: “it is the “conscience” that provides the much needed “testimony” to the possibility of an authentic way of life.”<sup>330</sup> Conscience is a historical experience related to anxious mood of Dasein in which the experience is located within the factual experience of life.<sup>331</sup> Conscience with its interruption to the inauthentic way of life, appropriates “one’s past as a possibility for the future”<sup>332</sup> for the sake of reorientation toward a possibility of being in the authentic manner. The role of the voice of conscience is to bring back Dasein from the lostness of the They, since inauthenticity is a result of failure to listen to oneself while listening to the *idle talk* of the They.<sup>333</sup> Hence, the voice has the character of appeal or call that summons an individual to be itself.<sup>334</sup> The call, however, does not provide wordy information, but the call happens through *silence*. Heidegger says:

The call asserts nothing, give no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set going a ‘soliloquy’ in the Self to which it has appealed. ‘Nothing’ gets called to this Self, but it has been *summoned* to itself – that is to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. [...] it calls Dasein forth (and ‘forward’) into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost *potentiality-for-Being-its-Self*. [...] The call does not report events; it calls without uttering anything. The call discourses in the uncanny mode of *keeping silent*. [...] it does not call him into the public idle talk of the “they”, but *calls him back* from this *into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being*.<sup>335</sup>

Another element relating with authenticity in appreciation of the potentially-of-Being is *community*. The experience of our existence, and the meaning of things we encounter in our lives only happens through co-existence with the community via a shared context of social practices.<sup>336</sup> In this way, our fate in choosing and taking a

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<sup>330</sup> . Crow, “Heidegger’s religious origins,” 179.

<sup>331</sup> . Ibid, 179-180.

<sup>332</sup> . Ibid, 181.

<sup>333</sup> . Ibid, 182.

<sup>334</sup> . Ibid, 183.

<sup>335</sup> . Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers LTD, 2001), 318-322.

<sup>336</sup> . Crow, “Heidegger’s religious origins,” 195.

resolute stand on a possibility of being become associated with our *generation* as the spirit of the age.<sup>337</sup> Heidegger says:

our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.<sup>338</sup>

The notion of community and generation does not impose that individuals should sacrifice themselves for the collective since "individual is always more than simply a part of a generation".<sup>339</sup> In this way, challenge and struggle of individual in a generation arises. Crow explains: "individuals form a bond not through submission to some collective will, but rather through a polemical dialogue aimed at challenging the other person uphold her own way of being true to herself."<sup>340</sup> On the other hand, this challenge does not mean that authentic Dasein (who has heard the call of conscience) should have the dominancy-relationship toward others in the community. The challenge being derived from the call of conscience is against of being leader or paternalism.<sup>341</sup> Furthermore, a conscience individual is already opposed to the dictatorship of the They.<sup>342</sup> Hence, maybe it is possible to say that an authentic Dasein neither wants to be leader, nor tolerates the dictatorship of the They. What lies deeply in this view is the continuous negation out of vague hope; negating of the dictatorship of the they, and negating the leadership of the self in the promise of novel but vague being. This negation is not against resoluteness of the authentic Dasein. Resoluteness is the engine of motion and continuity for authentic Dasein to not stand in the truth claiming of the they or truth claiming of the self. Resoluteness is the "continuous" part of the "continuous negation out of vague hope".

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<sup>337</sup> . Ibid, 196-197.

<sup>338</sup> . Heidegger, "Being and Time," 436.

<sup>339</sup> . Crow, "Heidegger's religious origins," 198.

<sup>340</sup> . Ibid, 199.

<sup>341</sup> . Ibid, 200-201.

<sup>342</sup> . Ibid, 201.

All in all, authentic life happens when Dasein realizes its own individuality by the call of conscience, and when it realizes the need to fulfil its individuality while facing up to its own death (finitude, or mortality). In this way, it can determinately decide for its being and for its life as a whole, which is somehow different from the they, and also is never clear enough for itself. The existence of Dasein that lies in its projection towards the possibilities, become susceptible and endangered by the everydayness of the they; so, Dasein by being authentic can clear this danger, and preserve its existence. However, this clearing or difference from the they in order to fulfill the individuality is not the only point, but difference from the self (self-negation, or negating the leadership of the self) is also required. Nevertheless, in authentic Dasein, as the true existence of Dasein, we see a unity of Dasein with its own Being; a unity with a projected possibility (out of thrown culture) through a resolute, unified, and coherent life.

#### **4.1.7 Existence of Dasein as Unity of Dasein with Being in later Heidegger: Living Without Why**

Early Heidegger concentrates on Dasein and its authenticity in which Dasein questions the Being in searching for real existent, and its questioning is its privilege among other beings.<sup>343</sup> Later, Heidegger changed this view on Dasein. Caputo, to extract later Heidegger's changed view on Dasein, indicates Heidegger's comment on Johann Scheffler's poem. The poem is called "without why": "The rose is without why; it blossoms because it blossoms; It thinks not upon itself, nor does it ask if anyone sees it."<sup>344</sup> And Heidegger's comment on this poem is: "what is unsaid in the saying – and everything depends upon this – is that man, in the most hidden ground of his essence, truly is for the first time when he is in his way like the rose – without why."<sup>345</sup> Therefore, there is an apparent opposition between early Heidegger's Dasein with its question, and later Heidegger's Dasein with its living without why, and unquestioning. Caputo searches for a unity between these two apparent oppositions.

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<sup>343</sup> . Caputo, John D. Caputo, "The Rose is without Why: the later Heidegger," *Philosophy Today* 15, no.1 (1971): 3-4.

<sup>344</sup> . Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>345</sup> . Ibid, p. 3-4.

For Scheffler, the rose is the metaphor of the soul who awaits, opens itself up, and is sustained by God's grace. Caputo says:

In Scheffler, the rose is the model of the soul. As the rose is sustained by the sunlight and mild temperatures of the Spring, so the soul is counseled to rely solely upon God's grace and favor. [...] Accordingly, the deepest obligation and highest life of the soul – as the rose – is to open itself up (*sich auf tun*) to its gracious benefactor. [...] This is the pivotal metaphor: God rushes in upon the soul like the sunlight upon a rose provided only that the soul “open” itself up to God's gift. The soul is “closed” by self-love; it contracts upon itself in the narrowness of self-will (*Eigenwille*) and attachment to its own desire. The “openness” of the soul, on the other hand, consists in what Scheffler [...] calls “abandonment” (*Gelassenheit*), i.e., an unselfish surrender to God's will. [...] in such consummate resignation the soul, like the opened rose, attains its greatest beauty.<sup>346</sup>

Caputo mentions that Scheffler repeats Meister Eckhart. So, in the analogy, Scheffler's and Eckhart's “mystical life of the soul with God” become related to Heidegger's relation of Dasein to Being.<sup>347</sup> In this way, Dasein should live without why like a rose, and in this living, it stays open to the truth of Being.

Caputo indicates that Heidegger's central concern in his all writings (earlier or later) was to “stay open to the truth of Being which has long been concealed”.<sup>348</sup> (This opening to the truth of Being, we can say, is the unity of Dasein to Being which is Dasein's existence.) This opening in early Heidegger happened through Dasein's authenticity and its question of the Being; in later Heidegger, this opening stressed through Dasein's living without why and its unquestioning. For Heidegger, this questioning does not change Being or it does not positively produce disclosure of Being in its truth, but it is a “psycho-spiritual” process that negatively overcomes the obstacle that prevents Dasein to let Being be; questioning merely provides opportunity to Being to “give itself out as what it is”.<sup>349</sup> On the other hand, unquestioning, which

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<sup>346</sup> . Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>347</sup> . Ibid, p. 8.

<sup>348</sup> . Ibid, p. 8.

<sup>349</sup> . Ibid, p. 9.

is the opening to Being, is not opposite of questioning, but a step back into the deeper ground of the questioning of Being.<sup>350</sup>

Hence, the difference of early Heidegger's questioning Dasein, and later Heidegger's unquestioning Dasein is mere difference of perspective.<sup>351</sup> While in questioning, the approach to Being is made by Dasein, in unquestioning, Heidegger directly thinks on Being itself.<sup>352</sup> Similar to the unquestioning Dasein that opens itself to the Being (and letting it be), the deepest function of questioning Dasein is to open up thinking to a closed question of meaning of Being, dismissed by Western metaphysics.<sup>353</sup>

The difference of early and later Heidegger is properly stated by Laszlo Versenyi:

What was once called authentic existence – existence as a concern for and understanding of Being, an ultimately self-directed concern, a restless seeking and questioning of one's own ground – will no longer do. Since ever questioning Dasein only encounters the silence of the gods, since Being gives no answers but only is, i.e., endures and abides, man too has to endure in the face of such ultimate, un-grounded silence. Abandoning his "existential" nature he has to abandon himself to the Ground, leap into the Abyss, and stake himself on the Play of Being in which Truth discloses itself – now that we no longer search but only wait – as Mystery.<sup>354</sup>

On the whole, the concern in later Heidegger is still the existence of Dasein (unity of Dasein to the Being). Its difference to early Heidegger is the difference of perspective. Dasein in questioning its existence (to be real existent) takes the course of authenticity for itself to get rid of obstacles that prevent opening to Being, and Dasein in unquestioning and living without why, directly surrenders itself and opens itself to Being, and lets Being be. In short, it is possible to say, in early Heidegger, questioning Dasein seeks something (some unknown thing/being) to be; and in later Heidegger, unquestioning Dasein receives whatever Being bestows.

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<sup>350</sup> . Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>351</sup> . Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>352</sup> . Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>353</sup> . Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>354</sup> . Ibid, p. 5.

#### 4.1.8 Belonging of Dasein to Being, and its Unity with Being as the Real Existence

Heidegger's philosophy, in his opposition to metaphysics, also can be observed from two points. First, belonging of Dasein to the (abyss) Being; second, unity of Dasein with Being as the real existence that showed itself as in early Heidegger as ready-to-handness of things, and authenticity of Dasein, and in later Heidegger, showed itself as openness to Being at the Event of Truth.

For the belonging of Dasein to Being, Caputo's says:

Heidegger proposes to us a "topological" model of thought (*Dasein*) as the "there" (*da*) of Being's own self-disclosure. Thought is not a "subject" standing over and against "reality" [...] or "object" [...], but it is wholly given over to Being as the place where Being emerges into manifestation. [...] we are always and already [...] claimed by Being. [...] Thinking does not make claims upon Being but is claimed by it. [...] We do not need constraining grounds to assert Being because we are *already in* Being's hold. [...] because man is held in the hold of Being, Being alone issues the true *nomos* for man, assigning him his essence and true abode. [...] Heidegger wants us to understand that we are always borne by Being.<sup>355</sup>

The other point that there is in Heidegger's post-metaphysics, against subject-object detachment of metaphysics, is the unity. In early Heidegger, there is a unity of Dasein with things (as necessity of existence to both things and Dasein) and also, there is a unity of Dasein with its own being through authenticity. In later Heidegger, there is a unity of Dasein with the Being (essence of existence) through Event of Truth in which Dasein receives its being, and by doing so, it lets the Being be. All in all, there is the abyss Being (essence of existence) that Dasein belong to it; and Dasein can unite with it (the Being), so, in this unity, Dasein and beings become truly existent.

For both belonging of Dasein to Being and its unity with Being, Caputo says:

Being and Dasein are not two different things which naturally belong apart. They are not "things" at all. Being is the process of

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<sup>355</sup> . Caputo, "The Thought," 668-671.



“un-concealment” and Dasein is the place of its disclosure. Dasein is an ecstatic relationship of openness to Being. Accordingly, neither Being nor Dasein can be fulfilled apart from one another, neither can attain what is proper (*eigen*) to it. As Being needs Dasein, Dasein needs Being. Dasein can enter into the truth of its essence (*Wesen*) only by opening itself to Being. And Being is admitted into its truth only by coming to pass in Dasein. Dasein, thus, attains its proper (*eigen*) meaning when it is “ap-propriated” (*ver-eignet*) by Being. Hence instead of “authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*)” the later Heidegger speaks of the “Event of Appropriation” (*Er-eignis*).<sup>356</sup>

#### 4.1.9 Heidegger’s Philosophy in a Nutshell

The main concern of Heidegger is Being as essence of existence. His quest is to find an answer to the issue of real existence. For Heidegger, the unity of man or Dasein with things or beings in the world (being-in-the-world) is the answer to the question of real existence; the real existence of things is their ready-to-handness for us, and real existence of Dasein is its authenticity.

Dasein’s authenticity guarantees two things: first, it assures that we are already deeply engaged with things in most unified way (for-the-sake-of-which). Second, it provides our real existence. It is to say that I show up really existent to myself if I am handy for myself; the I that has been arisen from its culture. So, I show up existent to myself and to my culture if I am handy to myself and to my culture. If I want to be handy to my culture, I have to be practical for my culture’s need. Then, I have to project towards a possibility because it is needed, not because everyone does it anyway. Therefore, authenticity is needed for my real existence. Nevertheless, ready-to-handness is needed for things, and authenticity is needed for Dasein through which they become really existent. In both cases, the existence lies in the unity of Dasein with thing, and with cultures in the world.

Later Heidegger slightly evolves his view and rather than focusing on authentic Dasein as the assurance of real existence for Dasein, he concentrates on Being itself, and the

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<sup>356</sup> . Caputo, “The Rose,” 11-12.

necessity for letting Being to be for providing Dasein its real existence. For Heidegger, Being as the essence of existence remains unknown. However, it emerges through the Event of Truth which is already the event of discovery. In the following imaginary example, Heidegger's thought can be realized better. If we imagine a primitive world of humans, when they somehow knew stones but unaware of practicality of stones, Being as being of stone (essence of existence of stone) was absent and unknown. But it emerges and falls back to the abyss at the Event of Truth, when humans found out that they can be used to build shelter against animals. This falling back to the abyss is because at the moment in which the truth or discovery of its usability emerged, it made itself familiar for humans' use; it becomes disclosedness, a culture, a familiar practicality. The Being as being of stone falls back to the abyss again, waiting for another Event of Truth or discovery like an event at which humans become aware for another usability of stones (like building a dam to catch fish for their food).

As Being shows itself in the being of stone, so it reveals itself in the being of Dasein (as essence of existence of Dasein). The Being as the being of Dasein emerges through the Event of Truth (and then falls back to the abyss). Through such event, we recognize our practicality for ourselves (our individuality) and to our culture. For instance, I can recognize that my culture needs a teaching, and I can be a teacher to fulfill both my individuality and my culture's need. Early Heidegger thought that Dasein should question its Being; it should question its essence of existence, and through this questioning it can find a practicality for its individuality and its culture. Early Heidegger would have said that the primitive man should play with the stone to recognize its practicality and so its existence in an event; so, Dasein should create the event through which its practicality be discovered. But later Heidegger admits that such an event is beyond Dasein's disposal, and it is in the hands of Being itself. It is the Being that creates such an event for its emergence, not Dasein. (However, before such an event, the questioning Dasein is needed to prevent obstacles that hinders Being to be). It is the admittance of flux, that life takes us to its flow, and creates for us events

through which we can discover our existence as our usability to ourselves and to our thrown culture.<sup>357</sup>

All in all, unity of Dasein with things in their practicality provides the real existence for things, and unity of Dasein with Being in its practicality for letting Being to be, assures the real existence for Dasein. The Being which is unknown, abyss, and absent for which Dasein and all beings belong to.

#### **4.2 Interpreting Heidegger: The Triplet Strategy**

Interpreting Heidegger's philosophy in general by using the main elements of his thought would result in an interpretive module or strategy of this thesis. However, the generated module is extracted specifically from Heidegger's thought on authentic Dasein (who searches for its being), it corresponds to both early and later Heidegger's thinking.

There seems to be at least three foundational elements in Heidegger's philosophy about authentic Dasein. First one is the thrownness of Dasein. Dasein is thrown to this world (to its specific culture, background and context). Thrownness to the world is the ground of Dasein; it is the starting and standing point to find its being. Moreover,

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<sup>357</sup> . I would like to comment on relation of authentic Dasein and event of truth in a deep note that would be entirely interpretive yet would lessen the confusion about the relation. Later Heidegger talks about belongingness of Dasein to Being, that Being itself has the full control in its abyss-ness. In this way, it seems that there are needed at least three events for authentic Dasein. First, is the event in which Dasein realizes its temporality and individuality facing its own death. In this level, Dasein searches for its being (what should I be to be really existent?). In the second event, Dasein seemingly decides what to be. For instance, a physician, a teacher, police, etc. However, it seems the decision is made by Dasein, but having in mind that Being is in full control, the decision is already decided by Being itself. For instance, one in his/her life may have experience some inadequacy in medical knowledge (for example, lost his/her loved ones, etc.) to be a physician; or experienced inadequacy in the behavior of his/her community to be a teacher, or experienced insecurity in his/her society to be police. So, it seems that what is to be is already another game of Being that makes Dasein to decide. The third level, after deciding what to be, is how to be. The question is how I am going to be a specific being (specific physician, teacher, police, etc.) that will cover the inadequacy within it? Authentic Dasein in searching for how to be, would encounter the third event of Being that another novel possibility of that specific being is introduced; in doing so, new world of possibilities is opened up. For instance, it might have taken the third event for the first person who tried to heal somebody by having surgery. That event could be a casual visitation of opened corps attacked by animals that displayed its organs. This act of surgery was the answer to question of how to be a physician, that ultimately opened up new world of meanings to the world (of physicians).

according to mentioned descriptions of truth and *aletheia*, it seems that this world itself is parallel to the meaning of *aletheia* in its both understandings. *Aletheia as such* is a hidden clue that refers to openness of the Being in which beings become manifest. The manifestation of beings in their presence, appearance, certainty and accuracy that is related to *on aletheia*. For instance, only in the world of sewing (as the spotlight or realm), entities like needle-threader come to their manifest; and the world itself is a hidden clue yet opening realm about existence in which beings come to their manifestation. Therefore, the compulsory thrownness to this world as the standing point from one hand, and the world as *aletheia* or truth from the other, evokes the element to be called *the stand of truth* in this thesis. However, the word of *truth* in the govern of metaphysics is equivalented to correctness, accuracy, presence, appearance, and fixity that is in direct opposition to Heidegger's philosophy, it is better to call the element as *the stand of truth-claimer*. As mentioned before, the term can be found parallel to other parts of Heidegger's philosophy, like background of intelligibility in disclosedness, or in familiarity, ready-to-hand-ness and everydayness.

Second element I borrowed from Heidegger's philosophy can be called *promise of death*. Authentic Dasein hears the call of conscience and realizes its individuality and temporality facing its own death. Observing the life as a temporal stretched period, makes authentic Dasein to search for its own being as a whole unity by questioning and challenging the thrownness and everydayness of the *they*. Therefore, *promise of death* subsequently leads to challenging the thrownness (probably through observing inadequacies of functionality for the fulfillment of individuality and having life as a whole) by authentic Dasein. The challenge takes place in the grounds of thrownness, using its own elements in searching for authentic Dasein's being. However, the challenge conducts to promise of the demise of the possibilities of the thrownness. In other words, the challenge opens on to *promise of death*.

The other foundational element in Heidegger's philosophy is Dasein's projection toward future. Authentic Dasein by projecting to its own death in the future desires for its own being as whole unity; so, it projects to its possible being – which is unique and new – out of challenging the possibilities of the thrownness. However, this projection

is not concrete, but vague and unclear because of its characteristics of possibility and novelty. Therefore, what remains is the mere promise of something (or some being) to be for authentic Dasein out of its projection. In other words, it can be said that there is a *promise of novel rebirth* of being for authentic Dasein out the promising death of the possibilities of its thrownness.

In the argument about authentic Dasein, interaction of thrownness and projection happens in a distressful ever-growing and ever-changing hermeneutical circle. As mentioned before, authentic Dasein in coherent and resolute search and question of its own being remains distressed. The interaction is a process (of becoming to something unknown) that is coherent, integrated, resolute, totalitarian and distressful. The coherent totality is not about content, but it is about distressed integrated process. All in all, authentic Dasein in Heidegger's philosophy has three consistent elements which are thrownness, projection, and distressed vague, unknown, temporal, ever-changing and novel result out the integrated and coherent interaction (or involvement) of the thrownness and projection. In short, there is resolute challenge of thrownness toward




Figure 36. The interpretive Triplet Strategy derived out of Heidegger's philosophy.  
(Source: drawn by author)

futural projection out of which a vague but novel outcome is merely promised; that led to the interpretive triplet elements of *stand of truth-claimer*, *promise of death*, and *promise of novel rebirth* out of a distressed integrated process.

The interpretive triplet elements, also, corresponds to later Heidegger's (seemingly) switched ideology from Dasein to Being itself. Later Heidegger talks about belongingness of Dasein to Being, that Being has the full control and decides for the being of an authentic Dasein in the event of truth. It is to say that act of questioning does not result in reaching a specific answer for the being of authentic Dasein, but it is Being that bestows the ultimate being in its abyss-ness, and authentic Dasein receives it without question. The whole process of hermeneutical circle of authentic Dasein between thrownness and projection is governed by Being in its abyss-ness. Therefore, in belongingness of Dasein to Being (in later Heidegger), totalitarian, unquestionable, yet unknown power of Being is indicated. In the interpretive triplet elements, this absence/abyss of Being (that it is the abyss that has the control, and it is the abyss that decides and bestows the being) shows itself in the mere promises – specifically, in the promise of some novel rebirth of being – as there is nothing concrete. Furthermore, receiving the being out of abyss Being without question indicates the casualness of the promise of novel rebirth, as the ultimate result for authentic Dasein, that emerges out of the abyss in the hermeneutical process of challenging the old and projecting toward future. So, the promise has the quality of casualness rather than predesigning.

The *promise of novel rebirth* as the result and final step of our interpretive triplet strategy is also accords to the other main discussions of Heidegger. In *disclosedness*, it can be realized that things cannot be known as they are, but as they are manifested in the light of Dasein as disclosedness. It is to say that unknowability/absence of Being must endure which in the triplet strategy, as said before, shows itself in the mere promises which has the quality of casualness. The *call of conscience* with its silence summons Dasein forward to its own most possibility of being which is parallel to *promise of novel rebirth*. In the term of *community* one can find that there is a constant negation of the thrownness, parallel to dictatorship of the *they* (as *they* are attached to

their thrownness), and also there is continuous negation of specific projection and leadership of the self out of the vague hope for novel rebirth. Furthermore, at the event of truth in which new possibility of being (for instance, new practicality of things, new meanings, new functionalities, etc.), different from the old ones is introduced, there would be opening up a new world of meaning aligned with the meaning of *aletheia* in which Being gives a glimpse of itself and recess back; all correspond to the *promise of novel rebirth*.

#### **4.3 Heidegger's Philosophy in Relation to Derrida's Deconstruction through Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics**

John D. Caputo, in his theory of *radical hermeneutics*, speaks about interrelation of Heidegger's philosophy and Derrida's deconstruction in opposition to metaphysics. Before indicating the relation (between Heidegger and Derrida) it is best to be acquainted with the radical hermeneutics.

Caputo insists on the radicality of hermeneutics in its essence, that Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Gadamer lacked to display in their hermeneutics.<sup>358</sup> Caputo's radical hermeneutics is the redefinition of hermeneutics in its essential radicality. Radical hermeneutics wants to complicate things, to effect liberation, to push hermeneutics to its uttermost limits.<sup>359</sup> Radical hermeneutics is about to restore life to its original difficulty against comfort, security, well-rounded truth, and unity that traditional metaphysics of presence asserts or deludes.<sup>360</sup> It is against metaphysics that wants to arrest the flux of life, to own up unity and assurance of life.<sup>361</sup> In this respect, Radical hermeneutics become on the contrary to any danger of totalitarian thinking and control.<sup>362</sup> Radical hermeneutics focuses, and has watchful eye on the ruptures and

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<sup>358</sup> . James Risser, "Hermeneutics at the End of Metaphysics," review of *Radical hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*, by John D. Caputo. *Research in Phenomenology*, 1990, 195.

<sup>359</sup> . Vincent B. Leitch, "Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (review)," review of *Radical hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*, by John D. Caputo. *Philosophy and Literature*, April, 1989, 153-154.

<sup>360</sup> . Caputo, "Radical," 4-7.

<sup>361</sup> . Risser, "Hermeneutics," 195.

<sup>362</sup> . Leitch, "Radical," 158.

gaps of life and existence that metaphysics of presence covers.<sup>363</sup> It is against the bad news of life that metaphysics masks by its subjectivism and humanism.<sup>364</sup> Caputo says:

[Radical hermeneutics] wants to describe the irregularities and differences by which we are inhabited. But I never gave up on the word “hermeneutics,” which ever since Heidegger has meant a critique of the hollow assurances and tranquilizing powers of the metaphysics of presence and which by the fact “restores” the difficulty of things. This hermeneutics exposes us to the ruptures and gaps, let us say, the textuality and difference, which inhabits everything we think, and do, and hope for. I want to show, however, that what I call here radical hermeneutics is not an exercise in nihilism, which wants to reduce human practices and institutions to rubble, but an attempt to face up the bad news metaphysics has been keeping under cover[.] [...] It provides an approach to the question of human existence that does not fall through the trap door of subjectivism and humanism.<sup>365</sup>

Radical hermeneutics is similar to Socratic vigilance that wants to cope with the flux without asserting the flux.<sup>366</sup> This flux of existence and life, seems to be the mysterious groundless/foundationless ground/foundation that Caputo refers to; flux seems to refer to giving and taking aspect of this foundationless foundation (call it Being of Lord or etc.) that we are caught in the mysterious powers which governs the movement of coming to be and passing away which is beyond our control, which we did not initiate.

Caputo says:

The mystery [of flux] is what withdraws beneath, behind, beyond the grip of concepts, the range of historical meanings and conceptualities. [...] [the mystery of the flux is] to awaken to the groundlessness of things: that everything is caught up in a certain fortuitousness [...] we depend upon forces which we not dominate [...] Someone, something, the Lord or not, always giveth and taken away. There is always giving and taking-again (*gien-tagelse*). We learn to come to grips with kinesis, with coming to be and passing away, and with the mysterious powers which govern that movement.<sup>367</sup>

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<sup>363</sup> . Risser, “Hermeneutics,” 197.

<sup>364</sup> . Caputo, “Radical,” 6.

<sup>365</sup> . Ibid, 6.

<sup>366</sup> . Risser, “Hermeneutics,” 195.

<sup>367</sup> . Caputo, “Radical,” 204-206.



So, radical hermeneutics is to stay in play and flux.<sup>368</sup> The play is without reason, without comfort.<sup>369</sup> It wants to “catch the life at its game of taking fight and thereby restore life to its original difficulty”<sup>370</sup>.

Besides play and flux, undecidability, death, and cold hermeneutics are three other main features of radical hermeneutics. Undecidability “keeps question in question”, “keeps us in motion and faithful to the flux”; it makes us discomfort.<sup>371</sup> Death is what keeps the play in play and motion.<sup>372</sup> Cold hermeneutics asserts that Being, truth, or meaning are not concrete, but they are as effects. It is “to recognize the flux, the play which all things are caught”; to recognize all forms are temporary and contingent.<sup>373</sup> Cold hermeneutics opens up the abyss, against metaphysics concrete truth. Caputo says:

Cold hermeneutics does not believe in “Truth” it renounces all such capitalization something hidden by and stred up in a tradition which is groaning to deliver it to us. [...] It understands that meaning is an effect. [...] Derrida’s effect is to keep us [...] ready for the difficulty and the flux. Just when the metaphysics of presence is about to convince us that being clings to being, that truth is a well-rounded whole, a hermeneutical or eschatological circle, cold hermeneutics opens up an abyss.<sup>374</sup>

In this way, “understanding and interpretation occur in the midst of existence and its dreadful anxieties”; “knowledge shows itself as *agnosis*”<sup>375</sup>. Cold hermeneutics is against unity of meaning in hermeneutics; it wants to assert that “meaning of Being is thought in terms of the “dispatches” across the epochs, of a special message sent to a privileged recipient”<sup>376</sup>.

For Caputo, Heidegger’s philosophy of facticity that want to turn back to the original difficulty of life, and Derrida’s deconstruction are the two wings of radical

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<sup>368</sup> . Ibid, 198.

<sup>369</sup> . Ibid, 201-202.

<sup>370</sup> . Risser, “Hermeneutics,” 194-195.

<sup>371</sup> . Caputo, “Radical,” 188-189.

<sup>372</sup> . Ibid, 201.

<sup>373</sup> . Ibid, 198.

<sup>374</sup> . Ibid, 189.

<sup>375</sup> . Leitch, “Radical,” 152-154.

<sup>376</sup> . Risser, “Hermeneutics,” 196.




Figure 37. Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics as intermediary space between Heidegger and Derrida  
(Source: drawn by author)

hermeneutics. Radical hermeneutics is an intermediary space between Heidegger and Derrida that pushes for “more radical reading of Heidegger” and “more hermeneutic reading of Derrida”.<sup>377</sup> Radical hermeneutics begins with Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity to renounce metaphysics’s relief, and to “describe the irregularities and difference by which we are inhabited”.<sup>378</sup> For Caputo, Heidegger and Derrida are like two wings of one bird (of Icarus) (or two faces of one coin); one (Derrida) stresses on dissemination, and other (Heidegger) emphasize on deep stillness and simplicity. In Caputo’s notion of foundationless foundation, Derrida focuses upon foundationless, and Heidegger concentrates more on foundation, while both have in mind that it is already foundationless foundation.

Derrida, stressing on the one side (right wing) criticizes Heidegger seemingly fixed notions of authenticity, event, and *aletheia*; that Heidegger has fallen again on metaphysics of presence that he denounced.<sup>379</sup> Derrida stays suspicious of rationality, celebrating dissemination, diversity, repetition to secure himself falling into the trap of metaphysics. Here, according to Caputo, “Heidegger whispers in his ear that putting all metaphysics under the sign of suspicion is a way of sheltering what conceals itself, protecting it from harsh lights”.<sup>380</sup> Heidegger whispers in Derrida’s ear: “*die Sache Selbst*”<sup>381</sup>; the thing itself. Heidegger refers to the elusiveness of the thing itself in the postal principle; that the thing sends post to recipients, and it is never one of its dispatches (it never posts itself).<sup>382</sup> Caputo says:

To delimit Being and truth as effects, [...] is to recognize the flux, the play in which all things are caught, and the temporary and contingent character of the forms that are traced in it. For Derrida, this issues in a metaphoric of dance and free play, of free signifiers [...] Heidegger develops another side of it, which he calls the “high and dangerous play” – let us say, the deep playing a metaphoric of stillness and simplicity. In neither case is it a question of arresting the play. In both cases one wants to keep the play in play, but the metaphoric of the play, the resonances and resoundings of the play, are different. [...] I want to keep these two [Heidegger and

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<sup>377</sup> . Caputo, “Radical,” 5.

<sup>378</sup> . Ibid, 6.

<sup>379</sup> . Ibid, 4.

<sup>380</sup> . Ibid, 190.

<sup>381</sup> . Ibid, 190.

<sup>382</sup> . Ibid, 190-192.

Derrida] after each other, giving each other no rest, each keeping the other in play. And, if this is to be described as a dialectic, let it be a negative dialectic whose point is to give no comfort or place to hide. In this way, one raises the tension and deepens the resonance of what I call here radical hermeneutics.<sup>383</sup>

All in all, it seems that the thoughts of both Heidegger and Derrida, alongside of Caputo's radical hermeneutics, are based on the main notion of Being (or text in the case of Derrida) as foundationless foundation, or groundless ground. Derrida questions Heidegger's ground and hermeneutical aspect which are Dasein, thrownness, and hermeneutical process between thrownness and projection that results in authentic Dasein, and event of truth (*aletheia*). However, as it is mentioned before, for Heidegger it is already groundless ground. In later Heidegger, Dasein belongs to Being in its abyss-ness (and Dasein's functionality is to let Being to be); Being that glimpse at the event of truth and recesses back to the absence; Being that, in its play, bestows promise of novel beings and identities to Dasein and other entities. On the other hand, Derrida focused on groundlessness/abyss-ness/radicality of text/Being opposing to conformity or ground of metaphysics. However, according to Caputo, there is Hermeneutical element in Derrida too. Caputo says:

I locate a certain hermeneutic element in Derrida [...] it does not recover hidden meanings and lost reassures from the tradition. On the contrary it brings us up short, startles us, exposing us to the play which plays without why. It catches us off-guard, in an unsuspecting moment. Derrida's effect is to keep us "ready for anxiety," [...] to expose us to the abyss [...] The moment of hermeneutic truth in Derrida is a moment of heartless honesty. [...] The "good news" is bad news. [...] his dialectic must always be negative. He must always stay on the move, remain a moving target. [...] Derrida sets about the deconstruction of all mystagogues and rationalist, of all who have claimed to see the light. Heidegger whispers in his ear that putting all metaphysics under the sign of suspicion, questioning every claim to privileged access, is a way of sheltering what conceals itself, of protecting it from harsh lights [...] a moment of recognition of the depths of the play in which we are caught up, a moment of openness to the mystery which everywhere invades us. [...] And what is that, if not a certain recognition of the mystery which infiltrates and surrounds us?<sup>384</sup>

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<sup>383</sup> . Ibid, 198.

<sup>384</sup> . John D. Caputo, "HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA: COLD HERMENEUTICS," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 17. No. 3. (October 1986): 271-272.

According to Caputo's explanations, it can be said that hermeneutical element in Derrida is recognition of abyss-ness of Being that entails the restless, distressed watchful eye for the disruptions of metaphysics to tell us about the bad news of life, of its difficulty. Therefore, it seems that the ground aspect of Derrida, or the hermeneutical element is the integrity of distressed watchful eye that observes the ruptures of metaphysics in order to, somehow, shelter the unknowability/abyss-ness of Being/text that ultimately, in my interpretation, results in the promise of production of more and more meanings. In short, what is radical hermeneutics is about (alongside of groundless ground term of both Heidegger and Derrida) is that to keep watchful eye on the ruptures of life, theory, meaning, or metaphysics. That is an acknowledgment of Being in its abyss-ness, and also it is cooperation with Being to let it be in whatever it wants to be out of its darkness. This would guarantee novelty and variety (or maybe freedom) of forms or ways that Being/text can display itself. As Risser says:

In this sense the hermeneutics of radical hermeneutics is not about words and texts [...] but simply about keeping a watchful eye on "the ruptures in existence." [...] for Caputo, beyond the pseudo assurance of faith, there is an openness to mystery, a ground that is an abyss where all hell breaks loose. [...] for radial hermeneutics, once we have owned up to the elusiveness which envelopes us all, the best we can do is let all things be.<sup>385</sup>

#### **4.4 The Triplet Strategy within Derrida's Deconstruction**

The accordance of Heidegger's philosophy with Derrida's deconstruction (alongside of Caputo's radical hermeneutics), in their recognition of Being/text as groundless ground, makes it possible to observe the triplet strategy analogous to the strategy of deconstruction.

Deconstruction is a strategy against truth-claiming of philosophy and any metaphysical system.<sup>386</sup> Derrida's strategy is to identify the context (as the self-referential moment of texts) upon which a specific reading or truth-claiming meaning

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<sup>385</sup> . Risser, "Hermeneutics," 197-198.

<sup>386</sup> . Norris, "Deconstruction," 146.

is presented. Then, it continues to question (by close and critical reading) to show the flaws, inadequacies, and complexities of the based context. For Derrida, text is unsaturable, so it would be false to claim any assertion of fixity in a context. After determination and display of more complexity of the context beyond any specific reading's claim of arresting that context, Derrida (re-)analyzes the whole truth-claiming text in another level. In doing so, Derrida converts the presumed center-margin hierarchy (or in another words, it displaces the traditional binary opposition) within a specific reading through which the whole truth-claiming system encounter its demise. Culler says:

We have already noted that Derrida's insistence on the unsaturability of context and the concomitant possibility of extending context in ways that allow further complexities of the text one is studying to emerge. One could, therefore, identify deconstruction with the twin principles of the contextual determination of meaning and the infinite extendability of context. Derrida exploits the force of contextual determination whenever he reads a work in relation to the system of metaphysical values from which it cannot succeed in escaping. [...] Deconstruction emphasizes the self-referential moment of a text in order to reveal the surprising effects of employing a portion of a text to analyze the whole or the uncanny relationships between one textual level and another or one discourse and another. The notion of a text accounting for itself is another version of self-presence, another avatar of the system of *s'entendre parler*. Texts work in self-referential ways to provide concepts that are strategically important in reading them, but there is always, Derrida would say, a lag or a limp.

Therefore, converting the traditional binary opposition is a major work of the strategy of deconstruction. However, the aim is not to priorities the second term over the first one, but to indicate there is no priority of each term in metaphysical presumption of hierarchy. Metaphysical opposition like speech-writing, signified-signifier, nature-culture, man-woman, original-supplement, inside-outside, present-absent, and many other terms in which the first term is privileged over the second term is subverted within deconstruction's strategy.

For instance, Culler explains about inherent paradox of metaphysical preference of speech over writing in Derrida's deconstruction. Before Saussure, it was assumed that

language is the system of positive entities in which words signify specific pure meanings. Saussure claimed that language is a system of signs in which signs are arbitrary that makes the linguistic system as system of difference. He says: “signs are arbitrary and conventional and that each is defined not by essential properties but by difference that distinguish it from other signs. A language is thus conceived as system of differences.”<sup>387</sup> In this relational system, sounds manifest the “units of the system in acts of speech”<sup>388</sup>. Therefore, there is a preference and privilege of speech as there is the presence of speaker to eliminate any kind of misunderstanding to convey his/her original intention or signified. However, this idea about language as system of difference contradicts metaphysical thought of signs are pure positive entities, it falls back to the metaphysical traps because not only signified/meanings is detached from signifier/words but signified prevails the existence of signifier. Culler says: “there is in Saussure’s argument an affirmation of logocentrism. [...] the signifier exists to give access to the signified and thus seems to be subordinated to the concept or meaning that is communicates.”<sup>389</sup> In Saussure’s system, there is preference of speech over writing since the linguistic objects are just spoken words, not the written ones. In this view, writing with the qualities of “distance, absence, misunderstanding, insincerity, and ambiguity”<sup>390</sup> not only are considered as secondary, accessory, supplementary, and mere technical device for representing speech, it also becomes a threat for speech because of possibility of distortion the intention of speaker. Culler argues that if language is the system of difference and if meaning of words are arbitrary in which we understand meaning of words because of their difference from other words, how can be identify or illustrate such difference?<sup>391</sup> The answer is by the same writing that Saussure denies to include in linguistic system. From the other hand, if speech is the concrete signifier of speaker’s intention, then it should remain identical to be contributed in different circumstances for people of different contexts. In other words, it should be repeatable when there is no presence of speaker and his/her intention. This feature (iterability without intention of speaker) is already a quality of writing.

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<sup>387</sup> . Culler, “On Deconstruction,” 98.

<sup>388</sup> . Ibid, 98.

<sup>389</sup> . Ibid, 99.

<sup>390</sup> . Ibid, 101.

<sup>391</sup> . Ibid, 101.

Therefore, writing is not a supplementary but an important part of linguistic system.

Culler says:

Thus writing which Saussure claimed ought not to be the object of linguistic enquiry, turns out to be the best illustration of the nature of linguistic units. Speech is to be understood as a form of writing, an instance of the basic linguistic mechanism manifested in writing. Saussure's argument brings about this reversal: the announced hierarchy that makes writing a derivative form of speech, a parasitic mode of representation added to speech, is inverted, and speech is presented, explained, as a form of writing: a generalized writing that would have as subspecies a vocal writing and a graphical writing. [...] Writing-in-general is an *archi-écriture*, an archi-writing or protowriting which is the condition both speech and writing in the narrow sense.<sup>392</sup>

In this subverting the hierarchy, the logic of supplementary is also converted. If there is a primary original concept that is complete in itself, and in which supplementary terms is "an inessential extra" to be added, then it refutes the first assumption because if the first term is complete in itself, then it would not need something to be added.<sup>393</sup> In the displacement of speech with writing, and primary with secondary in general, there also occurs the displacement between signified and signifier. Because of quality of iterability in writing within different circumstance and contexts, the signified becomes signifier of more meanings/signified in an endless chain of deferral through which there only remains a trace. There are also other examples of the strategy that deconstruction exploits in subverting the binary oppositions. For example, Freud argues that women are inferior to men because of their natural bisexuality they envy men's penis. But if women are origin bisexual, then it could make men inferior and derivative of women. In another example, if a hymn is the cause to invoke lovers, the romance of lovers could be cause of writing a hymn; or if a pin is the cause of experience of pain, the pain can be the cause of discovery of pin.

The strategy of deconstruction contains parallel elements of the interpretive triplet strategy driven from Heidegger's through. Compatible to thrownness in Heidegger's philosophy, there is stand of truth-claimer within deconstruction too. Deconstruction

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<sup>392</sup> . Ibid, 101-102.

<sup>393</sup> . Ibid, 102-103.



strategy is to mount upon metaphysical truth-claiming philosophy or ideology using the same conventions of that truth-claimer to display the inconsistency within it. Deconstruction is to show the convertibility of the hierarchy of a system to claim that what that system presumes and prefers as central unquestionable core over the assumed secondaries can be subverted. Deconstruction is to challenge the metaphysical system (truth-claiming) not to destroy it. This is a delicate point that is neglected in majority of deconstruction arguments in architecture; deconstruction is a strategy to challenge, not to kill because its own existence is already dependent upon that system. In this way, as soon as the system destroyed, the deconstructive strategy is also demolished. So, first of all, deconstruction depends on the system that it analyzes. In other words, there is a need for truth-claimer, not to be destroyed, but to be challenged. In accordance, Culler says:

The deconstruction appeals to no higher logical principle of superior reason but uses the very principle it deconstructs. [...] This sort of analysis, in which a discourse is shown to repeat the structures it is analyzing and in which the disruptive insights of this transference are explored, has become one of the major activities of deconstruction. [...] it [deconstruction] remains implicated in or attached to the system it criticizes and attempts to displace. [...] In general, while emphasizing the heterogeneity of Freud's texts, deconstruction has found in his writing daring proposals that put in question the metaphysical assumption with which he is ostensibly operating. [...] deconstruction explores self-referential structures in texts [...] What is deconstructed in deconstructive analyses attuned to this problem is not the text itself but the text as it is read, the combination of text and the readings that articulate it. [...] the claim is that because deconstruction is never concerned only with signified content but especially with the conditions and assumptions of discourse, with frameworks of enquiry, it engages the institutional structures governing our practices, competencies, performances. [...] Questions of institutional force and structure prove to be involved in the problems deconstruction addresses.<sup>394</sup>

Moreover, the acknowledgement of *stand of truth-claimer* to be challenged by the same conventions of the truth-claimer, also, can be realized in Norris's words. He says:

Deconstruction is therefore an activity of reading which remains closely tied to the texts it interrogates, and which can never set up

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<sup>394</sup> . Culler, "On Deconstruction," 87-139-151-157-164-205-215.

independently as method or system of operative concepts. [...] Yet, Derrida's texts are like nothing else in modern philosophy, and indeed represent a challenge to the whole tradition and self-understanding of that discipline. [...] Deconstruction is therefore an activity performed by texts which in the end have to acknowledge their own partial complicity with what they denounce. [...] Derrida argues that deconstruction must 'bore from within', or work to dismantle the texts of philosophy with concepts borrowed from philosophy itself. This reciprocal dependence is nowhere more evident than in Derrida's relationship with Husserl. [...] Deconstruction begins with the same gesture of turning reason against itself to bring out its tacit dependence on another, repressed or unrecognized, level of meaning. [...] Deconstruction is inimical to Marxist thought at the point where it questions the validity of *any* science or method set up in rigid separation from the play of textual meaning. [...] After all, was it not the whole *point* of deconstruction to problematize the logocentric claim of philosophers from Plato down that reason and logic enjoyed a rightful privilege over literature, rhetoric, and the duplicitous art of language?<sup>395</sup>

In architectural literature, in some point, one can find the necessity of existence of truth-claimer as the starting point. For instance, Hoteit says:

Deconstruction is a distinctive strategy in philosophical and literary approaches. It refutes prior intellectual, linguistic, and literary regulations by questioning the basic structure on which they were founded. [...] Deconstruction does not mean demolition, and its objective is not negative. However, it shakes the residual layers to show what is beneath it before reconstructing it again. [...] Derrida intends to create a philosophical, critical practice that challenges all the texts that are connected to a specific and final signifier. [...] Likewise, deconstructivist architecture requires the existence of a definite archetypal construction, so that it can be deconstructed.<sup>396</sup>

This stance of truth-claimer, however, is doomed to confront its demise by the act of challenge. As mentioned before, this is not about act of killing that brings death to the truth-claimer, but it is an act of challenge toward standing truth-claimer (using the same rules of the truth-claimer) that shows only the *promise of death*. In the constant and integrated negation or challenge of the metaphysical system or meaning, there is a radical element within deconstruction that remains radical to its own production. It denounces whatever deconstruction produces. In this endless negation, what remains

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<sup>395</sup> . Norris, "Deconstruction," 18-31-47-48-49-63-82-161.

<sup>396</sup> . Hoteit, "Deconstructivism," 121-122.

is not only the promise of death to metaphysical truth-claiming, but also promise of death to the futural projection. In other words, *promise of death* remains as the effect of this constant negation. About this constant active negation, Culler says:

Deconstruction is therefore an activity performed by texts which in the end have to acknowledge their own partial complicity with what they denounce. The most rigorous reading, it follows, is one that holds itself provisionally open to further deconstruction of its own operative concepts. [...] Deconstruction might be seen in the same negative terms: a discourse fixated upon the 'transcendental signified' of logocentric thought, self-locked (like Nietzsche) in the toils of endless demystification. [...] Deconstruction is the active antithesis of everything that criticism ought to be if one accepts its traditional values and concepts.<sup>397</sup>

The endless chain of negation guarantees production of more and more meanings out of the situated context within text. Because of iterability of writing and displacement of signified with signifier (in which every signified becomes a signifier for other novel signified), deconstruction remains radical and open-ended to its projected production. This open-endedness contains the promise of more meanings; in other words, it gives the *promise of novel rebirth* of meanings out of text. About the open-endedness of deconstruction, Norris says:

The end-point of deconstructive thought, as Derrida insists, is to recognize that there is no end to the interrogative play between text and text. Deconstruction can never have the final word because its insights are inevitably couched in a rhetoric which itself lies open to further deconstructive reading.<sup>398</sup>

Accordingly, G.C. Spivak says:

In Derrida's reworking, the structure preface-text becomes open at both ends. The text has no subtle identity, no stable origin, no stable end. Each act of reading the "text" is a preface to the next. The reading of a self-professed preface is no exception to this rule.<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>397</sup> . Culler, "On Deconstruction," xii-47-80.

<sup>398</sup> . Norris, "Deconstruction," 83.

<sup>399</sup> . Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1997), xii.




Figure 38. Confirmation of the Triplet Strategy within Derrida's strategy of deconstruction.  
(Source: drawn by author)

Moreover, there can be found more compatibilities between the interpretive triplet strategy driven from Heidegger to deconstruction in general and also within particular term of deconstruction. For instance, in general, the idea of metaphysics (including centrality of language, phonocentrism, logocentrism, centrality of presence, binary opposition) is about accepting some fixity/center concepts attached from outside/up above metaphysically that separates us as detached subject, and considers the assumed center/meaning/structure as detached object that which suppresses the interrelation between individuals/subjects with the object, and also arrests the becomingness of the object. Deconstruction opposes this idea of metaphysics to claim that there are no any fixed meanings fallen from sky, but they are dependent on individual's readings. In this way, deconstruction stresses on interpretive and hermeneutics nature of meanings. Hence, the major point of deconstruction is to stand against truth-claiming of metaphysics (using of its same elements). This opposition toward metaphysical fixity that brings temporality to any fixed meanings gives the *promise of death* to metaphysical conventions and also gives *promise of rebirth* of novel yet to come meanings out of the metaphysical context.

The interpretive triplet strategy also visible in deconstruction's particular term. For instance, *differance* is about postponement of meanings and displacement of signified with signifier (and displacement of writing with speech) that asserts temporality of old meanings in favor of production of more novel meanings which is parallel to *promise of death* and *promise of novel rebirth*. In the term of dissemination and fragmentation of meaning in which there is concealment of (ultimate) meaning that indicates abyss-ness of text parallel to abys-ness of Being. Also, the term contains proliferation of meaning in uncontrolled way (or free-play) that is compatible to the *casualness* of the production of novel rebirth of meanings; it just gives a *promise of novel rebirth* out of its scattered seeds of meanings in which ultimate meaning is only can be achieved by readers/individuals/visitors. The terms of postponement, interpretation, and concealed meanings are accordant to the *promise of novel rebirth*. In the term of supplement, in which there is an inherent displacement of center-margin duality indicates temporality of the state of centrality and marginality, leaves no concrete content but merely a trace, a promise. In the term of iterability, in which meanings are open-endedly susceptible

to change through various readings/interpretation, *promise of novel rebirth* of meanings emerges. Also, one can find compatibility of the notions of *promise of death* and *promise of novel rebirth* within the term of trace as it indicates there is no original meanings but only a vague trace. In the expression of “all readings are misreading” indicates that the futural projective meanings are also doomed to face their ends; so, what remains is just a *promise of novel rebirth* of meanings. In the expression of “there is no outside text”, it refers to the totalitarian abyss-ness of text (out of which different novel meanings can emerge) is analogous to totalitarian abyss-ness of Being (in which novel beings can emerge). All in all, the triplet strategy driven out of Heidegger’s philosophy is in accordance with Derrida’s strategy of deconstruction.



## CHAPTER 5

### RE-EVALUATION OF DECONSTRUCTIVISM IN ARCHITECTURE THROUGH THE TRIPLET STRATEGY

In accordance to Derrida's deconstruction, the interpretive triplet strategy derived from Heidegger's philosophy can be the missed link between deconstruction and deconstructivism in architecture. The possibilities within the strategy addresses the problems that seemingly are generated from misuse or misunderstanding of deconstruction within architecture. The triplet strategy is to fill the gaps and to reconnect the missed link between deconstruction and deconstructivism.

#### 5.1 The Possible Embodiment of the Triplet Strategy within Architecture

The triplet strategy, as it is obvious, is not a method, rule, convention, or a truth-claimer in general. It is a strategy that could take various forms and can be applied differently according to knowledge, context, and creativity of architects. However, to realize its possibility within architecture, it is better to give it a clue about the possible embodiment of the strategy within architecture.

The first part of the triplet strategy is the *standing of truth-claimer*. The truth-claimer, that could be any specific meaning, form, function, tradition, culture, philosophy, theory, convention, rules, etc., is the starting and standing point. It begins with the truth-claimer, and that truth-claimer is never destroyed but one should be able to observe its stand up to the end. Therefore, for the purpose of applying the strategy within architecture, the architectural project should start with some truth-claimer. If it is a specific form, function, culture, tradition, method, etc., it needs to be the starting point that endures in the entire project. (Here, one can see some problem within



deconstructivism. First of all, in majority of deconstructive works, there are less specific forms as the starting point that endures. From the other, deconstructive works are linked to be meaningless, anti-historical and anti-functional; but, meaning, history, and function are the truth-claimers that should endure in the entire project of architecture.)

The second element of the triplet strategy is the *promise of death*. It is the challenging process of the truth-claimer using the same elements of that truth-claimer in the integrated yet disturbed process. This challenging process is not to kill the truth-claimer, but to show its eventual temporality and death; in other words, it is to show the *promise of death* of that specific truth-claimer. Therefore, for contribution of the strategy within architecture, an architectural project (after commencing with some specific truth-claimer) should challenge the starting truth-claimer in an integrated and disturbed process. For instance, if the starting truth-claimer is a specific form (like a Platonic Solid or a cultural form), then one should observe that the form is challenged using the same traits, rules, or elements of the form to the point that it is only on the verge of destruction, but not destroyed. (One might argue that using morphology could be one of the tools for this purpose as morphology is a process that needs something to start, and also through its unintended (not purposeful) casualness it challenges and disturbs the initial form slightly in each step to the point that the initial form comes to collapse. However, one should be cautious that this morphological process should end at the point where with one further step there would be no trace of the initial form.)<sup>400</sup> Moreover, if the truth-claimer is about a specific function, meaning, or tradition, it should be possible to observe how that specific truth-claimer is challenged via its elements that eventually would give a promise of death of that truth-claimer.

The lack of this second phase of the strategy is generally visible in most deconstructive works in architecture. As said before, first there is less obvious standing of truth-

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<sup>400</sup> . Here, using computer programs for morphological manipulation comes at hand, because of their speed of rendering and reformation of the initial forms, and most importantly because they can contain the element of casualness and randomness when it is hard for a human architect/designer to refrain to include her/his own specific projection.

claimer. Second, in majority of deconstructive projects, there is less visible deconstructive integrated process. In the works, it is difficult to identify what is challenged and how it is challenged in which specific process. One could find more of fragmentation, displacement of structure and surface, assemblage, and chaotic collage in deconstructive projects which are way far from any sense of promise of death. According to the strategy, the *promise of death* is the disturbing and challenging process to show the temporality of truth-claimer. However, in most deconstructive projects, there are mostly chaos, death, and destruction, rather than disturbing process that gives a promise of death. Also, it can be said that there are more of meaninglessness, un-functionality, and anti-historicity rather than de-signification of some specific meaning, function, and tradition in an integrated process.

The third element of the triplet strategy is the *promise of novel rebirth*. It is the final product of the triplet strategy that comes out of challenging the truth-claimer. It has the quality of casualness out of which the possibility of new world of meanings emerges different from the previous truth-claimer. The *promise of novel rebirth* is a mere promise without any specific content of truth-claiming that only can be completed by individuals in their sense-makings. Possible embodiment of the third element within architecture depends upon the previous elements. Whatever the truth-claimer (specific form, function, meaning, culture, tradition, etc.) is, and in whatever process it has been challenged, as the final product, there should be a casual *promise of novel rebirth* that overshadows the truth-claimer. For instance, if the truth-claimer of an architectural project is about specific form, then, out of the challenging process, there should emerge a vague promise of novelty (or an indefinite trace of becoming) that shades the initial form. In such a project, one should sense the pregnancy of the project with something vague but novel that only can be incarnated with the sense-making of individual, visitors, and occupants. In another example, if the truth-claimer




Figure 39. Possible embodiment of the Triplet Strategy within architecture. (Source: drawn by author)

is about certain function, tradition or meaning, then, one should sense an unclear promise, trace, and pregnancy of project with some new function or some novel

meaning of tradition. *The promise of novel rebirth* is kind of a pregnancy that could completely open a new world of meaning by overriding the initial truth-claimer.

Here emerges another problem within deconstructivism in general. Major deconstructive works lack the promise of novel rebirth of form, function, meaning, or tradition either by lack of suggestion to any possible becoming, or by bringing some even new content rather than promising trace. In later, there happens an act of (re)birth rather than a promise, a trace, or a pregnancy. In the major works, one can find difficulty in tracking the trace of becoming to something unknown that can be completed by individuals. Completeness by individuals (visitors, occupants) in their sense-makings beyond any subjective truth-claiming of an architect is another aspect of the triplet strategy that some deconstructive projects neglect. Furthermore, as another quality of the *promise of novel rebirth*, the architectural project should open up a new world of meaning, form, function, tradition (by giving the promise) that would overshadow the entire project. This quality is also seeming to be neglected by majority of the deconstructive works within architecture.

Overall, the most important aspect of the triplet strategy (in accordance to Heidegger and Derrida) is to remain opposed to the truth-claiming of metaphysical thinking. Metaphysics claims unquestionable truth, meaning, form, function, theory, etc., that cuts individuals' understanding, interaction, and involvement with the world. Such a thinking presumes things and the world as detached object beyond our own sense-making that makes human being as detached subject; it neglects the interpretive and hermeneutics relation of human being with the world. So, including the involvement of individual sense-making is the other major aspect of the strategy. Therefore, for architectural practice, it is needed to refrain from giving any fixity of forms, function, tradition from one hand, and from the other, it is to include human sense-making to involve with the project.

## **5.2 The Triplet Strategy in Addressing the Problems**

### **5.2.1 The triplet strategy as a deeper interpretation of deconstruction**

The first problem is about lack of deeper reading of Derrida in his criticism on metaphysics of presence. Derrida in his opposition toward metaphysics and metaphysical concepts remains as similar yet more radical gesture of Heidegger, while for both Heidegger and Derrida the main concept (Being for Heidegger, and text for Derrida) is foundationless foundation. In Short, Derrida's deconstruction is basically derived from Heidegger's philosophy. Therefore, this thesis's interpretive triplet strategy out of Heidegger's thought in accordance to Derrida's strategy of deconstruction beyond mere handful of keywords (in argument of deconstruction within architecture) would be a possible solution to cover the first lack.

### **5.2.2 The triplet strategy as a possible missed link of deconstructivism and as anchorage for differentiation of the deconstructivist architects**

The second problem is about possibility of missed link between deconstruction and deconstructivism in architecture (that could eventually cover misinterpretation of deconstruction within architecture, and could lessen the relation of its practice in architecture with meaninglessness of nihilism or chaos of relativism). The triplet strategy seems to be the possible missed link between deconstruction and the thoughts and projects of major deconstructive architects. Furthermore, to address the third problem, the strategy can be the pivot point through which the differentiation of deconstructive architects in application of deconstruction can be identified.

In Libeskind's project, maybe it is possible to observe the standing truth-claimer in traditional forms or in some subjective symbolic meaning. However, it is less possible to notice an integrated process of challenging the truth-claimer by using the same traits of the truth-claimer. Jugged forms of Libeskind, coming out of some traditional forms, seems to be an outside/external object trying to kill the familiar forms. In those




Figure 40. Bundeswehr Military History Museum, Dresden, Germany, 2011, Daniel Libeskind  
 (Sources: <https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/daniel-libeskind-architecture>,  
<https://holzerkobler.com/project/military-history-museum>)

projects, a sense of promise of death to the truth-claimer using the same internal features of the truth-claimer through an integrated challenging process is lesser sensed. Also, there seems to be a lack of suggestion of promise or trace of novel rebirth but a collision of two different objects into each other. Furthermore, if the truth-claimer is Libeskind's own interpretive symbolic meanings, also, one can find difficulty in observing an integrated challenging process of those symbolic meanings with the possibility of some novel meanings.

It seems that Libeskind has fallen to the traps of metaphysics. For instance, there is a subjective preservation and installation of specific symbolic meaning throughout his projects. There is an intentional pre-design of forms and meanings that the architect wants to deliver his subjective thinking to visitors. In the Jewish Museum, features like presenting the absent, leading visitors through restricted voids, specific entrance and exit, alongside of symbolic meanings are to preserve another content that would be the same path of metaphysical thinking. It is against *promise of novel rebirth* in which individuals have freedom to have their own interpretation.

In Gehry's projects in which there is autonomy and free play of forms as source of meaning-creation, the *stand of truth-claimer* may could be identified in some projects with the symbolic fish. However, the free play of forms and animation seems to be positive aspects, yet an integrated process of challenging is hard to find. So, there seems to be lack of *promise of death*. Additionally, however there is no installation of specific meaning, form or function, as the free play of forms is intended for generation of meanings (which are another positive aspect of Gehry's works), but there seems to




Figure 41. Hotel Marques de Riscal, Elciego, Spain, 2006, Frank Gehry  
 (Source: [https://www.bernardsmith.name/hotels\\_and\\_restaurants\\_spain/hotel\\_marques\\_de\\_riscal/](https://www.bernardsmith.name/hotels_and_restaurants_spain/hotel_marques_de_riscal/))

be a lack of *promise of novel rebirth*. Gehry's spontaneous playfulness is a positive aspect that can be analogous to the *casualness*, but his projects remain sterile in any proposition of novel rebirth. It is difficult to identify a trace or promise of something new out of some projects. More than giving a suggestion of some possibility of rebirth or re-formulation, the projects seem to be more of a chaos.

There seems to be a metaphysical side within Gehry's thought visible in his projects. From one hand, there is complete abandonment of traditional forms; from the other, his architecture seems to play within the ground and culture of modern commodity fetishism. The main feature of the triplet strategy is to challenge the thrown ground or culture, not to abandon some tradition in favor of other culture. Additionally, his exaggerated exterior forms to arouse spatial experience (which is to cover the problem of indifference in general) remains too relative and chaotic that would eventually result in indifference as they lack the final element of the triplet strategy which is *promise of novel rebirth*. Furthermore, Gehry uses the element of wrapping in which exterior appearance hides the interior. This wrapping element not only gives the sense of preserving something or some entity beneath its appearance, it also gives the sense of duality of interior-exterior or old forms-new forms that ultimately is playing in ground of metaphysics.

Within Hadid's projects, there are fluid forms trying to gather the energy and forces of environment to reform and redirect the face of environment with a totalitarian big gesture. There are some positive aspects of Hadid's projects in accordance to the triplet strategy. For instance, there seems to be a *stand of truth-claimer* if the truth-claimer is




Figure 42. One North Masterplan, Singapore, 2001, Zaha Hadid. Figure 43. National Museum of XXI Century Arts, Rome, 1998-2008, Zaha Hadid.  
 (Source: Lebbeus Woods, "Drawn into Space: Zaha Hadid," *Architectural Design* 78, no. 4 (2008))

the forces or energies within the environment. However, by more concentration on the energies, maybe it can be said that she cared less to the (traditional) forms of building in the environment. In the triplet strategy, there is challenge of truth-claimer using its same features. Hadid prefers and uses one force of the environment (its energy) to re-design another force (traditional forms). In doing so, it seems that she deserts the existence of traditional forms of the environment. In another words, more than challenging the truth-claimer (if the truth-claimer is the energy of the environment) she seems to challenge something external to the truth-claimer, which is the traditional forms of environment.

There are other positive side of Hadid's projects in alignment to the triplet strategy. One can sense both casualness and also a promise of becoming and pregnancy with her works. As Woods says: "The forms gather energies around them and retain them. The contained energy contorts simple forms into complex ones. They are tightly wound, or bundled, and seem ready to explode – though they do not."<sup>401</sup> However, there seems a metaphysical side with her projects. There appears to be a subjective totalitarian governing aspect in the big gesture of her works that threatens the existence of other buildings in the environment. It seems her designs makes a decision for other buildings to follow her leads. As Woods says: "It is one thing to imagine Hadid's buildings as anchors in a broadly diverse landscape, but it is quite another to imagine entire districts that must conform to her designs."<sup>402</sup> In this way, her designs become

<sup>401</sup> . Woods, "Drown into space," 34.

<sup>402</sup> . Ibid, 34.





Figure 44. Dee and Charles Wyly Theatre, Dallas, Texas, 2004-2009, Rem Koolhaas, OMA, REX.  
 (Sources: <https://www.azahner.com/works/wyly-theater>,  
<https://arquitecturaviva.com/works/teatro-dee-y-charles-wyly-4>)

more of a subjective order rather than a mere promise; it becomes inclined to another truth-claiming that is ultimately metaphysical.

In Koolhaas's projects, in which there is big bulky gestures of volumes to create virtual reality to fade the distinction between inside and outside or between limitation and freedom, there seems to be a *stand of truth-claimer* that appears to be comparative aspect in analogy to the triplet strategy. However, his truth-claiming volumes have a quality of virtuality rather than reality. The triplet strategy is to challenge the thrown culture using its elements, not to ignore or escape from the thrownness by creation of some virtual reality. In some projects of Koolhaas, like other major deconstructive architecture, there is negligence of traditional and cultural forms. There is also another analogous concept in the projects of Koolhaas that is his usage of voids alongside of solid for the purpose of giving room and possibility for further recreation. In the solid-void concept, Koolhaas remains opposed to any fixed pre-designing to give space to the yet-to-come forces in re-formulation of the project. Here, the solid-void concept remains open to the unknown and casual reformation. One might argue that this allowing for further destruction and recreation in the solid-void concept has the sense of death and rebirth; however, it is not the *promise of death* or *promise of novel rebirth*. In the triplet strategy there is a disturbing integrated process out of which a trace and promise of temporality and rebirth is given. Accordingly, the project itself should give such a trace, not to remain too passively open and relative for further reconstruction. There is a difference between giving a space for possibility of death or rebirth, and displaying a promise of death or rebirth in an integrated process.

There seems metaphysical aspect in Koolhaas's project when he wants to recreate the face of a city or when he wants to create a virtual reality in a totalitarian manner. Analogous to Hadid, there is a self-given authoritative power in Koolhaas's designs that imposes and prescribes his subjective method to the traditional forms of environment. This big gesture of Koolhaas's works is more of a giving a new content rather than giving a mere promise; in other words, Koolhaas and his method claims truth that would be step into metaphysical realm.

Within some projects of Coop Himmelb(l)au, in which there is violent attack on cumulated rules, conventions, and autonomy of forms, there seems to be a *standing of truth-claimer*. The truth-claimer in some works are the familiar traditional forms, and in some other are the bulky volumes of specific forms. The strategy of Coop Himmelb(l)au is to attack the codes and forms (attack the truth-claimer) by an external force through which the final product is the captured moment of destruction. Additional to *standing of truth-claimer*, there are other comparative sides to the triplet strategy. For instance, there seems to be integrated process of destruction in which one might argue that there is a *promise of death* through this violent attack, or there is a quality of casualness within the final product. However, in the triplet strategy, the integrated process of challenging uses the same traits of the truth-claimer to show the promise of death which is less violent (or maybe peaceful) than act of killing from outside. Within the projects of Coop Himmelb(l)au, there is an attack from outside force, like a dagger that wants to rip apart buildings. The firm does not use the same codes and conventions to deconstruct it. Moreover, there can be find less of *promise*




Figure 45. Dalian International Conference Center, Dalian, China, 2012, Coop Himmelb(l)au, (Source: [https://www.archdaily.com/405787/dalian-international-conference-center-coop-himmelb-l-au?ad\\_medium=office\\_landing&ad\\_name=article](https://www.archdaily.com/405787/dalian-international-conference-center-coop-himmelb-l-au?ad_medium=office_landing&ad_name=article))

*of novel rebirth* in the projects of Coop Himmelb(l)au. The casualness within the triplet strategy is more related to *promise of novel rebirth* in which there is a production of a promise or a trace that opens a new world that overshadows the meaning of the whole project. The casualness within the projects of Coop Himmelb(l)au is the captured moment of killing or destruction.

However, there is discreet opposition toward any metaphysical fixity of forms, codes, and conventions, Coop Himmelb(l)au's projects appears to be in direct support of meaninglessness and nihilism. The firm projects seem to be less related to production of more meanings via focusing on killing both already existent meanings and possibility of meanings.

Different from other deconstructivist architects, and closer to Derrida, Eisenman's thought and project have more affiliation with the triplet strategy. In the main idea of Eisenman there lies a displaced architecture in which architecture is put in the state of in-betweenness; remaining in the continuity of tradition from one hand, and projecting toward novelty from the other. In his idea of *presence of absence*, by favoring absence (and violating the unknowability of absence), he wanted to present the absent aspect of tradition.

As can be seen, there are much relative aspect between Eisenman's thought and the triplet strategy like tradition, novel rebirth out the tradition, and absence. However, there is a difference between them. For instance, if the truth-claimer is traditional forms and elements, it should stand there to the end. One should observe the stand and the challenging process of it that gives the *promise of death*. In Eisenman's projects, the factor of *stand* is eliminated from the truth-claimer, and element of *promise* seems to be neglected from both death and novel rebirth. Eisenman subjectively reformulates the tradition in his mind (to present another absent feature of tradition) and shows a novel rebirth of tradition without showing the deconstructive process. Rather than giving the *promise of death*, the tradition is already dead in his mind, and rather than displaying the *promise of novel rebirth*, the new birth or content out of the tradition is already presented. Therefore, one could find less signs of *stand*, *promise*, or integrated




Figure 46. Taichung City Cultural Center, Taichung, Taiwan, 2013, Eisenman Architects, (Source: <https://eisenmanarchitects.com/Taichung-City-Cultural-Center-2013>)

disturbing process in Eisenman's ideology. Furthermore, he is distanced from involving individuals to have their own interpretive conclusion. For Eisenman, the final product (which is another presence of absence) as a new content is already presented without including individuals' sense-making. In this way, Eisenman becomes too subjective.

Another main aspect of Eisenman's ideology in his opposition to metaphysical thinking is to destroy the metaphysical hierarchy by detaching traditional elements from their functions (for instance, meaningless usage of elements like windows, columns without function) or by switching the traditional function of elements (for instance, giving the function division to columns rather than walls). There appear to be a nihilistic aspect in Eisenman where he destroys meanings from traditional elements or forms. This is also against the triplet strategy as there is no intention of killing the truth-claimer, but to show its temporality; to display a mere promise of death in favor of a trace of novel rebirth. For instance, if Eisenman wanted element of traditional wall to be deconstructed, first, the wall as the element of division should stand there to the end, but through an integrated process it should give the sense that the wall starts to lose its identity as element of division and gives a promise of another function.

Besides some nihilistic gestures within Eisenman's projects, there is also a metaphysical side. Denying some traditional meanings in bringing some new content




Figure 47. Opera House, Dubai, 2005, Bernard Tschumi Architects,  
(Source: <https://www.tschumi.com/projects/37>)

is already a metaphysical path. Presence of absence is just another truth-claiming of metaphysics.

Main ideology and interest of Tschumi can be realized through his handful texts. In a text<sup>403</sup>, he talks about influence of Derrida in rereading architecture. Derrida by stressing on unpredictable events against traditional architecture (that is about repetition of established patterns of forms and function), raises the idea of unleashing the event through rearrangement of architecture among architects.<sup>404</sup> According to Tschumi, deconstruction is a strategy for interpreting the world and “questioning blind dogma and rigid beliefs”, it is about “clarifying concepts and to refine understanding, uncovering contradictions and dislocating certainties along the way”.<sup>405</sup> For Tschumi, architecture is not a fixed discipline but it is a marginalization and materialization<sup>406</sup> of an idea or concept.<sup>407</sup> His main idea, against stylistic identity and synthesis, is about systematic contradictions and heterogeneity to increase the set of action by infinite movement of body through building. In another words, the idea is about designing conditions for occurrence of unpredictable event.<sup>408</sup> It seems that the event for Tschumi is the interaction (or meaning-making) of individuals with the architectural space, as

<sup>403</sup> . Bernard Tschumi, Derrida: An Ally et un Ami,” *Log*. No. 4 (Winter 2005): 117-119.

<sup>404</sup> . *Ibid*, 119.

<sup>405</sup> . *Ibid*, 119.

<sup>406</sup> . Bernard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman, “I do not mind people being innocent, but I hate when they’re naïve,” *Log*. No. 28 (Summer 2013). 108.

<sup>407</sup> . Bernard Tschumi and Enrique Walker, “Avant-Propos: Bernard Tschumi in Conversation with Enrique Walker,” *Grey Room*, No. 17 (Fall 2004). 122.

<sup>408</sup> . *Ibid*, 119-124.

he defines architecture as “meeting place between (and maybe the seam) between space and program, space and event.”<sup>409</sup>

Tschumi show his interest in continuous disjunction, disruption, contradictory, and fragmentation against whole.<sup>410</sup> For instance, about his two major projects, he insists on systematic challenge of the idea of order, unity, whole, and totality within those projects. He says:

*The Manhattan Transcripts* (1981), and the *Parc de la Villette*, now under construction, what is questioned is the notion of unity. As they are conceived, both works have no beginnings and no ends. They are operations comprised of repetitions, distortions, superpositions, and so forth. Although they have their own internal logic – they are not aimlessly pluralistic – their operations cannot be described purely in terms of internal or sequential transformations. The idea of order is constantly questioned, challenged, pushed to the edge. ... Both the *Transcripts* and *La Villette* employs different elements of a strategy of disjunction. This strategy takes the form of a systematic exploration of one or more themes: for example, frames and sequences in the case of the *Transcripts*, and superposition and repetition in *La Villette*. Such explorations can never be conducted in the abstract, *ex nihilo*. ... Hence the disjunctive strategy used both in the *Transcripts* and at *la Villette*, in which facts never quite connect, and relations of conflict are carefully maintained, rejecting synthesis or totality. The project is never achieved, nor are the boundaries ever definite.<sup>411</sup>

All in all, against majority of the other deconstructivist architects, Tschumi remains more radical against metaphysical fixity by refraining a production of some fixed content, and also by including otherness and individuals’ sense-making to have their own conclusion over the architectural projects. His strategy is to accumulate the supplies for more interaction of meanings through individuals’ interpretation beyond any imposition of intention by a designer/architect or tradition. In this way, the power is given to individuals rather than architects. For instance, in *Parc de la Villette*, there

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<sup>409</sup> Bernard Tschumi, “Ten Points, Ten Examples,” *ANY: Architecture New York*. No. 3. Electrotecture: Architecture and the Electronic Future (November/December 1993). 41.

<sup>410</sup> . Bernard Tschumi, “HOMELESS REPRESENTATION. Peter L. Wilson – Bridgebuildings + The Shipshape,” *AA Files*, No. 9 (Summer 1985). 93.

<sup>411</sup> . Bernard Tschumi, “Disjunction”, *Perspective* 23 (1987). 114-118.

is a superimposition of three-layered system (of point, lines, and surface) that makes possible for ever-changing generation of meaning through various patterns of movement and function.

There seems much relevance between Tschumi's ideology and the triplet strategy. The supplies (for more production of meaning) can be interpreted as the *standing of truth-claimer*. For instance, the three-layered system in the park is the starting point of design that remains standing there in the entire project. The challenge of each layer seems to be activated by another layer. For instance, the same distance of follies is to be challenged by different various paths between them. However, the main challenge happens in the visions of individuals to makes sense of the possible hierarchy or possible meaningful relation between the layers. The architect and the project in offering the trace (or promise of death and rebirth), completely rely on relative sense-making of individuals to produce more meanings. In this way, the role of architect reduced to be a mere crater of various supplies. In Tschumi's projects, one can find difficulty in tracking an integrated process of deconstruction. If there is such a process, it is too virtual and relative that probably the architect hopes to happen in the minds of individuals. There are some compatible aspects of Tschumi's ideology in accordance to the triplet strategy – like his refrain in giving a fixed content, meaning or truth-claiming in general, respecting individuals by letting them be in their sense-making, stand of truth-claimer, and possibility of ever-changing production of meanings – however, it seems too chaotic, relativistic, or even passive.

It seems that main conflict between the triplet strategy and Tschumi's idea revolves around notion of the event. For Tschumi, event is the interaction and meaning-making of individuals. In the triplet strategy, sense-making of individuals is the effect of the event. In the strategy, the event should be occurred within the program so it could entail promises of death and novel rebirth. The event is the hidden clue of abyss Being with the sense of pregnancy with some unknown thing; and sense-making of individuals out of the event becomes the effect of that event.<sup>412</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> . In order to clarify this notion, I would like to remind our example of visiting the internal organs of someone attacked by an animal for the first time. The event (exposed organs) already happened. As it



### 5.2.3 The triplet strategy in relation to meaninglessness

Meaninglessness or nihilism is another concept that is linked to both deconstruction and deconstructivism that can be found, for instance, in the projects of Coop Himmelb(l)au and Eisenman. Meaninglessness in deconstructive architecture is accompanied with unfunctional and anti-historical forms. The first level of the interpretive triplet strategy, which is *standing of truth-claimer*, guarantees to cover this problem of meaninglessness. The truth-claimer is already related to familiar and meaningful forms, function, history; and as there is a stand of truth-claimer, those meaningful concepts should remain in the entire project. However, the standing meaning is to be challenged in the triplet strategy, yet it is not to be destroyed in favor of nihilism. From the other hand, the third and ultimate level of the strategy is to give a promise of novel rebirth which leads to production of more meanings that is against meaninglessness. However, Derrida's deconstruction in some point has been assumed to be against reason, logic, consistency, meaning, and value of truth in general, Norris defends deconstruction against those assumptions. He says: "Deconstruction involves absolutely no slackening or suspension of the standards (logical consistency, conceptual rigour, modes of truth-conditional entailment, etc.) that properly determine what shall count as a genuine or valid philosophical argument."<sup>413</sup> Additionally, Derrida about the relation of his texts with value of truth says:

The value of truth (and all those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts ... and that within [those] contexts (that is, within relations of force that are always differential – for example, socio-political-institutional – but even beyond these determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakable, it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigour, criticism, and pedagogy.<sup>414</sup>

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happened for the first time, it bears unknown meanings for different individuals. Different individuals could have different sense making at the event. For instance, as said before, that event, for a physician, could show the possibility of further step of healing people. For another one, it could be a step further of some religious beliefs (that considered human being as divine creature of god beyond earth, animals or mundane physical mechanics.). These sense-makings are the effects of the event.

<sup>413</sup> Norris, "Deconstruction," 149.

<sup>414</sup> . Ibid, 153.



Therefore, deconstruction and the interpretive triplet strategy are not to stand against meaning, but are in favor of more production of meanings that possibly overshadows (and do not erase) the old meanings. The triplet strategy resists practice of nihilism within deconstruction. It respects for the old meanings (form, function, history) as there is the *stand of truth-claimer*. It refuses architectural signs to be meaningless (for instance, in some Eisenman's projects in which there is meaningless redundancy of architectural signs that signify nothing in order to eliminate the historical form-function bond). From the other hand, the strategy suggests a trace for more production of meanings that possibly would be different from the old ones. Therefore, deconstruction through the triplet strategy would have no relation to nihilism, but makes way for transformation of meanings.

#### **5.2.4 The triplet strategy in relation to Subjectivism and Relativism**

The fifth problem within deconstructivism is related to excessive authority that is given to either architect to manipulate or (re)create unfamiliar meanings, forms, and functions against tradition, or it is fully given to individuals to have their own sense-makings. The first part, which is related to subjective power and control of designer over the project, is visible (as said before) in the works of Libeskind, Gehry, Hadid, Koolhaas, Coop Himmelb(l)au, and Eisenman; and the second part, which is linked to relative understanding of individuals, is obvious in Tschumi's projects. Therefore, subjectivism and relativism are other problematics of deconstructivism.

One of the main outcomes of this thesis is to claim that deconstruction – through the interpretive triplet strategy – at least, has less relation to either subjectivism or relativism. Because of *stand of truth-claimer* and *promise of death*, the architect/designer has no power to destroy the old meanings, forms, and functions; also, s/he has no power to bring new content because of *promise of novel rebirth*. The

authority of architect/designer is just to give a promise (of death, and of rebirth).<sup>415</sup> In this way, deconstruction and the triplet strategy remains opposed to subjectivism.

From the other hand, however, deconstruction respects individuals to have their own meaning making, but that is not completely relative. The individuals would have their own conclusion over the project through what the project or the architect suggests. The sense-making of individuals happens through a trace, or a promise that the project gives. In this way, the application of the strategy within architecture cannot be mere assemblage of contradictories, collages, superimposition of layers that makes the project too relative. Hence, deconstruction and the triplet strategy remain against pure relativism.

### **5.2.5 The triplet strategy in relation to indifference and disengagement**

The last problematics of deconstructivism, which is at the same time the outset issue of which deconstructivism wanted to cover, is the problem of indifference and disengagement within architecture. Deconstructivism inaugurated at the time whence architecture desired to be the site of *affect* against indifference. However, the outcome of deconstructivism is resulted in exaggerated exterior appearance to evoke spatial experience (for the problem of possible indifference).

In my interpretation, as long as deconstructivism is linked to fixity of metaphysics from one hand, and to meaninglessness of nihilism and also to chaos of relativism from the other hand, it cannot cover the problem of indifference or disengagement. Metaphysics that claims unquestionable truth and meaning neglects individual's sense-makings. It ignores various context of individuals to have their own reading the product. It does not let individuals be in their meaning-making, and it detaches them as outside subject. Metaphysics brings totalitarian content and impose other readers to read the product/object as it wants. In this view, subject-object detachment happens through metaphysical truth-claiming. As far as metaphysics does not let

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<sup>415</sup> . The authority to choose the *Stand of truth-claimer* is also can be given to both designer and inhabitants.

individuals/readers be in their sense-making, there would be a gap, indifference, and disengagement between individuals and the architectural project. From the other hand, it is obvious that lack of meaning also would break the bond between people and (architectural) project. Furthermore, in my interpretation, when something is too relative that cannot be discussed in some point, makes that thing irrelevant or even meaningless. It seems that people have less care about things that cannot be communicated or shared with others.

The triplet strategy, as discussed before, remains against totality of metaphysics from one hand, and also stands opposed to nihilism and relativism from the other. The strategy includes the old meanings without destroying them (against nihilism), suggests a *promise of death* (against metaphysics), and promises a trace of novel rebirth (against relativism), and also includes individual sense-making (against metaphysics). In this way, the possibility of the triplet strategy within architecture would have lesser link to the problem of indifference and disengagement.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

In the first chapter, there is a brief introduction to Derrida's deconstruction in favor of multidimensionality of text against intention of author, and against constraints of metaphysics. Then, deconstructivism is introduced as the reaction of intervention of philosophy within architecture in the 80s. As philosophy prescribed contextualism and continuity of architecture in its history, deconstruction came to reject philosophy's prescription. However, deconstructivism resulted in exaggerated manipulation of surface and structure in general for the problem of indifference. Then, major deconstructivist architects are presented, and it is noticed the different path of Eisenman and Tschumi from the others. While Eisenman stresses on re-reading the past, Tschumi intensifies on irreducible individuality of experience. Generally, deconstructivism is criticized as meaningless, unfunctional, and anti-historical.

It seems that main critiques of deconstructivism revolves around meaninglessness, and in my interpretation, it is linked to subjectivism and relativism that leads to more chaos or indifference. There is acknowledgment of lack of proper relation between deconstructivism and Derrida's deconstruction. Mainly, the problem of this thesis lies within the lack of study between deconstructivism and Derrida's deconstruction. Therefore, the aim of study is to search for the possible missed link between deconstruction and deconstructivism beyond Derrida's keywords (that mostly applied in deconstructive architecture without deeper reflect) through Heidegger. The significance of study is aligned with significance of deconstruction that currently affected architectural practice and architectural literature. Critical position of deconstruction in theory in dealing with metaphysics, meaninglessness, and relativism from one hand, and interpretively to the problem of disengagement denotes value on its practice within architecture.

Chapter 2 starts with introduction of deconstructivism and transition of deconstruction to architecture. It is to be stated that the demand of the 80s from architecture to be the site of affect from one hand, and intervention of philosophy to architecture from the other was the main cause of intervention of deconstruction with architecture. Deconstruction came to oppose philosophical stress on aesthetics, contextuality and continuity to architecture that generally resulted in exaggerate external appearance. Then, the prominent deconstructivist architects are introduced like Daniel Libeskind, Frank Gehry, Zaha Hadid, Rem Koolhaas, Coop Himmelb(l)au, Peter Eisenman, and Bernard Tschumi. Except Eisenman and Tschumi, the others (however they had different methods) are aligned with the same gesture of deconstructivism (which is overstated visual presence). Libeskind represented subjective symbolic meanings, Gehry stressed on freedom and autonomy of forms against tradition, Hadid wanted to reformulate the environment through her totalitarian designs, Koolhaas idea of Bigness is to blur the border between freedom and limitation, Himmelb(l)au's nihilistic-related captured moment of destruction, Eisenman presented the absent face of tradition, and Tschumi caters for more interaction of individuals in their sense-makings.

In the same chapter, deconstruction is introduced against unified meaning of text, and in opposition toward metaphysical concepts like centrality of presence (presence as present and now), logocentrism (unquestioned authority of external center), phonocentrism (privilege of speech over writing), centrality of language (fixed meanings of words), and binary opposition (preference of first term over the second one). Afterwards, major concepts of deconstruction are presented like *La Différance* (that indicates meanings of words are dependent to their relation to other words), supplement (that challenges the center/margin duality), iterability (that refers to possibility of different meanings of text through various contexts), and trace (that declines existence of pure originality). In the transition of deconstruction within architecture, the keywords of deconstruction interpreted and implemented within architecture that followed emergence of concepts of deconstructivism. For instance, deconstructing traditional architectural discourse (to deny tradition and history), the non-centrality of construction (to refrain centrality within buildings), presentness (to

dismantle the conventional forms or elements with their function), free-floating signifier (to switch meaning and function of forms or element with each other), paradox (to evoke the sense of lacking presence), trace (to inaugurate designing with respect to the trace of past), superimposition of layers (to offer various possibilities for interpretation), *differance* (to postpone the ultimate meaning, form or function via interrelation of various layers), iterability (to signify different possibility of re-reading architectural forms, elements, or functions), and deconstructing binary opposition (to dismantle conventional axiomatics in architecture like form and function).

Among deconstructivist architects, Eisenman and Tschumi are expressed to be more relevant to Derrida's deconstruction. First, consistency and inconsistency of Eisenman's *displaced architecture* with Derrida is explained. The most important inconsistency of Eisenman with Derrida dwells in Eisenman's *presence of absence* and *trace*. Eisenman wanted to present the absent face of tradition by giving the priority to the second term in the duality of presence-absence, that would be eventually falling back to metaphysical thinking. Moreover, trace for Eisenman has the sense of lost origin which is inconsistent with idea of deconstruction. Also, the relation of Tschumi with main idea of Derrida on architecture has been explained. Derrida argues that architecture has been under the reign of metaphysical pattern: the law of *oikos* that repels outside and external in favor of inside and internal. For this reason, for Derrida, the most important aspect of architecture should be its openness to the other, that what he calls as arche-writing. It refers to irreducible condition of possibility of experience and of elaboration of meaning; and Derrida observes such arche-writing within Tschumi.

Afterwards, the problems are articulated. The main problems are the lack of deeper reflection on Derrida's thought beyond his keywords against metaphysics (through Heidegger), the lack of research on following the possibility of missed link between deconstruction and deconstructivism, lack of differentiation of deconstructivist architects in their relation to deconstruction, and main criticism on deconstructivism that is linked to meaninglessness, relativism, and indifference.

Chapter 3 begins with introduction of metaphysics of presence as the main thought of Western tradition. By presupposition of Being as presence, metaphysics search for absolute fixed truth in body or mind that resulted in body-mind dualism or subject-object detachment. One main effect of this thinking is to consider human being as detached subject from the objective world with no sense of unity and belonging. Caputo argues that in metaphysics, opening of Being as the realm in which entities come presence is neglected, and Being has been determined and owned by human subject.

Then, influence of metaphysical thinking on architecture explained through part-whole relationship in architectural history and effect of subjectivism and objectivism on architecture. In the part-whole relationship, there has been presence of whole over parts since Plato to the 60s. This preference has derived from two main ideologies. From one hand, Stoicism, Renaissance, Neo-classic, French Rationalism (which are inclined to Conservatism and Rationalism) including Vitruvius, Alberti, Descartes, Laugier, Durand, Le-Duc consider unity and whole as coherent combination of parts, and searches for worldly organic and original unity. In this view, preference of geometry, symmetry, ration, reason, composition, typology, and methodology in architectural history is sensed as priority of whole. From the other hand, Platonism consider whole as transcendental fixed unitary realm outside human experience in which part-whole relationship becomes relation of human with divine. In this respect, there is a metaphysical archetypal whole in which parts are the analogous representation of the whole. Related to Platonism, there are Idealism and Historicism for which there is a transcendental spirit of epoch, context, meaning, and style through which parts become symbolic representation of the whole. However, historicism's position is criticized by their own ideology that if history is needed to be interpreted in its context, those interpretations expressed in this respect are already happened in particular time and place. That opened excessive re-interpretation that shattered the idea of whole to its fragments. In this way, fragmentation and multiplicity become favored in architectural practices after the 60s (like within deconstructivism, postmodernism, hermeneutics).

Subsequently, the effect of Objectivism and Subjectivism on history of architecture is introduced. Objectivism is about to search and claim innate truth in the assumed independent existence of objective reality through pure reason, and beyond human sense-making (like context and tradition). So, it is concerned with natural code and material properties of entities. Objectivism's element of pure reason resulted in precise proportion, geometry, ratio, rational mimesis, constraint and rules within architecture that can be seen through various architects or periods like Vitruvius, Alberti, Neoclassical architecture, Enlightenment, Renaissance, French Rationalism (Le-Duc and Durand), Modern Movement's positivism. Another factor of Objectivism is to discard human sense-making that is its opposition to context, culture, and history. This effect can be traced in the history of architecture (for instance, in Stoicism, French Rationalism, and modern architecture). Another element of Objectivism is to search for worldly innate truth, unity, and originality. This worldly quest can be seen in Vitruvius's model of human body as perfection, or in Laugier's rustic hut as the original building. Also, Objectivism's stress on natural properties of outside world seems to have found its effect on architecture through aesthetics (for instance, golden ratio extracted from geometries of objective world beyond any imposed meanings) and display of characteristics of materials.

On the other hand, subjectivism is concerned with human sense making out of objective reality to provide meaning for purpose of communication. It is related to value-judgement, culture, context, tradition and history. The influence of subjectivism on architecture can be followed by various factors. For instance, in searching for some unified ideal/imaginative meaning that its source is transcendental divine, religion, culture, or spirit that can be seen in Platonic mimesis in which archetypal divine are to be copied by artists. Another effect is the idea of incompleteness of buildings that are needed to be completed by human part that can be observed within German Idealism and Historicism that stress on spirit of epoch. Major example in this regard is Semper's concept of style. Moreover, one of the main aspects of subjectivism in architecture is the signification of meaning or symbolic architecture that can be seen from Platonism to postmodernism.



Under the influence of metaphysics, in the part-whole relationship in architecture, and influence of Subjectivism and Objectivism on architecture, there is a preference and presupposition of unquestioned fixed truth, unity and whole within body/reality or mind/transcendental. After the failure of metaphysics, the idea unity/whole collapsed in favor of parts/fragments. This predilection of unity/whole, and subject-object detachment in metaphysics has derived from presupposition of Being as mere presence and appearance. It was first Heidegger who questioned Being against metaphysical thinking.

Chapter 4 starts with introduction of Heidegger's philosophy as the main source of Derrida's deconstruction. Heidegger questioned Being against metaphysical thinking of Being as self-evident unchanging presence of substance. For him, knowledge about Being derives from our interrelation and interpretation of human with beings and with its own Being. In this regard, Heidegger raises two questions: what must entities be like such that they can enter into our understanding? And what must we be like such that we can understand what entities of various type are? Heidegger starts with the second question and uses the term of Dasein (for human being) with the sense of becoming as human being seeks the highest life to become. Dasein projects toward future for becoming and having its life as a whole. Two main aspects of Dasein are its thrownness to this world with various cultures, meanings, and possibilities to be, and also its projection toward future to become. These aspects make care as character of Dasein by which things show up as existent. There are two main point within Dasein: First, Dasein as disclosedness or Dasein as the place of manifestation of world's existence (that implies the interpretive nature of the world – that things can't be known as they are but as they are manifested in the light of Dasein – and necessity of human sense-making). Second, Dasein is not detached being from the world, but its existence (projection) is already constituted by its essence (thrownness). In this view, subject-object detachment of metaphysics like Realism and Idealism is deserted. For the first question (what thing should be so we can recognize them as existent?), Heidegger's answer is that things should be ready-to-hand with sense of unity between self and things in the involved world.

Heidegger raises another question: how Dasein show up as existent? The answer is to be authentic in which Dasein unites with its own Being – in another word, authentic Dasein. Dasein by projection towards its own death realizes its individuality with the mood of anxiety, and by hearing the silent call of conscience takes responsibility for its individuality. Therefore, it resolutely searches for its being and life as united whole that would entail a challenge against both dictatorship of the they and leadership of the self (with the sense of continuous negation out of vague hope for becoming).

Later Heidegger talks about unquestionable Being, to surrender to Being, to live without why. However, it seems different from early Heidegger's idea in which authentic Dasein questions Being, but actually it is a point of perspective. Authentic Dasein should question Being in order to get rid of obstacles that prevents opening of Being. For later Heidegger, then, Dasein should surrender itself to the opening of Being, to let Being be in whatever way it wants to be without questioning it. Questioning Dasein seeks something (some unknown thing/being) to be, and in later Heidegger, unquestioning Dasein receives whatever Being bestows. There are two major points in Heidegger's philosophy against metaphysics: there is an abyss Being that Dasein belongs to it, and Dasein can unite with Being through which Dasein and beings become existent.

Based on Heidegger's philosophy, there has been an attempt to develop a strategy (which is called the *triplet strategy*) extracted out of Heidegger's fundamental elements. First element called *the stand of truth-claimer* related to thrownness of Dasein as the starting point and ground of Dasein. Second element is called *the promise of death* related to challenging and questioning aspect of authentic Dasein in which it questions thrownness of the *they* after realizing its own individuality and responsibility after facing its prospective death. One of the reasons, it is called promise of death is that, through this challenge, the old meanings come to fade away (death) in respect to projection toward futural becoming. The third element is called *the promise of novel rebirth* related to Dasein's projection towards its possible being in the future out of challenging the possibilities of the thrownness which is unique but vague. The triplet strategy is about distressed but resolute/coherent hermeneutical process of

challenging the truth-claimer without any predesigned goal/meaning as it is ultimately Being that owns Dasein and controls and bestows beings in its abyss-ness at the event of truth. In the strategy, there are senses of casualness, vagueness, mere promises rather than any concrete outcome, and opening the new world of meaning that overshadows the old ones.

Caputo recognizes both Heidegger and Derrida in an alignment of what he calls *radical hermeneutics*. Radical hermeneutics is based on idea of both Heidegger and Derrida, while the first is the father (or right wing) and second is the son (left wing). It is about original difficulty of life, stressing on radicality of hermeneutics and having watchful eye on ruptures of life/existence that stems from recognition of Being as abyss against well rounded truth offered by metaphysics. However, Derrida criticizes Heidegger for notions like authenticity (that Heidegger himself falls back to what he renounces), but Caputo indicates that Being for Heidegger is already foundationless foundation, that Heidegger already recognized Being as abyss, that radicality endures within Heidegger. According to Caputo, while Derrida denounces hermeneutical/foundation/ground aspect of Heidegger, Derrida himself has already such hermeneutical aspect which is having fixed watchful eye on the ruptures of metaphysics to shelter abyss-ness of Being. In short, both Heidegger and Derrida have both hermeneutical and radical aspect as for both Being is groundless ground. In this view, Caputo recommends for more hermeneutical reading of Derrida and for more radical reading of Heidegger. Therefore, Derrida seems to be much of the same Heidegger. However, for one the argument about Being, for another it's about text.

Therefore, recognition of Heidegger's philosophy through the triplet strategy within Derrida's strategy of deconstruction is stressed. Derrida's strategy starts with assessment of the self-referential moment within the text which is the basic metaphysical presumption of truth/meaning claiming on which entire structure of text is mounted. Then by close and critical reading, he subverts the metaphysical hierarchy between what is prioritized as center and what is renounced as secondary. By doing so, the entire structure, meaning, and truth-claiming of the text becomes inconsistent. Strategy of deconstruction corresponds to the triplet strategy derived out of

Heidegger's philosophy. For instance, deconstruction is not a method but a strategy that mounts upon another truth claiming philosophy, ideology, or meaning. So, its existence starts and depends to that truth-claimer. As Derrida indicates, deconstruction "bore from within" philosophy using its elements to dismantle it. It completely accords to *the stand of truth-claimer*. Also, there is constant challenging and negating process within deconstruction that subverts the core presumption of text in its truth claiming through which the structure of text becomes instable. In accordance with *the promise of death*, this challenge displays the eventual death of that truth-claiming. This constant negation, not only is against metaphysical presumed context, but it is also about remaining radical to its own production. This is open-ended aspect of deconstruction that remains open for more and more recreation of possible meanings. in this way, deconstruction becomes analogous to *the promise of novel rebirth*.

Chapter 5 starts with possible embodiment of the triplet strategy within architecture. For *the stand of truth-claimer*, it is suggested that architectural project should begin with some specific truth-claiming form, function, culture, tradition, method and that truth-claimer should be remained and sensed in the entire project. Such stand of truth-claimer is lesser detectable in most deconstructivism project, or tradition as one of possible truth-claimer is neglected in those projects. For *the promise of death*, it is suggested a disturbed yet integrated process of challenging the initial truth-claimer that brings it on the verge of collapse, but not destroys/kills it. For instance, in the case of form, morphology can be practical tool for this challenge. Maybe it is possible to say that death, destruction, or chaos is more visible than an integrated deconstructive challenging process. For *the promise of novel rebirth*, it is suggested that out of the challenge, one should sense a casual emergence of vague novelty, or indefinite trace of becoming, or sense of pregnancy of forms, functions, or tradition that could open new world of meaning and can be only completed in the eyes of individuals. That would be a mere promise without anything concrete that only can be completed in the minds of individuals. It seems that in some deconstructive project there is lack of such promise of possible becoming of form, function, or tradition. In this regard, some consistency and inconsistency of the prominent deconstructivist architects with the triplet strategy are presented. At the end, relation of the offered triplet strategy in

addressing the articulate problems of the thesis such as meaningless, relativism and subjectivism, and indifference or disengagement is explained.

All in all, the story of this thesis is about to say that architecture has been under the influence of metaphysical thinking since Plato (like stoicism, subjectivism, objectivism, French Rationalism, German Idealism, Historicism, modernism, etc.) by stressing on either presence, whole, reason from one hand, or spirit of epoch and meaning making by the other. These effects derive from metaphysical thinking that considers Being as fixed truth in body or mind that can be grasped within pure reason and spirit of epoch. In this thinking, human being is regarded as detached subject from the objective world. It was first Heidegger who questioned Being as fixed truth. He introduced Being as groundless ground and as the abyss, and (authentic) Dasein as the ground of Being. His philosophy marked its effect on philosophy, literature, art and architecture. One of the main figures influenced by Heidegger was Derrida who offered deconstruction. However, his argument was mainly against unified meaning within a text, he was deeply influenced by Heidegger in opposition to metaphysics. Nevertheless, the contribution of these opposition toward metaphysics affected architecture in the 60s. After the collapse of metaphysical rigidity in the decade, architecture departed toward fragmentation and parts (rather than whole). Post-modernism, Deconstructivism, Hermeneutics are among those styles that flourished after the 60s. However, they opened relation of architecture to nihilistic meaninglessness or relativistic indifference. It is the main aim of this thesis to search for the relation between deconstruction and deconstructivism with metaphysics, meaninglessness and relative indifference. After further interpretation of deconstruction through Heidegger, there emerges a strategy as a possible solution for deconstructive approaches within architecture that would be lesser linked to metaphysics, nihilism, and relativism. In this way, the most important contribution of this thesis is to remain alert against metaphysical fixity from one hand, and from the other to remain opposed to nihilistic and relativistic gesture – as the source of indifference and disengagement – within architecture.<sup>416</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> . I would like to add my interpretation of architecture in accordance with the triplet strategy. Deconstruction, generally, resulted in exaggerated appearance for spatial experience. The experience,

Concerning some current attitude of architectural practices, beyond mere subjectivism (like iconic buildings, mass production), relativism (like fragmentation), or meaninglessness (like negligence of traditional forms and functions), this thesis addresses deeper problematics within architecture including: problem of disengagement or indifference; relation and boundaries between tradition, future, becoming, programme, architect/designer, and individuals (visitors, occupants); and critical approaches within methodologies of architectural criticism (that requires to be performed in deeper ontological and epistemological enquiries.)

The rapid growth in technology opened for more subjective productions and diversity of fragmented approaches within architecture. In opposition to dominance of technology to human life – as there is unity with entities or real existence of entities through their handiness and practicality – this thesis could suggest practicality of technology for human beings in their becoming and having their life as a whole by providing conditions for emergence of event of truth, or by providing conditions for more interaction, involvement, and engagement of humans with each other, meanings, and architecture; also, by protecting the abyss-ness of Being by letting the architectural projects to remain open-ended for further production of casual meanings.

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sometimes, was unclear for the mind of visitors to complete (related to Tschumi), and sometimes were relatively carrying a specific message from the mind of architect to visitors (related to Libeskind). Deconstructive projects sometimes stand to show the different possibility of tradition (related to Eisenman), sometimes they ignore tradition (related to Gehry), or sometimes they can be angry with the tradition (related to Himmelb(l)au). And sometimes they override the face of city with new known forces (related to Hadid) or unknown forces (related to Koolhaas). But it seems that architecture, more than being about spatial experience or exaggerate appearance, is about accommodation of human being with the world; to link humans with the world as the place of in-betweenness. The world is what we are thrown into, it is the bedrock of history, culture, tradition, and meaning in general. And the most characteristic feature of human being is its projection toward future. From one hand, the future is unclear and all we can project is a trace of it. From the other, the world's meanings are temporal, and can be different based on different perspectives. Yet we have no choice but to stand on the world we are thrown with all its (however temporal) meanings. So, we stand on the claimed meaning (culture, tradition, ideology, etc.) of the world (stand of truth-claimer) knowing that it is not fixed, but temporal; that it will come to its end (promise of death), in hoping for (or better to say, having dark faith for having) some novelty out of our projection from past toward future (promise of novel rebirth). In this way, what this thesis is drawn out of Heidegger and Derrida, is compatible to architecture as the in-betweenness; linking human being with the world.

Also, there can be contribution of this thesis for the current situation of the world beyond architecture. As there is a stress on belongingness of Dasein to Being and to the world, it may implicitly suggest protection of natural sources, respecting the world with its varieties in opposition to exploiting them. That would ultimately entail lesser natural crisis like rising temperature, climate change, or extinction of various types of plants and animals. Also, this thesis, in its opposition toward metaphysical thinking, could have implicit notion to refrain from metaphysical dogmatism. Maybe one of the main problems within the middle east countries, nations, or rulers could be the adherence to metaphysical ideology like religion. As this thesis suggest let Being be, it offers let human beings be in whatever way they want to be beyond any metaphysical restrictions. (May this thesis touches humans in reconsideration of metaphysical dogmatism.) Moreover, the world today experiences various crises (like wars, terrorist attacks, Covid-19, climate change, economic recession, etc.,) that makes countries, nations, and individuals to be more conservative, frightened, and alienated. This is the problem of disengagement in general. As this thesis deals with the problem of disengagement in architecture so it can implicitly offer a possible solution for the problem of disengagement in general. This thesis supports individuals to be in their meaning-making, so it welcomes other meaning, other people, and interaction of humans for further progress. Furthermore, rapid change of the world has made a gap between generations, making them more distanced, alienated, or lost. It seems that one of the main reasons for this state of lostness is the break of new generation with their context, tradition, and history. As this thesis offers stand of truth-claimer, so it supports history and meaning. It implicitly suggests to recatch the history and old meanings as the platform to approach the novelty of future.

The argument of this thesis is also aligned to the current new paradigm of thought distancing from centrality of human that encompasses various disciplines of scholarships including new materialism, posthumanism, actor-network theory, science-technology studies, assemblage theory, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's dynamic theory, new media theory and others<sup>417</sup>. Main interest of these disciplines is

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<sup>417</sup> . Melinda, H. Benson, "New Materialism," *Natural Resource Journal* 59, no 2. (Summer 2019), 251-280.

to rethink the legacy of materialistic view of the world and the Enlightenment in which there is an assumption of human being as a detached being (human exceptionalism and anthropocentrism) who has the only capacity to act. In this traditional materialistic view, authority, centrality, and control is given to human being and nature has become his/her property to manipulate. Benson mentions that this worldview is ontologically stemmed from Newtonian physics, Cartesian epistemology and monotheistic religions.<sup>418</sup> This thesis is in direct opposition of metaphysical understanding of human being as a detached being from the world, or subject-object detachment that stemmed from Cartesian epistemology. The main gravity of the thesis revolves around (belongingness of humans to) Being itself beyond human authority and beyond any metaphysical religious perceptions. As Benson acknowledges, one of the parallel scholarships to new materialism is category of philosophy that remains opposed to metaphysical centrality. She says: “[New materialism] shares interest in ... a category of philosophy concerned mainly with a metaphysics that explicitly rejects the centrality of Kantian correlationism; object-oriented ontology; and panpsychism.”<sup>419</sup>

Old materialism supposes matter as inert, passive, fixed, determined, universal, timeless, and mechanical at the disposal of human being.<sup>420</sup> It seems that this materialistic view in architecture could suggest passiveness of architectural programme and architectural elements; that the elements are put in a fixed and timeless system or whole. It is relevant to the metaphysical view of parts in the part-whole relationship under the govern of metaphysics. However, this thesis, against passiveness, offers vibrancy to architectural programme and elements by giving a promise of temporality and novelty. In such a programme, architectural forms, elements, and functions have no fixed or dead act, but have vibrant agency for production of ever-changing acts. In this way, also, the centrality/exception of human agency is opposed.

Benson about the main interest of new materialism and those disciplines parallel to it says:

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<sup>418</sup> . Ibid, 257-259.

<sup>419</sup> . Ibid, 254-256.

<sup>420</sup> . Ibid, 257.



Collectively, they represent a move away from the centrality of the human and toward a more complex and relational perspective of art, literature, politics and other elements of lived experience. ... Scholarship and research in this area tends to intersect and overlap, collectively sharing a desire to “rethink the political, political agency and subjectivity beyond anthropocentrism”.<sup>421</sup>

To rethink the political and power distribution regarding more complex interrelated relationship between various elements of lived experience beyond human autonomy corresponds to the arguments of this thesis as it offers to rethink architectural programme and power distribution between the programme, architect, and individuals in a complex relationship beyond centrality and autonomy of human being (as it is opposed to mere subjectivism and relativism).

There can be found other parallel elements between new materialism and the arguments of this thesis. For instance, in new materialism, knowledge is not the product of investigating reality anymore, but it is “a dynamic refection of the particular arrangements of matter”<sup>422</sup>. In other words, it stresses on unknowability of matter or things as they are which is compatible to abyss-ness of Being which shows itself in the mere vague promises of the triplet strategy. In another example, in new materialism, matter is not a fixed pre-given content, but is agentic as it is “produced and productive, generated and generative”<sup>423</sup>. It seems that matter has agentic factor in the in-betweenness process which can be seen in the endless process of deconstructing and becoming in the triplet strategy.

All in all, this study criticizes ongoing architectural criticism methodologies and offers that architectural criticism would be more meaningful within the support of ontological and epistemological arguments. This thesis suggests that ontological and epistemological association of Heidegger, Derrida, and Caputo is an intellectual

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<sup>421</sup> . Ibid, 253-256.

<sup>422</sup> . Ibid, 258.

<sup>423</sup> . Ibid, 260.

necessity beyond mere decorative refinement. In this regard, there is an implicit meaning within entire thesis, that is to dig deeper and challenge more of the assumed source as truth-claimer beyond any superficial selected keywords on the surface. For this reason, it can be suggested for further interpretation of deconstructivism, one should go deeper than Heidegger himself through Meister Eckhart and Mysticism, and through Eckhart to Sufism, and through Sufism to Neo-Platonism, and so forth. In each step – which is already a challenging of previous step – there would a promise of novel rebirth, or a new world of meaning that would overshadow the entire understanding of deconstructivism, deconstruction, and Heidegger's philosophy. Such a study would entail various promises (of novel rebirth). For instance, one may find a link between architectural practice in the era where Sufism flourished in the Islamic region and practice or idea of deconstruction within architecture. That would also entail a differentiation of Islamic ideology with Sufism, and differentiation of their effect on architecture. Moreover, it would raise the question of deep relation between west and (middle) east.



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